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OUTSPOKEN ESSAYS

WILLIAM BATES, 1871-1901, D.D., LL.D.

OUTSPOKEN ESSAYS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
1891
CHICAGO, ILL.
LONDON, ENGLAND

OUTSPOKEN ESSAYS

829
In 407
Set 1

BY

WILLIAM RALPH INGE, C.V.O., D.D.

DEAN OF ELIZABETH

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

15 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK: 15 NASSAU ST. N. Y. C.
BOSTON: 15 NASSAU ST. B. C.

1897

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PREFACE

THE *Essays* in this volume, except the last, have appeared in the *Edinburgh Review*, the *Quarterly Review*, or the *Edinb. Journal*. I have to thank the Publishers and Editors of these Reviews for their courtesy in permitting me to reprint them. The articles on *The Irish Race*, *The Future of the English Race*, *Bishop Gore and the Church of England*, and *Cardinal Newman* are from the *Edinburgh Review*; those on *Patriotism*, *Catholic Modernism*, *St. Paul*, and *The Indictment against Christianity* are from the *Quarterly Review*; those on *Institutionalism and Mysticism* and *Secular and Pseumadology* from the *Edinb. Journal*. I have not attempted to remove all traces of overlapping, which I hope may be pardoned in essays written independently of each other; but a few repetitions have been avoided.

Printed in Hong Kong

Originally published in 1974 by and reproduced
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First Government printing, 1982

Library of Congress Catalogue card number: LC 82-5738

Printed by the Government of Hong Kong

1982-5738

CONTENTS

I.	Our Pioneer Discoveries	1
II.	Paradise	10
III.	The Egyptians	23
IV.	The People of the Eastern Race	37
V.	Money-Gods and the Origin of Money	109
VI.	Roman Calendar Mosaics	177
VII.	Calendar Mosaics	173
VIII.	So. Pers.	222
IX.	Decorations and Symbols	236
X.	The Treatment of the Community	242
XI.	Heaven and Immortality	259

Flower Power was published under the name

of *William Lloyd Garrison*, and the *Harvard* edition.

The name of historical writers is hard; for if they tell the truth they provoke men, and if they write what is false they offend God.—*Matthew Paris*.

Quotations must contain comprehensive notices of the whole; without, figures of individual excellence, examples, but without distortion, only names, legends, or principles, after making available some individuality, especially important.

History presents; it is the same history.

That means; and it follows not, because not.

History, even still, follows nature.

History.

And if we give nature, then the history follows.

History.

OUTSPOKEN ESSAYS

I

OUR PRESENT PROBLEMS

[JANUARY, 1918]

THE ESSAYS in this volume were written at various times before and during the Great War. In reading them through for republication, I have to ask myself whether my opinions on social science and on the state of religion, the two subjects which are mainly dealt with in this collection, have been modified by the greatest calamity which has ever befallen the civilized world, or by the issue of the struggle. I don't very much think that I should now wish to alter. The war has caused events no more fateful, but in the same direction as before. The social revolution has been hurried on; the inevitable counter-revolution has equally been brought nearer. For if there is one safe generalization in human affairs, it is that revolutions always destroy themselves. How often have histories proclaimed 'the year one'! But its revolutionary era has yet reached 'year twenty-five.' As regards the national character, there is no sign, I fear, that much wisdom has been learnt. We are more warlike and ruthless than ever. The democracy-demand still requires about democracy, though representative government has obviously lost both its power and its prestige. The labour party will keep its comprehensive insistence of economic justice. Organ-

and religion remains as important as it was before the war. But one fact has changed with startling clearness. Human nature has not been changed by civilization. It has neither been leveled up nor leveled down to an average mediocrity. Beneath the dingy uniformity of international business is done, man remains what he has always been—a splendid fighting animal, a self-sacrificing hero, and a bloodthirsty savage. Human nature is all more ruthless and harder, bolder and colder. Apart from the accumulation of knowledge and experience, which are national and persistent acquisitions, there is no proof that we have changed much since the last stone age.

The war itself, as no doubt has been called to recognition, laid its giant hand on the political and social structure of Europe. The growth of wealth and population, and the law of diminishing returns, led to a struggle for unappreciated lands producing the raw materials of industry. It was, in a way, a war of capital; but capitalism is its servant upon the body politic. It is the master of the modern world and an essential part of a living organism. The Germans unquestionably made a deep-fair play to capture all markets and cripple or ruin all competitors. Their aims and methods were very like those of the Standard Oil Trust on a still larger scale. The other nations had not followed the logic of competition in the same ruthless manner; there were several things which they were not willing to do. But war to the hilt cannot be confined to one of the contestants; the alternative, *Weltkrieg* oder *Niederzug*, was thrust by Germany upon the Allies when she chose that route for herself. If the modern man were as much dominated by economic motives as is sometimes supposed, the initial results of such a conflict would have been apparent to all; but the poetry and idealism of human nature, no longer content, as formerly, in religion, had gathered round a romantic patriotism, for which the intelligentsia were willing to sacrifice their all without counting the cost. Like other civilizations, patriots were from a noble devotion to a moral cause.

But there was another cause which led to the war. Germany was a curious combination of irreconcilable century

theory and every modern practice. Its Emperor ruling by divine right was the head of the most scientific state that the world has seen. In many ways Germany, with an intelligent, organized, and energetic Government, was a model to the rest of the world. But the whole structure was sustained by that form of individualistic materialism which calls itself social democracy, and which in practice is at once the copy of vulgar materialism and the reaction against it. The motives for drilling a whole nation in the pursuit of purely national and purely materialistic aims are not strong enough to prevent dissipation. The German Empire was falling to pieces through internal causes. A successful war might give the empire a new lease of life; otherwise, the rising tide of revolution was certain to sweep it away. As Sir Charles Wilson has shown, it was for some years doubtful whether the democratic movement would obtain control before the necessary and army which succeeded in perpetrating a war. There was a kind of race between the two forces. This was the situation which Lord Balfour found still existing in his famous visit to Germany. In the event, the conservative powers were able to strike and to rattle public opinion. Perhaps the necessary war started along by its own momentum. Two or three years before the war a German publicist, replying to an invited Englishman, who asked him who really directed the policy of Germany answered: 'It is a difficult question. Nominally, of course, the Emperor is responsible; but he is a man of words, not a strong man. In reality, the machine runs itself. Whether it is carrying us to some of us know; I have towards some great disaster.' This seems to be the truth of the matter. No doubt, a remarkable imperialism, with dreams of extending the empire of Charles V., was a factor in the criminal enterprise. No doubt the national ambitions of officers, and the greed of contractors and speculators, played their part in promoting it. But when we consider that Germany held all the winning cards in a game of powerful penetration and economic competition, we should attribute to the Imperial Government a stronger responsibility if we did not conclude that the political

condition of Germany itself, and the automatic working of the machine, were the main reasons why the attack was made. There is, in fact, abundant evidence that it was so. The island failed only because Germany was foolish enough to threaten England before settling accounts with Russia. But this, again, was the result of internal pressure. Hamburg, and all the interests which the empire stands for, stand here for expansion in the East than for the capture of markets overseas. For this important reason of conservative Germany, England was the enemy. In the gambler was thrown down to the whole civilised world at once, and the odds against Germany were too great.

For the time being, the world has no example of a strong monarchy. The three great European empires are, at the time of writing, in a state of deep dislocation. The victors have sprung to the welcome conclusion that democracy is everywhere triumphant, and that hence long an older type of civilised state will cease. The amazing predictions of American political thought average this conclusion without danger; and our public men, some of whom, doubtless know better, have served the needs of the moment by effusions of political rhetoric which almost outpace the wildest delirium every year on the Fourth of July. But no historian can suppose that one of the most widespread and successful forms of human association has been permanently extinguished because the United Empire was not quite strong enough to conquer Europe, an attempt which has always failed, and probably will always fail. The issue is not fully decided, even for our own generation. The monarchy will belong to that nation which is the best organised, the most strenuous, the most intelligent, the most united. Before the war time would have limited its power Germany as holding this position; and until the downfall of the Empire the nation seemed its pattern there qualities undisputed. The three Empires collapsed in hidden chains as soon as they deposed their monarchs. In the case of Russia, it is difficult to imagine any recovery until the monarchy is restored; and Germany could probably be well advised to procure some number of the imperial family as constitutional sovereigns. A monarch desperately

opposes his subjects better than an elected assembly; and if he is a good judge of character he is likely to have more capable and loyal advisers. President Wilson's declaration that 'a standing consent for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations; for no autocratic government could ever be trusted to keep faith with us, is one of the most childish exhibitions of doctrinaire intellect which ever proceeded from the mouth of a public man. History gives no confirmation to the theory that popular governments are either more moral or more pacific than among monarchies. The late Lord Salisbury, in one of his articles in the *Quarterly Review*, speaks the truth on this subject. 'Moderation, especially in the matter of territory, has never been a characteristic of democracy. Whenever it has had free play, in the ancient world or the modern, in the still hemisphere of the east, a blood for empire and a readiness for aggressive war has always marked it. Though governments may have an appearance and even a reality of pacific intent, their action is always liable to be impeded by the violent and vehement operations of more ignorance.' The United States are no exception to this rule. They have extended their dominion by much the same means as the empire of the Turks or our own. Texas and Upper California, the Philippines and Porto Rico, were annexed hostilely; New Mexico, Idaho, and Louisiana were bought; Florida was acquired by treaty; Maine ceded from Canada. In no case were the wishes of the inhabitants consulted. Our very experience of repudiation is the same. It was during the short period when Great Britain had no king that Fremont's court-pier, Richard Maxwell, urged him to complete his glorious career by dissolving our present alliance

O Queen be, no long, no dead,
To Italy as thou wilt.

On the other hand, some of the 'autocrats' wanted this war. The Kaiser was certainly pushed into it.

Democracy is a form of government which may be rationally defended, not as being good, but as being less bad than any other. Its strongest motive seems to be:

first, that the citizens of a democracy have a sense of proprietorship and responsibility in public affairs, which in times of crisis may add to their bravery and endurance. The determination of the Federals in the American Civil War, and of the French and British in the First World War, against Germany, may be legitimately adduced as arguments for democracy. When De Toqueville says that "it is hard for a democracy to begin or to end a war," the answer is that that is true. And, secondly, the educational value of democracy is so great that it may be held to counterbalance other defects. Not desiring in the case of democracy merely to be proved that "it promotes a better and higher form of national character than any other policy," most governments by democracy commit the faultless, narrow, the superficial, and destroy the power of initiation. "The perfect commonwealth," says Mr. Emerson, "is a society of free men and women, each at once ruling and being ruled." It is also fair to argue that monarchies do not escape the worst evils of despotism, for monarchy is often obliged to oppress the educated classes and to perpetrate the worst, brutal, uneducated cruelties with impunity, and only feel "judgment belaboured and conscience seared." If an autocrat does not rest on the army, which leads to the chaos of praetorianism, it must rely on "pious abolitionists." Even so, the worst of the worst faults of democracy, without its advantages, as Mr. Graham Wallas says: "When a Tyrant or a democracy finds itself forced to govern in opposition to a vague national feeling which may at any moment smother its overwhelming national purpose, the national becomes the best stronghold of despotism, and runs up social or religious or racial hatred, or the love for foreign war, with less scruple than a newspaper proprietor under a democracy." The national, in fact, is often a slave, as the despotism is often a tyrant. Lastly, the democrats may urge that one of the commonest accusations against despotism—that the populace chooses its rulers badly—is not true in times of great national danger. On the contrary, it often shows a sound instinct in finding the strongest man to carry it through a crisis. As such were the periods

and modern are despised, and a Napoleon or a Buchanan is given a free trial, though he may have despised all the despised acts. In other words, a democracy sometimes knows when to abdicate. The enemies of revolutionists are left an argument against democracy, since revolutionists are anything rather than democratic.

Nevertheless, the indictment against democracy is a very heavy one, and it is worth while to state the main items in the charge.

1. Whatever may be truly said about the good sense of a democracy during a great crisis, at ordinary times it does not bring the best men to the top. Professor Henderson, in his admirable 'Democracy at the Crossroads,' collects a number of weighty opinions confirming this judgment. Carlyle, who proclaimed the merits of slavery in some thirty volumes, blames democracy for ignoring the "wieldy, stout men" who could serve it best, and placing power in the hands of "weaklings." Hooker, Matthew Arnold, Sir James Spenser, Sir Henry Maine, and Lordy, all agree that "the people have for the most part neither the will nor the power to find out the best men to lead them." In France the denunciations of democratic politicians are so general that it would be tedious to enumerate the writers who have uttered them. Our example will suffice; the words are the words of Wendell Phillips in 1855:

The wider the circle from which politicians and state functionaries are recruited, the lower comes their intellectual level to have work. The deterioration in the personnel of government has been yet more striking from the moral point of view. Politics have tended to become more corrupt, more dishonest, and to call the hands of those who take part in them and the men who get their living by them. Political parties have become too selfish and too rigid and too have inspired enmities in the nation and most upright nations by their violence and their intrigues. The class of the nation is more than one century are showing a tendency to have nothing to do with them. Politics is an industry in which a man, to prosper, requires less intelligence and knowledge than industry and capacity for intrigue. It has already become in some states the most ignominious of careers. Parties are organized for exploitation, and the honest become ever more obnoxious.

A later account of French politics, drawn from broader knowledge and experience, is the remarkable novel, '*Les Morts qui parlent*,' by the Viscount Le Faguet. Readers of this book will not forget the description of the house de laire in which a new deputy at once finds himself plunged, and the reading of corruption which sets into the whole system. It is no wonder that the majority of Frenchmen do not care to amend their votes. In 1901, 3,500,000 votes were given, 8,200,000 abstentions did not go to the poll. The moral of democracy is the new corruption in an house. We must respectfully submit that Louis Brinard was right when he said, 'Five people take the trouble to persuade the people, except those who see their interest in deceiving them.'

4. The democracy is a ready victim to idealistic and extreme, as all demagogues know too well. 'The abstract idea,' as Scheler says, 'is the national element of popular thought, the total form of thought which, for want of solid knowledge, operates in a vacuum.' The politician has only to find a fascinating formula; facts and arguments are powerless against it. The art of the demagogue is the art of the parent; he must utter some sentence endorsed again and again, working on the suggestibility of the crowd. Archbishop Turpin, '*On the Family of Man*,' notices this fact of psychology and the use which is commonly made of it.

If I marked any further evidence of the moral atmosphere which words diffuse, I would ask you to observe how the last thing men do, when engaged in controversy with others, is ever to assume some honorable name to themselves, such as, if possible, shall keep the whole subject in dispute, and on the same time to call on their adversaries a name which shall place them in a false and disadvantageous or wrong light. A deep instinct, deeper perhaps than man give any account of to themselves, tells them how far this will go; that multitude, utterly unable to weigh the arguments on one side or the other, will yet be susceptible of the influence which these words are conscious, however imperceptibly, diffusing. We imagined they might hope to gain even the reason of a few, but by help of these ill-chosen the prejudices and passions of the many.

The chief instrument of this loose art is no longer the public speech but the newspaper.

The psychology of the crowd has been much studied lately, by Le Bon and other writers in France, by Mr. Mosier Fuller in England. I think that Le Bon is in danger of making *The Crowd* a mystical, supernatural thing. Of course, a crowd is made up of individuals, who remain individuals still. We must not accept the studied idea of Rousseau and the sociologists, "*The General Will*," and turn it into an *esprit*. There is no General Will. All we have a right to say is that individuals are occasionally guided by reason, *crowds never*.

3. Several critics of democracy have accused it not only of such irrationalism, but of absolute conservatism and conservatismism. It seems unreasonable to charge the same persons with two opposite faults; but it is true that where the popular emotions are not touched, the masses will cling to old abuses more tenaciously than the élite. As Maine says, universal suffrage would have prohibited the spinning-jenny and the power-loom, the threshing-machine and the Crompton calculator; and it would have restored the *Sturges*. The theory of democracy—our people can do—is a pure superstition, a belief in a divine or natural mission which does not exist. And superstition is usually obstructive. "We used the temporary weaknesses of democratic politics (as eternal truths); and having accepted as gospels the passions of our fathers, we perpetuate them as obstacles to the progress of our children."¹

4. A more serious danger is that of reaction and impulsive tyranny. This is caused partly through public opinion, a vulgar, impatient, anonymous tyrant who deliberately makes the implement for anyone who is not content to be the average man. But partly it is even in constant interference with the Legislature and the Executive. No man can govern who cannot afford to be unpopular, and no democratic official can afford to be unpopular. Sometimes he has no wish to be a tyrant (imperial autocrat); at other times a historical imagination compels

¹ *Mass History*, Supplement, July 14, 1911.

him to policies which forbid the citizens to indulge profusely in luxury tastes, or tax him to contribute to the pleasure of the majority. In many ways a Russian under the Tsar was far less indulged with than an Englishman or American or Australian.

5. But the two diseases which are likely to be fatal to democracy are anarchy and corruption. A democratic government is almost necessarily weak and timid. A democracy cannot tolerate a strong executive for fear of losing the control just out of the hands of the mob. The executive must be weakened and debilitated. The result is that it is at the mercy of any violent and sectional faction. No civilized government has ever given a more humiliating and humiliating object-lesson than the Chamber and House of Commons in the years before the war, in face of the outrages committed by a small gang of fanatic anarchists. The legislation of corruption by the trade-unions was too flagrant a surrender to be hidden, but it was even more flagrant. None could be surprised when, during the war, the Government started from dealing with irreconcilable conspiracy in the same quarter.

The House for May 14, 1917 contained a noteworthy example of justice influenced by pressure, and therefore applied with English inequality. In parallel columns appeared reports of 'organized crime' and 'strong trade-unionism.' The former told the full gravity of their mischievous business as body of reliable opinion maintained them. The latter, who were stated to have committed offences for which the maximum penalty was penal servitude for life, got off scot-free because they were members of a powerful organization which was able to bring immense weight to bear on the Government.*

The 'immense weight' was, of course, the threat of virtually betraying the country to the Germans. The country is at this moment at the mercy of any factional faction which may choose either to hold the community to ransom by paralyzing our trade and channels of supply, or by organized violence against life and property. Democracy is powerless against sectional anarchism.

* *Illustration, Democracy at the University*, p. 42.

and when such movements break out there is no remedy except by substituting for democracy a government of a very different type.

Democracy is, in fact, a disintegrating force. It is strong in destruction, and tends to fill its place when the work of destruction (which may of course be a necessary task) is over. Democracy dissolves communities into individuals and collects them again into mobs. It pulls up by the roots the social order which civilization has gradually evolved, and leaves nothing but an empty stage in ruins of the best novels, tragedies and histories, with no place ready for them to fill. It is the opposite extreme to the caste system of India, which, with all its faults, does not seem to have the European type of stage, the remedy of society as such.

4. The corruption of democracy proceeds directly from the fact that one class imposes its laws and another class pays them. The constitutional principle, 'No taxation without representation,' is utterly out of sight under a system which leaves certain classes without any effective representation at all. At the present time it is said that one-third of the population pays five-twentieths of the taxes. The class which imposes the taxation refused to touch the burden of the war with one of its fingers; and every month new claims on the public exchequer are distributed under the coverings of 'social reform.' At every election the worldly goods of the minority are put up to auction. This is the worst feature of the old-fashioned election bribery, which was a comparatively honest deal between two parties; and in its effects it is far more ruinous. Democracy is likely to perish, like the monarchy of Louis XVI, through national bankruptcy.

Under these defects, the democracy has ethical standards of its own, which differ widely from those of the educated classes. Among the poor, generosity ranks far below justice, sympathy below truth, love below chastity, a pleasant and obliging disposition below a rightly honest one. In brief, the low standards of intellect required for the practice of any virtue, the highest in

stands in popular estimation.¹ In this country, at any rate, democracy means a victory of sentiment over thought. Some may prefer the other type of character, and may hope that it will make civilization more humane and sympathetic than it has been in the past. Unfortunately, experience shows that none is so cruel as the disillusioned sentimentalist. He thinks that he can touch or ignore nature's laws with impunity; and then, when he finds that nature has no sentiment, he jumps like a mad dog, and rushes with his theoretical objections to capital punishment a head to murder all who disagree with him. This is the ground of Jacobinism and Bolshevism.

But whether we think that the bad in democracy predominates over the good, or the good over the bad, a question which I shall not attempt to decide, the popular fallaciousness about it corresponds to its real character. The upper class has never believed in it; the middle class has the strongest reasons to hate and fear it. But how about the lower class, in whose interests the whole machine is supposed to have been set going! The working man has no respect for either democracy or liberty. His whole interest is in transferring the wealth of the minority to his own pocket. There was a time when he thought that universal suffrage would get for him what he desired; but he has lost all faith in constitutional methods. To keep blacked in the community, under threats of civil War, meant to him a more expeditious way of gaining his object. Monopolies are to be established by gross coercion of those who wish to keep their freedom. The trade unions are huge capitalists; they are well able to shut factories for themselves and work them for their own exclusive profit. But they find it more profitable to hold the nation to ransom by blocking the supply of the necessities of life. The new laborer despises productivity for the same reason that the old soldier harvests did: it is too trouble to take money there to make it. The mass evangelism popular leaders no longer conceal their contempt for and rejection of democracy. The socialist preaches the

¹ Wm E. Leary. No. 53 *glens Republic* has said the same.

irreconcilable contradiction between the two ideas; and they are right. Democratic institutions consist of inherent or loyal partialities. When these are absent in manifest form, Syndicalism, which seems to be growing, is the antipode of socialism, but, like socialism, it can make no terms with democracy. "If syndicalism triumphs," says the great prophet bold, "the parliamentary system, so dear to the individuals, will be at an end." The syndicalist has contempt for the vulgar idea of democracy; the vast anonymous mass is not to be taken into account when the minority wishes to act as no to handle it.¹ "The effect of political majorities," says Mr. Leavis, "is to hinder advance." Accordingly, political methods are rejected with contempt. The minorities go one step further. Edmund produces that "we reject all legislation, all authority, and all influence, even when it has proceeded from universal suffrage." These powerful movements, opposed as they are to each other, agree in rejecting the very idea of democracy, which Lord Morley defines as government by public opinion, and which may be defined with more precision as direct government by the votes of the majority among the adult members of a nation. Even a political philosopher like Mr. Lewis Dickinson says, "For my part, I am so disgusted."

What then are the friends of this various faith, so quaintly called democracy? It appears to have none, though it has been the subject of intense speculation ever since the time of Rousseau. The Americans have become bored by it, but they are themselves ruled by the Boss and the Trust.

The attempt to justify the labour movement as a legitimate development of the old democratic liberalism

¹ Professor Dickinson quotes: "It is a opposition between an individual man his principle position of his principle democraticism. It is a question the mysterious principle of what authority and the effect of the principle of it democratic or it is not." (Leavis). "Democracy must be left to the masses and must not be taken away from the idea and institutions of democracy" (Dickinson). "The democratic ideal is in contradiction with itself, and it is in contradiction with itself" (Dickinson).

² A. L. Lewis, *Syndicalism and the General Strike*.

in truth. Freedom in these combinations is no doubt a logical application of labour's aims; and the anarchistic possibilities latent in labour aims have been made plain in the anti-fascist movements of labour. But Liberalism rested on a too favourable estimate of human nature and on a belief in the law of progress. As there is no law of progress, and as civilised society is being destroyed by the evil passions of men, Liberalism is, for the time, quite discredited. It would also be true to say that there is a fundamental contradiction between the two dogmas of Liberalism. There even, that unlimited competition is stimulating to the competitors and good for the country, and that every individual is an end, not a means. Both are anarchistic; but the first logically issues in individualistic anarchy, the last in communitarian anarchy. The economic and the ethical theory of Liberalism cannot be harmonised. The rough-and-ready competition tempered by an ethical process of consideration in favour of the individual was by no means satisfactory. But it was better than what we are now threatened with.

That the labour movement is economically naive is in easy to prove. In the words of Professor Buchanan, 'the government has ceased to govern in the world of labour, and has been compelled, instead of governing, to follow, to adjust, to beg, to grovel. It has purchased labour peace at the cost of increasing losses of output drawn from the diminishing resources of the patient community. It has substituted on a system of payment of blackmail which must end either in national bankruptcy or in the social revolution which the anarchists seek.' The powerful trade unions are now plundering both the owners of their 'plant,' and the general public. It is easy to show that their members already get much more than their share of the national wealth. Professor Hawley¹ has estimated that an equal division of the national income would give about £185 a year to each family, less of course. But even this estimate, discouraging as it is, cannot not be taken sufficiently far into fact that under the present system

¹ *The Statistics of the Production of Industry.*

much of the income of the richer classes is created value at their time over. Jewish large incomes, and Jewish profits, wages, fees, special and not skill like that of the operating engineer and industrial perfect painter, but all at least of their money value. All the large professional incomes, except those of the few convention and his like, are made out of the rich, and are created at least twice for income-tax. It is certain that a large part of the national income could not be 'withstanded,' and that in the attempt to do so credit would be destroyed and wealth would melt like a snow man. The rich, therefore, are not making justice; they are blackballing rich and poor alike by their monopoly of one of the necessities of life. And now they stand against paying income-tax!

It is not necessary or just to bring railing accusations against any class as a body. Power is always abused, and in this case there is much honest ignorance, stimulated by agitation who are selfish human. In a recent number of the *Edinburgh Review* Sir Lyndal Murray speaks of the widespread, almost universal, delusion to which the hand-worker has fallen a victim. They believe that all their aspirations can be realized out of present-day profits and production. They believe that in protesting against they are performing a moral duty in their class. They do not believe that the prosperity of the country depends upon its production, and are opposed to all labor-saving devices. They refuse co-operation because they desire the continuance of the class-war. Such pervading would seem hardly creditable was not attested by overwhelming evidence. The Government remedy is first to create unemployment and then to remove it—the shortest and maddest road to ruin since the downfall of the Roman Empire.

We may have a false hope that some of these illusions will be abandoned by the workman when their destructive results can no longer be concealed. But sentimentalism seems to be inevitable. It craves indignation into an act of religious faith, gives them rise to the emotion of pity, and thinks that it is imitating the Good Samaritan by relieving the Priest and Levite for the benefit of the man by the

road-side. The sentimentalist shows a bitter hatred against those who wish to cure an evil by removing its names. A good example is the language of writers like Mr. Thornton about capitalism and population. If social problems were treated rationally, the trials of the emotional sentimentalists would be gone.

We have seen that democracy—the rule of majorities—has been described and abandoned in action, though officially we all bow down before it. Another popular delusion is that the chief change in the last fifty years has been a conversion of the world from individualism to socialism. In the language of the Christian socialists, who wish to combine the socialist spirit and organization of medieval Catholicism with a bid for the popular vote, we have ‘socialized the Corporate Idea.’ But if we take socialism, not in the narrower sense of collectivism, which would be an economic experiment, but in the wider sense of a loose conception of the solidarity of the community as an organic whole, there is very little truth in the commonly held notion that we have become more socialistic. It is easy to see how the idea has arisen. It became necessary to find some theoretical justification for rising taxes, no longer for national needs, but for the benefit of the class which imposed them; and this justification was found in the theory that all wealth belongs to ‘the State,’ and may be justly divided up as ‘the State’—that is to say, the majority of the voters—may determine. Whenever the question arises of voting now (due to the dominant notion of the people of the expense of the minority), our new political philosophers profess themselves fervent socialists. But true socialism, which is almost synonymous with pacifism, is as conspicuously absent in those who call themselves socialists as it is strong in those who repudiate the title. This paradox can be easily proved. The most socialistic strategy in which a nation ever engages is in a good war. A nation at war is conscious of its corporate unity and its common interests, as it is at no other time. The nation then calls upon every citizen to surrender all his personal rights and to offer his life and limbs in the service of the community. And what

has been the record of the 'evolutions' in the struggle for national independence in which we have been engaged! In the years preceding the war they collected the idea that the country was in danger of being attacked, and used all their power to prevent or have preparing against attack. They strongly opposed the teaching of patriotism in the schools. When the war began, they prevented the Government from introducing compulsory service until our French Allies, who were left to face the huns, were on the point of collapse; they, in very many cases, refused to serve themselves, thereby proving that, so far as they were concerned, they were willing to see their country conquered by a horde of cruel barbarians; and they nearly haltered just our studies to distraction by incessant statements the most critical periods of the war. Their attitude cannot be accounted for by any conscientious objection to violence, which is in fact their favorite weapon, except against the enemies of their country. Their evolution is, in truth, individualism run mad; it is the very antithesis to the consciousness of organic unity in a nation, which is the spiritual basis of evolution. In this sense, the nation as a whole has shown a fine evolution; but the deplorable exception has been the socialist party. The intense and perverted individualism of the so-called socialist is shown in another way. Whatever freedom a State may possess in its citizens, it is certain that no nation can be in a healthy condition unless the government keeps in its own hands the keys of birth and of death. The State has the right of the farmer to decide how many cows should be allowed to graze upon his acres of grass; the right of the forester to decide how many squares feet are required for each tree in a wood. It has also the right and the duty of the gardener to pull up noxious weeds in his flower-beds. But the socialist reluctantly repudiates both these rights. Being an individualist, he is in favour of laissez faire, where laissez faire is most indefensible and most disastrous.

It would be easy to maintain that the organic idea was more potent, both under medieval feudalism and under absolutism, than it is now. In

largest step, economic and social equality were not even aimed at, because it was thought inevitable that in a social system there must be subordination and a hierarchy of functions. Essentially, and in the sight of Christ, all are equal, or, rather, the essential difference between man and man are absolutely independent of social status. In a few years Lazarus may be in heaven and Dives in hell. Under this equality of moral opportunities and tremendous inequality in self-chosen destiny, the status of master and servant seemed of small importance. It was a temporary and trivial accident. Accordingly, in feudal times, as today in really Catholic communities, feelings of injustice and social bitterness were seldom expressed and class differences take on a more genial colour. In spite of the lawlessness and brutality of the Middle Ages it is probable that men were happier then than they are now.

The French Revolution, which was a disintegrating event, pulverised society, and was imposed by accident on it. Yet under the industrial system which followed it in this country, the nation was conscious of its unity. The system was the best that could have been devised for increasing the population and aggregating wealth of the country; and even those who suffered most under it were not without pride in its results. The ill-paid workmen of the last century would have thought it a poor thing to do a deliberately bad day's work.

I am not passing either the age of feudalism or the "Hungry Forties" of the nineteenth century. In the latter case especially the suffering started from the poor was too great for the rather vulgar means of which it was the result. But to call that age the period of individualism, and our own generation the period of socialism, is in my opinion a profound mistake. In Germany, too, the real socialists are not the "Spartanist" revolutionaries who have betrayed and ruined their country, but the bureaucracy with their Deutschnote and *Alles*. If I were a little more of a socialist, I would almost believe them, in spite of all their claims.

The landed gentry (and in Germany I must add the

endured sleep) was a survival of feudalism, as the capitalist is a survival of industrialism. Both have to a large extent survived their functions. The enriched farmer, reared where barbed wire the parents and others gathered for protection, has become the country gentleman, upon whom the industrial is not so much that his only parasite is pleasure, as that his only pleasure is pain. 'The rich man is his wife, the poor man is his gate' were *intelligible* while the rich man protected the poor man from being plundered and killed by marauders; but in our time nobody wants a castle or to live under the shadow of a castle. The clerical profession was a necessity when most people could neither read nor write. But to-day our best prophets and preachers are laymen. As at ancient Athens, in the time of Aristophanes, 'the young learn from the schoolmaster, the mature from the poets.' Similarly, the captains of industry cannot hold the same authoritative position as formerly in view of the growing intelligence and capacity of the workman; and the capitalist who is not a captain of industry is a debtor to the community to an extent which he does not always realise. This class is becoming painfully conscious of its vulnerability.

There are, therefore, occasional eruptions in our social order; and though it may be proved that they are not a serious burden on the community, it is natural that popular literature and discussion should focus upon them and exaggerate their evil results. It cannot be disputed that this literature and discussion were becoming very acute in the years before the war. An increasing number of persons saw no meaning and no value in our civilization. This feeling was common in all classes, including the so-called labour class; and was strong that many welcomed with joy the clear call to a plain ship, though it was the duty of being all the horrors of war. What is the cause of this discontent? There are few more important questions for us to answer.

There should be more in the education of the workman which we have mentioned are certainly mistakes. It is no new thing that there should be a small class more or less parasitic on the community. The whole number

of persons who pay income-tax in ENGLAND numbered upwards of only 12,000 out of 40 millions, and their wealth, if it could be divided up, would make no appreciable difference to the working man. The wages-slaves are better off than they have ever been before in our history, and the danger of revolution comes not from the poor, but from the privileged artisans who already have incomes above the family average. We must look elsewhere for an explanation of social unrest. If we consider what are the chief causes of discontent throughout the civilized world, we shall find that they are the great aggregations of population in working industrial conditions. Social unrest is a disease of over-life. Whenever the conditions which create the great modern city exist, we find revolutionary agitation. It has spread to Hawthorne, to Boston, Lyons, and to Osaka, to the miles of the factory. The inhabitants of the large town do not copy the countryman and would not change with him. Poor, unknown to themselves, they are leading an unnatural life, cut off from the kindly and wholesome influences of nature, surrounded by vulgarity and ugliness, with no traditions, no legends, no culture, and no religion. We seldom reflect on the strangeness of the fact that the modern working-man has fire in his aspirations. At other times the masses have evolved for themselves some phantasmagoric nature-religion, some phantasmagoric morality, some cult of saints or heroes, some system of fasting, gluttony, or abstinence, and a mass of quaint superstitions, good or evil-doing. The modern town-dweller has no God and no love: he lives without awe, without admiration, without love. Whatever we may think about these beliefs, it is not natural for men and women to be without them. The life of the town artisan who works in a factory is a life in which the human organism has not adapted itself; it is an unnatural and unnatural condition. Hence, probably, comes the modern which makes him think that any relief change must be for the better.

Whatever the cause of the illness may be said, I do not pretend that the conditions of urban life are an adequate explanation of the misery in towns, and will probably prove

ideal to our civilization. I have given my views on this subject in the essay called *The Future of the English Race*, and yet there is a remedy within the reach of all if we would only try it.

The essence of the Christian religion is the proclamation of a standard of absolute values, which contradicts at every point the estimation of good and evil current in "the world." It is not necessary, in such an essay as this, to write out the *Parables*, or the very numerous passages in the *Gospels* and *Epistles* in which the same lessons are rehearsed. It is not necessary to remind the reader that in Christianity all the paraphernalia of life are valued very lightly; that all the good and all the evil which make or define a man have their seat within him, in his own character; that we are sent into the world to suffer and to conquer suffering; that it is more blessed to give than to receive; that love is the great secret of the enjoyment of life; that we have here no everlasting city, and must therefore set our affections and lay up our treasures in heaven; that the things that are seen are temporal, and the things that are not seen are eternal. This is the Christian religion. It is a form of idealism; and idealism means a belief in absolute or spiritual values.

When applied to human life, it introduces, as it were, a new currency, which demotes the old; or gives us a new scale of prices, in which the cheapest things are the dearest, and the dearest the cheapest. The world's standards are quantitative; those of Christianity are qualitative. And being qualitative, spiritual goods are unlimited in amount; they are increased by being shared; and we rich nobody by taking them.

Realists ask, in effect, what Christianity has done or proposes to do to make mankind happier, by which they mean more comfortable. The answer is, — yet it is a form intelligible to the questioner, that Christianity increases the wealth of the world by creating new values. Wealth depends on human valuation. For example, if women were sufficiently well educated not to care about diamonds, the Kimberly mines would pay no dividends, and the mine in Fick Lane would go down. The price

of paintings by old masters would decline if millions were preferred to collect another kind of works to decorate their residences. Bacheliers and company-promoters live on the widespread passion for acquiring money without working for it. It is hardly possible to estimate the increase of real wealth, and the decrease of waste, which would result from the adoption of a rational, well-meaning Christian, valuation of the good things of life. I have dealt with this subject in the essay on *The Justification against Christianity*, and have emphasized the importance of taking into consideration, in all economic questions, the human state of production, the factors which make work pleasant or tedious, and especially the moral condition of the worker. Christ will diminish the toll which labour takes of the labourer; every man labourer really increases it while they diminish its product. It is, of course, impossible that the worker should not cease having to devote his life to making what is useless or mischievous, and to submitting to the irrational wastefulness of luxury. Christianity, by condemning the selfish and irresponsible use of money, seeks to remove one of the chief causes of social suffering. Christian civilization is the best friend of revolution.

The abuse passed upon 'the old political economy,' as it is called, is only half deserved. As compared with the human distress now in harrow with the working-man, the old political economy was sound and sensible. Hard work, thrift, and economy in production etc., in truth, as we used to be told, the only ways to increase the national wealth, and the contrary propositions only led to economic ruin. There is not much fault to find with the old economists so long as they recognized that their science was an abstract science, which for its own purpose dealt with an unreal abstraction—the 'economic man.' Every science is obliged to follow one aspect of reality in this way. But when political economy was treated as a philosophy of life it began to be mischievous. A book on 'the science of the stomach,' without knowledge of physiology or the working of other organs, would not be of much use. Man has never been a merely acquisitive

being; for example, he is also a fighting and a praying being. If our dominant motive were changed, the whole civilization dealt with by political economy would change with them. There have been civilizations in which the passion for accumulation was comparatively weak; and naturally there are many persons in whom it is wholly absent. Devotion to art, to scientific investigation, and to religion is strong enough, where it exists, to kill "the economic man" in human nature. A civilized nation becomes its idealists, and recognizes the immense benefit which they render on the community by creating or revealing new and inalienable values; in an uncivilized country they can hardly live. Darwin and William Morris saw, and doubtless exaggerated, the danger to which spiritual values were exposed at the hands of the dominant economic. The danger now is that neglect of the simplest economic laws may plunge the nation into such misery that the people will no longer be willing to support art, science, learning, and philosophy. A large section of the labour party has the same standard of values as the hated 'capitalist,' and detests those whom it calls intellectuals and sky-pilots because they deprecate the economy which their class, no less than the capitalist, believes to be the only moral economy.

It may be asked whether there is any reason to think that there is now less regard for the higher, the qualitative values of life, than at other periods. My opinion is that ever since the time of Rousseau and his contemporaries, we have been led away by a willful discovery akin to the apocalyptic dream of the Jews in the last two centuries before Christ, dreams which also filled the minds of the first generation of Christians. The Greeks never made the mistake of shoving their heads into the future, a practice which, as Dr. Harnack has said, "is the death of all true idealism." The belief in "a good time coming" is a Jewish delusion. It withheld the Jews in their smouldering hostility, and led to the annihilation of their State which, to the very end, they saw in their dreams treating all other nations with a rod of iron, and breaking them to pieces like a potter's vessel. But, as our

Islamism is better than none, the Hebrew race has won remarkable triumphs, though of a kind which it never desired.

The myth of progress is one form of apocalypticism. In France it began with sentimentalism, developing normally into homicidal mania. In England it took the form of a kind of Theodosian religion. As a reward for our national virtues, our population expanded, our exports and imports went up by leaps and bounds, and our empire received additions every decade. It was plain that when Christ said 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth,' He was thinking of the British Empire. The whole structure of our social order encouraged the measurement of everything by quantitative standards. Everyone could understand that a generation which needs sixty million tons must be five times as divided as one which only needed twelve. Thus the frenzied 'law of progress' was exemplified in that nation which had least deserved to be its exponent. The myth in question is that there is a natural law of improvement, manifested by greater complexity of structure, by increase of waste and the means to satisfy them. A nation advances by division into wealth and population, and by multiplying the necessities and paraphernalia of life.

Belief in this myth has vitiated our natural science, our political science, our history, our philosophy, and even our religion. Science declared that 'the survival of the fittest' was a law of nature, though nature has continued to cultivate the majestic animals of the savanna era, and has carefully preserved the frog, the lion, and the splendourous pallid.

We stand as a mile on each other,
When nature's the toughest survival.

It is this parody of this doctrine. In political science, by a political machinery, the actual evolution of European government was assumed to be in the line of upward progress. Our literature continued the brightened condition of past ages with the high morality and general enlightenment of the present. In philosophy, the problem

of evil was met by the theory that though the Devil is not omnipotent yet, He is on His way to become so. He cannot well, and if we give Him time, He will make a real success of His creation. Human beings, too, commonly make a very poor thing of their lives here. But continue their existing after they are dead and they will all come to perfection. We have been living on this unshaken illusion for a hundred and fifty years. It has driven out the two illusions, of which it is a substitute, and has made the deeper and higher ideal of religious faith abnormally difficult. Even the hope of immortality has degenerated into a belief in apparitions and voices from the dead.

Nature knows nothing of this precious law. Her design is not the material life, nor even the spirit, but the drive—the violent drive, according to Samuel Butler, "Man eat flesh, flesh eat man, man eat man again." Some stars are getting hotter, others colder. Life appears at a certain temperature and is extinguished at another temperature. Evolution and involution balance each other and go on concurrently. The normal condition of every species on this planet is not progress but stasis; and none. 'Progress,' so-called, is an incident of adaptation to new conditions. Foxes and cats must have spent millions in perfecting their organization; now that they have reached a stable equilibrium, no more change is perceptible. The "progress" of humanity has consisted almost entirely in the transformation of the wild man of the woods, not into some apes but into some fish, man the toolmaker, a genus of which nature suppresses her partial disapproval by plugging so much diverse stupidity and taking away our teeth and claws. It is not certain that there has been much change in our intellectual and moral endowments since pre-historic times dropped the first half of his name. I should be very loath to maintain that the Germans of to-day are morally superior to the army which defeated Quisling's Nazis, or that the modern Turks are more humane than the hordes of Timur the Tartar. If there is to be any improvement in human nature, look we must look to the latest science of eugenics to help us.

It is not easy to say how this world of progress seems to take hold of the imagination, in the world of science and experience. Quaint speaks of the "fetichistic epidemic" of historians, of which there have certainly been some strange examples. We can only say that evolution, like other religions, needs an mythology, and has produced one. A more sceptic generation than ever looked forward to a gradual extension of busy industrialism over the whole planet; the progress ideal of the masses seems to be the greatest villain of the greatest monster, or a Fabian formula of tame heresies, or the American an ice-water-drinking generosities. But the expectation cannot flourish much longer. The period of expansion is over, and we must adjust our view of earthly goodness to a state of decline. For no nation can flourish when it is the ambition of the large majority to put its frequency and take not sleepless. The middle-class will be the first victims; then the privileged aristocracy of nations will exploit the poor. But trade will also wings and migrate to some other country where labour is good and comparatively cheap.

The disappointment of a selfish man gives a wonder full to existence. In the time of decay and disintegration which has fallen on, some persons will seek consolation where it can be found. "Happiness and unhappiness," says Spinoza, "depend on the nature of the object which we love. When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will arise concerning it, no sadness will be felt if it is perished, no envy if it is possessed by another; no love, no hatred, no disturbance of the mind. All these things arise from the love of the perishable. But love for a thing eternal and infinite leads the mind wholly with joy, and is itself translated with one notion; whence it is greatly to be desired and sought for with our whole strength." It is well known that these noble words were not only chosen, but the expression of the working faith of the philosopher; and we may hope that many who are doomed to suffer hardship and pollution in the evil days that are coming will find the same path to a happiness which cannot be taken from them. Spinoza's words, of course, do not point only to religious theories and meditation. The

spiritual world includes art and science in all their branches, when these are studied with a genuine devotion to the Good, the True, and the Beautiful for their own sakes. We shall need 'a revival' in our Europe from religious life hereafter; for the new forces are almost wholly cut off from the previous traditions which link our civilization with the great men of the past. The possibility of another dark age is not remote; but there must be enough who value our last traditions to preserve them till the next spring-time of civilization. We must take long views, and think of our great-grandchildren.

It is tempting to dream of a new Renaissance, under which the life of reason will at last be the life of mankind. Though there is little sign of improvement in human nature, a herculean conjunction of circumstances may bring about a civilization very much better than ours to-day. For a time, at any rate, war may be practically abolished, and the military question may find another and a less poisonous outlet. 'Sport,' as Emerson says, 'is a liberal form of war stripped of its complications and indignity; a national act and the expression of a civilized instinct.' The art of living may be taken in hand seriously. Some of the ingenuity which has lately been lavished on engines of destruction may be devoted to improvements in our houses, which should be easily and cheaply put together and able to be carried about in sections; on labour-saving devices which would make servants unnecessary; and on international campaigns against disease, some of the work of which could be accomplished in one or twenty years of concerted effort. A scientific civilization is not impossible, though we are not likely to live in one it. And, if science and humanity can work together, it will be a great age for mankind. Such hopes as these must be allowed to float before our minds; they are not unreasonable, and they will help us to get through the twentieth century, which is not likely to be a pleasant time to live in.

Some writers, like Mr. H. G. Wells, recognizing the danger which threatens civilization, have suggested the formation of a society for mutual encouragement in the higher life. Mr. Wells developed this idea in his 'Modern

Temple." He contemplated a best husband, like the Japanese Samurai, living by a Rule, a kind of lay monastic order, who should endeavor to live in a perfectly rational and wholesome manner, so as to be the nucleus of whatever was best in the society of the time. The scheme is interesting to a Philologist, because of its resemblance to the Order of Chivalry in the "Mephisto." A very good case may be made out for having an Order of moral and physical ascetics, and educating them with the government of the country. Plato looks his guardians to own wealth, and thus secured an unswerving administration, one of the rarest and best of virtues in a government. But political events are not moving in this direction at present; and the question for us is whether those who believe in science and humanism should attempt to form a society, not to reform the country, but to protect themselves and the ideas which they wish to preserve. But I agree with Mr. Wells' second thought, that the time is not ripe for such a scheme. Philately, "the greatest new highlighting in the world's history," appeared, as he says, in its age of disintegration, and "we are in a symbolic rather than a disintegrating phase. . . . Only a very real and terrible overpopulation can, I think, change this state of affairs." The vast population has increased, and the stage of disintegration, which Mr. Wells might perhaps have seen approaching even eleven years ago, has already begun. But it will have to go further before the need of such a society is felt. The time may come when the oppressed classes, and those who desire freedom to live as they think right, will find themselves oppressed, not only in their home life by the tyranny of the land-owners, but in their work by the greedy and wasteful conditions of low-morality. Then a league for national protection may be formed. Much working out must be doing the following principles are, I think, necessary for its success. First, it must be on a religious basis, since religion has a cohesive force greater than any other bond. The religious basis will be a bond of Christian Platonism and Christian

¹ First and Last Things pp. 147-8. Published in 1889.

Sweden, where it must be founded on that basis, in absolute spiritual values which is common to Christianity and Paganism, with that steady defiance of opinion and popular folly which was the hallmark of Luther. First, it must not be affiliated to any religious organization; otherwise it will certainly be exploited in denominational interests. Thirdly, it must include some purely disciplinary institutions, such as bathhouses for students and scholars for men, and both costly dresses and jewelry for women. This is necessary, because it is more important to keep out the half-hearted than to increase the number of members. Fourthly, it must prescribe a simple life of duty and discipline, where idleness will be a condition of expiring self-respect and freedom. Fifthly, it will require the choice of an open-air life in the country, where possible. A whole group of French writers, such as Frothingham, Deherville, Lucotte de Lisle, Fauriol, Lefebvre, and Faguet agree in withdrawing our social machine to life in great towns. The lower death-rooms of country districts are a hint from nature that they are right. Sixthly, every member must pledge himself to give his best work. As Dr. Jukes says, "Producers of good articles support each other; producers of bad despise each other and hate their work." It may be necessary for those who recognize the right of the laborer to possess his self-respect, to make him in order to satisfy each other's needs in resistance to the trade-union. Seventhly, there must be provision for community life, like that of the old monasteries, for both sexes. The members of the society should be encouraged to spend some part of their lives in these institutions, without retiring from the world altogether. Temporary 'retreats' might be of great value. Intellectual work, including scientific research, could be carried on under very favorable conditions in these by monasteries and convents, which should contain good libraries and laboratories. Lastly, a collective dress, not merely a badge, would probably be essential for members of both sexes.

This last paragraph tempts me to add that the Government would do well to appoint at least a Royal

Commission, or, rather, two Commissions, to decide on a compulsory national uniform for both sexes. Reports should recommend the most comfortable, becoming, and economical dress that could be devised, with considerable variety for the different trades and professions. Such a law would do more for social equality than any regulation of taxation. It has been often noticed that every man looks a gentleman in India; and it is to be feared that every war bride has suffered a painful surprise on seeing their husbands for the first time in civilian garb. There need be no suggestion of imitation about the new costume; but a man's walking might be spoiled, like the name of his regiment, on his shoulder-straps, and the absence of such a badge would be regarded as a disgrace, whether the subject was a tramp or one of the aristocracy. This suggestion may seem trivial, or even ludicrous; and I may be excluded of my diatribe of meddling legislation; but the importance of the philosophy of clothes has not diminished, since 'Barney Ransome.' Clerical dignitaries might be tempted to vote for this mitigation of their lot.

Some may wonder why I have not expressed a hope that the guardianship of our intellectual and spiritual inheritance may pass into the hands of the National Church. I heartily wish that I could cherish this hope. But organised religion has been a failure ever since the first quarrel between Church and State under Constantine the Great. The Church of England in its corporate capacity has never seemed to represent anything but organised force. In the sixteenth century it proclaimed Henry VIII the Supreme Head of the Church; in the seventeenth century it pointedly upheld the 'right divine of Kings to govern wrong'; in the eighteenth and nineteenth it was the champion supported of the aristocracy and plutocracy; and now it preaches before the working-man, and supports every scheme of glorifying the minority. In fact, we must distinguish sharply between ecclesiasticism, theology, and religion. The issue of ecclesiasticism is a political question. In the opinion of some good judges, the ecclesiasticism now dominant in Europe will quickly pass away, and a deep well spring will between the 'Black

‘*Intervention*’ and the ‘*Real*’ Catholics, it is supposed, will shelter all who dread revolution and all who value traditional civilization; its unqualified opposition will make it the one possible centre of resistance to anarchy and barbarism, and the conflict will go on till one side or the other is crushed. This prediction, which opens a truly appalling prospect for civilization, might be less terrible if the Church were to open its arms to a new Renaissance, and become more more, as in the beginning of the modern period, the house of learning and the patroness of the arts. But we must not overlook the new and growing power of science; and science can no more make terms with Catholic archaism than with the Revolution. The Jacobins galled the *Intervention*, ‘*having no need of churches*’; but the Church burnt *Desire* and imprisoned *Odier*. Science, too strong to be crushed again, may come between the two enemies of civilization, the *Robespierres* and the *Ultramarines*; it is, I think, our best hope.

I am conscious that I have spoken with too little sympathy to men or two of those men who stand the *Régime* party. I was more afraid of it a few years ago than I am now. The Oxford movement began as a late wave of the Romantic movement, with words even less upon the past. But Romanticism, which lives on ruins, shrinks from real restoration. Modernism is a *Realist* only when seen from a close distance. To the movement in coming to his either medieval or Catholic or Anglican; it is becoming definitely *Roman*. But a *Roman* Church in England which always the Pope is an *absurdity*. Many of the character High Churchmen are, as I have said in this volume, throwing themselves into political agitation and intrigue, for which Catholics always have a great aptitude; but this involves them in another inconsistency. For Catholicism is essentially international and uninterested, though it keeps a ‘*secret*’ upon its *talents*.’ The spirit of Catholicism breathes in the Third Cause of the ‘*Paradise*,’ where Dante sets the soul of a friend whom he finds in the lowest circle of *Paradise*, whether he does not desire to go higher. The third region: ‘*Brother, the love of charity quins me with, making us wish only for what we have and desire*

for nothing more. If we desired to be in a similar spirit, our dissent would be dissident with the will of those who have allied us our dissenters. . . . The manner in which we are ranged from step to step in this kingdom pleases the whole kingdom, as it does the King who gives us the power to will as he wills.' Accordingly, those ecclesiastical notions of democracy put a strange force upon that rule as legislative for the Church. The High Church scheme (coloured the other day by a small majority) for drawing up a constitution for the Church, constituted in dominating the large majority of the electorate and reserving the initiative and vote for the House of Lords (the Bishops). In fact, the constitution which our Catholic dissenters would like best for the Church closely resembles that of Great Britain before the last Reform Bill. In the same way the ritualistic clergy, while professing a superstitious reverence for the episcopal office, make a point of flouting the authority of their own bishop. The movement, in my opinion, is beginning to break up, and there will be the chief gain. But many of its leaders have been among the glories of the Church of England, and I could never speak of them with disrespect.

Catholicism, whether Roman or Anglican, stands to lose heavily by the decay of institutionalism as an article of faith. It is becoming impossible for those who mix at all with their fellow-men to believe that the grace of God is distributed disinterestedly. The Christian vision, as far as we can see, flows impartially in the souls of Catholic and Protestant, of Churchman and Separatist, of Anglican and Quaker. And the text, 'by their fruits ye shall know them,' cannot be easily rejected by any Christian. But Imperial institutionalism has been the driving force of Catholicism as a power in the world, from the very first. The Church has lived by its monopolies and composed by its intoleration. The war has given a further impulse to the fall of this belief, which, with its dogmas, Latin evolution walls, robes, was tottering before the crisis came.

— The prospects of Christian theology are very difficult to estimate; and I am so-overwhelmed myself of the uncertainty

of the Catholic theology based on Scholasticism, that I cannot view the matter with impartial detachment. We all tend to prefer the triumph of our own opinions. But, whatever else, I am convinced, be relegated to the system of *ipse dixit*. It is not likely, perhaps, that the progress of science will increase the difficulty of believing things; but it can never again be possible to make the tenets of religion depend on physical persons having taken place as records. The Christian revolution can stand without them, and the rulers of the Church will soon have to recognise that it very much incline it does stand without them.

I have already indicated what I believe to be the essential parts of that revolution. Whether it will be followed by a larger number of persons a hundred years hence than is day depends, I suppose, on whether the nation will be in a more healthy condition than it is now. The chief evil in Christianity is materialism; and this creed has some fatal disappointments in store for its worshippers. I cannot help hoping that the human race, having taken its accustomed wrong path except the right one, may yet turn attention to the proper way that leadseth unto life. In so doing, the Church will undoubtedly have a hard battle to fight. The younger generation has discarded all talismans, and in matters of sex we must be prepared for a period of unbridled license. But such lawlessness brings about its own cure by creating disgust and shame; and the institution of marriage is far too deeply rooted to be in any danger from the revolution.

I have, I suppose, made it clear that I do not consider myself specially fortunate in having been born in 1846, and that I look forward with great anxiety to the journey through life which my children will have to make. But, after all, we judge our generation mainly by its surface currents. There may be in prospect a change of intellectual habits which we cannot see. There are signs of coming and signs of passing: the brilliant epoch may be those in which spiritual wealth is squandered, the epoch of apparent decline may be those in which the race is re-creating what an interesting effort. To all appearance, man has

will a good part of his long hair before him, and there is no reason to suppose that the horses will be less generous of mind and spiritual strength than the poet. The source of all good is like an inexhaustible river; the Chinese poets find new treasures of goodness, truth, and beauty for all who will love them and take them. "Knowing that LIFE is not what we feel," as Emerson says, "whatever the thing in God's hand is safe for mortals." The half-bred world is the subject of man, in which we are fitted to live as humans. We are led to set our feet upon it, but its heart beats within us; it can reach us when we pass through it. I will therefore call these thoughts on the present distant train with two messages of courage and confidence, not from Emerson, but rather from Blake.

That thou be true, thyself is heaven,
 The meaning for the world such a tale
 How it has lived, how up the wilderness
 Forth, forth, forth! Forth, forth, up to the wall!
 Know thy nature, look up, thank God of all;
 Where the heart, and in the arm that side;
 And neither shall depart, if it be death.

And this:—

Joy and we are never free,
 A seeking for the soul divine
 Finding every great and good
 From a joy and other things
 It is right to stand to us;
 What can make us joy and we,
 And when we are fallen from
 Truly, through the world we go.

PATRIOTISM

[1914]

THE sentiment of patriotism has seemed to many to mark an arrest of development in the psychological expansion of the individual, a halfway house between mere self-contentment and full human sympathy. Some moralists have condemned it as pure egotism, magnified and disguised. "Patriotism," says Frost, "is an almost perfect projection based on an extended selfishness." Mr. Wood Allen calls it "a vulgar vice—the national or collective form of the mercenary instinct." Mr. Herbert Ellis allows it to be "a virtue among barbarians." For Richard Spenner it is "often egotism—extended selfishness." These critics have made the very common mistake of judging human emotions and sentiments by their roots instead of by their fruits. They have forgotten the Aristotelian canon that the 'nature' of anything is its completed development (i. e. *quod erat actus*). The human will, as we know it, is a transitional form. It had a humble origin, and is capable of indefinite enhancement. Ultimately, we are what we love and care for, and no limit has been set to what we may become without ceasing to be ourselves. The man in the man with our love of country. No limit has been set to what our country may come to mean for us, without ceasing to be our country. Marcus Junius reflected himself—"The great man, this city of Greece; shall not I say, that city of God?" But the city of God is, which he wished to be was a city in which he would still live as 'a Roman and an *optimus*.' The citizens of Ithaca knew that it was his

deep to 'best formations' on earth, though he was not obliged to immerse his hands with 'Cremation.'

Patriotism has two roots, the love of clan and the love of home. In migration follow the former about roots; in settled communities direction of sight are often forgotten. But the love of home, as we know it, is a gentler and more spiritual bond than clanship. The good home is associated with all that makes life beautiful and earnest, with tender memories of joy and sorrow, and especially with the first eager outlook of the young mind upon a wonderful world. A man does not as a rule feel much sentiment about his London home, still less about his office or factory. It is for the home of his childhood, or of his ancestors, that a man will fight most readily, because he is bound to it by a spiritual and poetic tie. Emerging from this source, the sentiment of patriotism endures with varying as a whole.

Both forms of patriotism—the local and the racial, are frequently allied with almost, necessarily or habitually narrow. The local patriot thinks that Pudding, and not Paris, is the place for pleasure, or asks whether any good thing can come out of Bantock. To the Chinaman all ideas are 'either barbarous' or 'foreign devils.' Admiration for ourselves and our institutions is too often measured by our contempt and dislike for foreigners. Our own nation has a peculiarly bad record in this respect. In the reign of James I the Spanish ambassador was frequently insulted by the London crowd, as was the Russian ambassador in 1880; and, apparently, because we had a burning grievance against either of these nations, but because Spaniards and Russians are very unlike Englishmen. That at least is the opinion of the majority of people on the basis of these incidents. 'Lord! to see the absurd nature of Englishmen, that cannot believe laughing and joking at anything that looks strange.' Deben says that the English are 'the most stupid people alive' in language, with the note that 'all men think an Englishman the devil.' In the 17th and 18th centuries Scotland seems to have looked on a foreign country, and the presence of Scots

in London was much excited. Cleveland thought it worth the while :—

That Cain knew best, God would have changed his doom ;
But tried his wiles, but could not win him home.

And we all remember Mr. Johnson's gift.

British patriotic arrogance culminated in the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century : in Lord Palmerston it found a champion at the head of the government. Goldsmith describes the bearing of the Englishman of his day :—

Pride in their park, shame in their eye,
I see the looks of human-kind pass by.

Michael French in England "found pride personified in a people," at a time when the characteristics of Germany were "a profound imprudence." It may be doubted whether even the arrogant hostility of the modern French is more offensive to foreigners than was the calm and haughty assumption of superiority by our countrymen at this time. Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers were quite of Milton's opinion, that, when the Englishman writes something unusually great and difficult to be done, he attributes it to his Englishness. The world's his characteristic was probably much more the result of mental ignorance than of a deep-seated pride. "A generation or two ago," said Mr. Joseph Hardy, "patriotism was largely fed and fostered upon national ignorance and contempt." The Englishman sincerely believed that the French rebelled mainly upon dogs, while the Frenchman was equally convinced that the rule of wire at Southfield was one of our national institutions. This foolish notion of international misunderstanding has become less dangerous since the facilities of foreign travel have been increased. But in the relations of Europe with alien and independent civilisations, such as that of China, we still see brutal arrogance and vulgar ignorance profusing their natural vices.

Another cause of perverted patriotism is the intense popularity of the life insurance. This species is the most cruel and destructive of all that infect the planet. It

the lower animals, as we call them, were able to formulate a religion, they might differ greatly as to the shape of the benevolent Deities, but they would surely all agree that the devil must be very like a big white man. Mr. McDougall¹ has lately raised the question whether civilized man is less gregarious than the savage; and he answers it in the negative. The Europeans, he thinks, are among the most sociable of the human race. We are not allowed to knock each other on the head during peace; but our civilization is based on cut-throat competition; our favorite games are mimic battles, which I suppose affect the *instinct of the combatant*² similar to that which doubtless originated in witnessing the performance of a tragedy—and, when the fit comes on, we are ready to engage in wars which cannot fail to be disastrous to both combatants. Mr. McDougall does not regard this disposition, emotional though it is. He thinks that it tends to the survival of the fittest, and that, if we substitute civilization for savagery, which on other grounds might even be assumed advantageous, we shall have to call in the science of eugenics to save us from becoming as degenerate as the Chinese. There is, however, another side to this question, as we shall see presently.

Another instinct which has supplied fuel to patriotism of the lower sort is that of territoriality. This instinct, without which even the most rudimentary civilization would be impossible, began when the female of the species, instead of carrying her foetus on her back and following the male to his breeding grounds, made some sort of a lair for herself and her family, where primitive hygienic and means of food could be kept. There are still tribes in Brazil which have not reached this last step towards domestication. But the instinct of hoarding, like all other instincts, tends to become hypertrophied and perverted; and with the institution of private property comes another institution—that of plunder and brigandage. In private life, no motive of action is so potent as powerful and as persistent as acquisitiveness, which, unlike most other desires, knows no satiety. The average man is sick

¹ In his *Introduction to Social Psychology*.

enough when he has a little more than he has got, and not till then. The acquisition and possession of land reflects this desire in a high degree, since land is a visible and inalienable form of property. Consequently, as soon as the instincts of the individual are transferred to the group, territorial aggrandizement becomes a main pre-occupation of the state. This desire was the chief cause of wars, while kings and nobles regarded the territorial gains which they ruled as their private estates. Whichever despotic or feudal conditions survive, such ideas are likely still to be found, and to cause dangers to other states. The greatest ambition of a modern emperor is still to be called *emperor* as a "Mikado des Mikado."

Capitalism, by separating the idea of property from any necessary connection with landed-estate, and democracy, by denying the whole theory on which dynastic wars of conquest are based, have both contributed to check this, perhaps the worst kind of war. It would, however, be a great error to suppose that the instinct of aggrandizement, in its old and barbarous form, has lost its hold upon even the most civilized nations. When an old-fashioned big game sportsman, and gets himself at the head of his nation, he betrays at once a popular hero. By any rational standard of morality, his greater moral delinquencies than Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. But they are still names to conjure with. Both were men of singularly lucid intellect and entirely unclouded consciences. Their great achievement was to show how under modern conditions aggressive war may be carried on without much loss except to human life in the slaughter. They tore up all the conventions which regulated the conduct of warriors, and refused to be done brigandage and terrorism. And now, after a hundred years, we see these methods deliberately revived by the greatest military power in the world, and applied with the same ruthlessness and with an added potency which makes them more infamous. The perpetration of the same calculated acts carries with it the same fear on the part of the victim, the system of extortion, the unscrupulous dividing, the robbery. It must, indeed, be a bad name that cannot stand on the

support of the large majority of the people at the beginning of a war. Propaganda, greed, mere enthusiasm, the contagion of a crowd, will fill the streets of almost any capital with a shouting and jostling mob on the day after a war has been declared.

And yet the motives which we have commented are plainly statistic and pathological. They belong to a mental condition which would condemn an individual to the prison or the gallows. We do not argue seriously whether the career of the highranger or briglar is legitimate and desirable; and it is impossible to maintain that what is disgraceful for the individual is creditable for the state. And apart from the consideration that posthumous posthumous defiance is not and never is helpful in the eyes of the world, subsequent history has fully confirmed the moral instinct of the ancient Greeks, that national honour or injustice (*klêro*) brings its own severe punishment. The imaginary dialogue which Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Athenian and Melian envoys, and the debate in the Athenian Assembly about the punishment of revivified Mycenæ, are intended to prepare the reader for the tragic fate of the Melian expedition. The same writer describes the breakdown of all social morality during the civil war in words which seem to herald the destruction not only of Athens but of Greek freedom. Machiavelli's *Prince* shows how history can repeat itself, reminding us hence that a nation which gives itself to internal aggrandisement is far on the road to degeneration. Seneca's words to his slaveholding countrymen, 'Can you complain that you have been robbed of the liberty which you have yourselves abolished in your own houses?' applies equally to nations which have enslaved or exploited the inhabitants of subject lands. If the Roman Empire had a long and glorious life, it was because its methods were liberal, by the standard of ancient times. In so far as Rome showed her power, she suffered the doom of all tyrannies.

The illusions of imperialism have been made clearer than ever by the course of modern history. Attempts to destroy a nationality by overthrowing its government,

improving its language, and advancing its science, are never successful. The experiment has been tried with great thoroughness in Poland; and the Poles are now more of a nation than they were under the oppressive feudal system which existed before the partition. Our own empire would be a brilliant nation if it were any part of our ambition to Anglicise other races. The only English parts of the empire were waste lands which we have peopled with our own emigrants. We hoisted first the French flag in Canada, with the motto that *Canada is now the only flourishing French colony*, and the only part of the world where the French race increases rapidly. We have helped the Dutch to multiply with almost equal rapidity in South Africa. We have added several millions to the native population of Egypt, and still a hundred millions to the population of India. Recently, the Americans have made Cuba for the first time a really Spanish island, by driving out its independent Spanish governors and an alienating immigrants from Spain. On the whole, in imperialism, nothing fails like success. If the conqueror oppresses his subjects, they will become heretical patriots, and sooner or later have their revenge; if he treats them well, and 'governs them for their good,' they will multiply faster than their rulers, till they claim their independence. The Englishman now says, 'I am quite content to have it so'; but that is not the old imperialism.

The notion that frequent war is a healthy tonic for a nation is scarcely tenable. Its dynamic effect, by eliminating the strongest and healthiest of the population, while leaving the weaklings at home to be the fathers of the next generation, is no new discovery. It has been supported by a succession of men, such as Tacitus, Polibius, Fœnelon, de Laplace, and Richet in France; Treitschke and Schenk in Germany; Guicciardini in Italy; Kollège and Stuart Forbes in America. The case is indeed overwhelming. The last century and a half are nearly all males, thus disturbing the sex equilibrium of the population; they are in the prime of life, at the age of greatest fecundity; and they are picked from a hot net of which from 10 to

30 per cent. have been rejected for physical weakness. It seems to be proved that the children born in France during the Napoleonic wars were poor and undersized—30 millimetres below the normal height. Was combined with religious inability to risk Spain. "Famine makes men and makes them," said a Spanish writer. "This epidemic and terrible plague came up the whole of Spanish history." Another was right: "Famine has killed everything but justice." We in England have suffered from this scourge in the past; we shall suffer much more if the trial generation.

We have fed our men for a thousand years,
And the wolf is still wolf.
Though there were a wave of all her waves,
But make our English dead.

We have stored our land in the wolf's throat,
To the dark and the devouring gulf,
I thank for the price of humanity,
Lord God, we be' paid in full.

Aggressive patriotism is thus condemned by common sense and the verdict of history as less than by morality. We are entitled to say to the militarists who threaten war in Spain:

"The doctrine of force has now been rejected and found wanting. And this doctrine must have saved the rest—that we ought to be more afraid of doing than of suffering wrong; and that the prime business of every man (and nation) is not to make good, but to be good, in all private and public dealings."

If the nations would realize something more than lip-service to this principle, the abolition of war would be within sight: for, as Burke says, waiting the judgment of the Epistle of St. James, "The best reason for all wars, and for the intensity of national enmities, is that the majority of persons, high and low, in all European countries, are thieves." But it must be remembered that, in spite of the proverb, it takes in making only one to make a quarrel. It is useless for the sheep to jump headlong in

to root of vegetation, while the soil remains of a different symbol.

Our own conversion to patriotism, though slow, is somewhat recent. Our literature does not reflect it. There is hardly a military:

above all, for empire and greatness. It is perhaps most, that a nation its political aims, or their political means, study, and comparison. For the things which we formerly have spoken of are two institutions towards us; and what is patriotism without intention and will? . . . It is no claim that a man greatness is that he must understand, that it is not to be in the mind upon. It is enough to point out; that to know, which does not directly prove them, may look to have greatness fall into their hands.

A state, therefore, 'ought to have those living or existing, which may reach forth upon those just notions of war.' Shakespeare's 'Henry V' has long not unanimously acknowledged by the Germans as 'good war-teaching.' It would be easy to compile a volume of brilliant maxims from our literature, reaching down to the end of the 18th century. The change is perhaps that has in progress in making them to that political good sense which has again and again saved our ship through dangerous waters. But there has been some real advance, in all civilized countries. We do not find that men talked about the 'bankruptcy of Christianity' during the Napoleonic campaign. Even the Germans think it necessary to tell each other that it was Religion who began this war.

But, though piety and imperialism have been the two inspirations of much misdirected patriotism, better motives are generally mingled with these patriotic instincts. It is the noble blood of noble and ignoble sentiment which makes patriotism such a difficult problem for the mind. The patriot nearly always believes, or thinks he believes, that he desires the greatness of his country because his country stands for something intrinsically great and valuable. When this conviction is shared we almost speak of patriotism, but only of the religion of a well-path. The Greeks, who at last perished because they could not combine, had nevertheless a consciousness

that they were the teachers of civilization against barbarism; and in their day of triumph over the Persians they were filled, for a time, with an almost Jewish sense in position of the righteous judgment of God. The "Fervor" of *Archelaus* is one of the noblest of patriotic poems. The Romans, a harder and crueller race, had their ideal of order and justice, which included simplicity of life, dignity and self-control, honesty and industry, and devotion to the state. They rightly felt that these qualities constituted a mission to Europe. There was much hardship and injustice in Roman imperialism; but what soldier spirit could come from the British empire sterner than the tribute of Chastan, when the weary Roman was at last stricken and dying:

*Non est, in gentium vultu quis esse populi,
transcensque patet cunctos amens horridi
males non dominat vix, streperet remora
quis domat, utique pro linguas verba?*

Jewish patriotism was of a different kind. A federation of seven Hebrew tribes, managed small hostile populations, and set in the midst of rival empires against which it was impossible to stand, the Israelites were hampered by misfortune from the most insuperable of all obstacles, a theology. Their religion was to them what, in a wider degree, Roman Catholicism has been to Ireland and Poland, a compensation of patriotic faith and hope. What did save the Jews hated because they hated foreigners more than they loved God. They have had good reasons to hate foreigners. But unfortunately the effect of their hatred has been that the great gifts which their nation had to give to humanity have come through other hands, and we have failed to gratitude. In the first century of our era they were called to an almost unquestioned absorption of their hereditary inflexibility, and they could not rise to it. An almost every other nation would have done, they chose the lower patriotism instead of the higher; and it was against their will that the religion of civilized humanity grew out of Hebrew soil. But they gained this by their choice, tragic though it was, that they have stood

by the grasp of all the empires that oppressed them, and have preserved their social integrity and traditions in the most adverse circumstances. The history of the Jews also shows that oppression and persecution are far more efficacious in binding a nation together than community of interest and national prosperity. Instead of weakly dividing rather than uniting a people; but suffering divided is common binds it together with bonds of steel.

The Jews were the only race whose spiritual independence was not crushed by the Roman slave-master. It would be untrue to say that Rome destroyed nations; for her subjects in the West were backward slaves, and in the East she displaced monarchies so that they to their subjects than her own rule. But she prevented the growth of nationalities, as it is to be feared we have done in India; and the absence of sturdy independence in the countries round the Mediterranean, especially in the Greek-speaking provinces, made the final downfall inevitable. The lesson has its warning for modern theorists who wish to substitute the sentiment of nationality, the revival of which, after a long eclipse, has been one of the achievements of modern civilisation. For it was not till long after the destruction of the Western Roman Empire that nationality began to assume its present importance in Europe.

The transition from medieval to modern history is most strongly marked by the emergence of this principle, with all that it involves. At the end of the Middle Ages Europe was at last compelled to admit that the great idea of an universal state and an universal church had definitely broken down. Hitherto it had been assumed that behind all national disputes lay a far position by which all were bound, and that behind all religious questions lay the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, from which there was no appeal. The modern period, which certainly does not represent the last word of civilisation, has witnessed the abandonment of these ideas. The change took place gradually. France became a nation when the English took power in the middle of the 15th century. Spain achieved unity a generation later by the union of Castile and Aragon and the expulsion of the Moors from

the principle. Holland found herself in the heroic struggle against Spain in the 17th century. But the practice of conducting wars by hiring foreign mercenaries, a sure sign that the nationalist spirit is weak, continued till much later. And the dynamic principle, which is the very negation of nationalism, actually re-emerged in the 19th century; and this is the true explanation of the heroic resistance which Europe offered to the French revolutionary armies, until Napoleon stirred up the dormant spirit of nationalism in the peoples whom he plundered. "In the old European system," says Lord Acton, "the rights of nationalism were neither recognised by governments nor asserted by the people. The interests of the reigning families, not those of the nations, regulated the frontiers; and the administration was conducted generally without any reference to popular desires." Slavery or conquest might unite the most diverse nations under one sovereignty, such as Charles V.

While such ideas prevailed, the suppression of a nation did not seem heinous; the partition of Poland evoked few protests at the time, though perhaps few acts of injustice have needed with greater force on the heads of their perpetrators than this is likely to do. Poles have been and are among the bitterest enemies of slavery, and the strongest advocates of republicanism and socialism, in all parts of the world. The French Revolution spread a new era for nationalism, both directly and indirectly. The deposition of the Bourbons was a national act which might be a precedent for other oppressed peoples. And when the Revolution itself began to trample on the rights of other nations, an uprising took place, first in Spain and then in Prussia, which proved too strong for the tyrant. The apostasy of France from her own ideals of liberty proved the failure of mere doctrine, like those of Rousseau, and compelled the people to win themselves and win their freedom by the sword. The national unification of Prussia was the direct consequence of her humiliation at Jena and Tilsit, and of the harsh terms imposed upon her at Tilsit. It is true that the Congress of Vienna attempted to revive the old dynamic system. But her

the steady opposition of England, the chaos of disputes might have collapsed the old order upon their subjects. The settlement of 1815 also left the entire nation of Europe in a state of chaos; and it was only by slow degrees that Italy and Germany attained national unity. Poland, the Austrian Empire, and the Russian Empire still remain in a condition to trouble the peace of the world. In Austria-Hungary the chaos of the dynasty and the national ideas is obvious; and every citizen of that empire has to choose between a wider and a narrower allegiance.

Europeans are, in fact, far from having made up their minds as to what is the organic whole towards which patriotic sentiment ought to be directed. Russians agree with disputes in saying, 'It is the political aggregate, the state,' however much they may differ as to how the state should be administered. For this reason nationalism and internationalism might at any time come to terms. They are at one in regarding the 'organic' unity of a political or geographical entity; and they are at one in depreciating the value of individual liberty. Loyalty to 'the state' instead of to 'king and country' is not an easy or a natural reaction. The state is a bloodless abstraction, which as a rule only materialises as a dull-argument or a tax-collector. Individualism for it, and not only for what can be got out of it, does not extend much beyond the Fabian Society. Concerning how the great advantage of a nation lies, as well as of its appeal to very old and strong thought-habits; and accordingly, in any national crisis, loyalty to the War-bond is likely to show unexpected strength, and distinctive national unexpected weakness.

The devotion to the head of the state in his representative capacity is a different thing from the old feudal loyalty. It is far more impersonal; the ruler, whether an individual or a council, is treated as a non-human and non-moral embodiment of the national power, a sort of Platonic idea of sovereign authority. This kind of loyalty may very easily be carried too far. In reality, we are members of a great many "social organisms," each of which has individual claims upon us. Our family,

our clubs of acquaintance, our business or profession, our church, our country, the society of civilized nations, humanity at large, are all social organisms; and some of the chief problems of ethics are concerned with the adjustment of their conflicting claims. To make any one of these absolute is destructive of morality. But militarism and revolution deliberately make the state absolute. In internal wars this may lead to the ruthless oppression of individuals or whole classes; in external relations it produces wars waged with 'methods of barbarism.' The whole idea of the state as an organism, which has been emphasized by social scientists as a theoretical substitution of social individualism, rests on the basis of a metaphysics. The bond between the divisions in the same political area is far less close than that between the organs of a living body. Every man has a life of his own, and some purely personal rights; he has, moreover, moral links with other human associations, outside his own country, and important moral duties towards them. No one who reflects on the solidarity of interests among capitalists, among bond-workers, or, in a different way, among scholars and artists, all over the world, can fail to see that the expenditure of the state, whether in the interest of war or of revolution, is an anachronism and an absurdity.

A very different basis for patriotic sentiment is furnished by the scientific or pseudo-scientific theories about race, which have become very popular in our time. When the history of ideas in the 19th century comes to be written, it is certain that among the causes of this great war will be named the belief of the Germans in the superiority of their own race, based on certain historical and ethnological theories which have acted like a deadly virus in stimulating the spirit of aggression among them. The theory, stated briefly, is that the slaves of the Baltic are the home of the finest human type that has yet existed, a type distinguished by blond hair, great physical strength, unexcelled mental vigour and ability, superior morality, and an innate aptitude for governing and improving inferior races. Unhappily for the world, this noble stock cannot breed' in very long in climates outside its own; but from

the earliest historical times it has "swarmed" periodically, subjugating the Indian peoples of the south, and elevating them for a time above the level which they were naturally fitted to reach. Whenever we find marked energy and boldness of character, we may suspect *dayan* blood; and history will usually support our suspicion. Among the great men who have certainly or probably Chinese or Japanese blood, Julius Cæsar, the Founder of Christianity, Dante, and Shakespeare. The blood *dayan* giant is fulfilling his mission by conquering and imposing his culture upon other races. They ought to be grateful to him for the service, especially as it has a worlded aspect, the lower types having, at least in their own climate, greater power of survival.

The historic theory has been defended in a large number of German books, of which the "Foundations of the Nineteenth Century," by the energetic Englishman Herbert Chamberlain, is the most widely known. The objections to it are numerous. It is notorious that until the invasion of gunpowder the settled and civilized peoples of Europe were in frequent danger from bands of barbaric mountaineers, forest-dwellers, or pastoral nomads, who generally came from the north. But the formidable fighting power of these marauders was no proof of intrinsic superiority. In fact, the most successful of these conquerors, if success is measured by the number of territory overrun and subdued, were not the "great blond hosts" of Minotaur, but yellow maniacs with black hair, the Huns and Tartars.² The cause of Tartar ascendancy had not the remotest connection with any moral or intellectual condition which we can be expected to admire. Nor can the *dayan* race, well explored by nature as it undoubtedly is, prove such a superiority as this theory claims for it. Some of the largest brains yet measured have been those of Japanese; and the Jews have probably a higher average of ability than the Germans. Again, the Herakleids are not

² The names of their possible strength have just exploded in a most brilliant manner by Dr. Posner in the first volume of the "Cambridge Medieval History."

descended from a pure Nordic stock. The Slavonic type has been studied in Scandinavia, where the people share with the Irish the reputation of being the least homogeneous race in the world. The Slavonic is a mixture of various ancestral types, including, in other parts, distinct strains of Mongolian blood, which indicates that the leading Slavic nations, according to their customs, with the Germanic women, and imported to a variety of the blood like the Slavonic stock found, as well as distinct racial characteristics. Lastly, the Slavonic race has never shown much aptitude for governing and civilising other peoples. The Slavs, by virtue of their greater openness, are far less susceptible.

The French have their own form of this pseudo-science in their doctrine of the persistence of national characteristics. Such notions may be summed up in a formula: England, for example, is "the country of wit." A few humorous say, in truth, be applied in support of this theory. Jules Ceasar said: "There are four things which indelible national propensities, two millions of square leagues," and these are all the characteristics of our gallant ally. And Voltaire in that way he thought to have got off the German character very cleverly about the time when Germany first saw the light. "The Germans are excessively serious. They employ philosophical meanings to signify what is the least philosophical thing in the world, except for love and the food which therefore that requires little admiration." But the fact remains that the character of nations frequently change, or rather that what we call national character is usually only the policy of the governing class, based upon it by circumstances, or the changes of living which climate, geographical position, and other external causes have made necessary for the inhabitants of a country.

To treat nations as homogeneous of race is as wrong then as to treat it as divided race. As the Abbé Nod has fairly written about his own country, Belgium,

the race is not the nation. The nation is not a philosophical fact, it is a moral fact. What constitutes a nation is the community of sentiments and ideas which results from a common

history and education. The variations of the capitalistic order are less of so great importance. The essential factor of the national consciousness resides in a certain common mode of receiving the traditions of the social life.

Belgium, the 1844 national, has found this national consciousness amid her sufferings. There are no longer any distinctions between French-speaking Belgians and Walloons or Flemings. This is in truth the real basis of patriotism. It is the basis of our own love for our country. What Britain stands for is what Britain is. We have long known in our hearts what Britain stands for; but we have now been driven to search our thoughts and make our ideals explicit to ourselves and others. The Englishman has become a philosophical subject for, 'Whatever the world thinks,' writes Bishop Doane, 'be who hath not much meditated upon God, the human soul, and the common future, may possibly make a striking mathematician, but will never indubitably make a very polished and a very statesman.' These words, which were quoted by Mr. Arthur Hallam a few years ago, may seem to make a large demand on the average citizen; but in our quiet way we have all been meditating on these things since last August, and we know pretty well what our common future is for our country. We believe in liberty and fair play and kindness—these things first and foremost; and we believe, if not exactly in democracy, yet in a government under which a man may think and speak the thing he wills. We do not believe in war, and we do not believe in bullying. We do not flatter ourselves that we are the superior; but we are convinced that the ideas which we stand for, and which we have on the whole tried to carry out, are essential to the peaceful progress and happiness of humanity; and for these ideas we have drawn the sword. The great words of Abraham Lincoln have been on the lips of many and in the hearts of all since the beginning of the great conflict: 'With malice towards none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right—let us strive on to finish the work we are in.'

Patriotism, thus spiritualised and generalised is the true

paternalism. When the question is once put in its right relation to the whole of human life and to all that makes human life worth living, it ceases to become an isolated abstraction. It is certain to involve an isolated element if it is isolated and made absolute. We have seen the appalling perversion—the methodical diabolism—which this element has produced in Germany. It has marched on because we thought that the devilish world had got bored with heaven; but it is of course no new thing. Mark Twain said, "I prefer my country to the salvation of my soul—a sentiment which would hold but a lot; it has only a superficial resemblance to it. Doubt's willingness to be 'assured' for the sake of his countrymen. Devil-worship remains what it was, even when the idol is draped in the national flag. This devotion may be in part a survival from savage conditions, when all was so crude in every kind; but chiefly it is an example of the idealising and universalising power of the imagination, which turns every material person into a monstrosity. The only remedy is, as Lowell's *Good-Bye Europe* reminds us, to tear in mind that

our true country is that ideal realm which we represent to ourselves under the names of religion, duty, and the like. Our theoretical disquisitions are but far-off approaches to so fair a world; and all they are really intended to do is to get our brains to draw them from time their original intentions. Our true country is bounded on the north and the south, on the east and west, by Nature, and when the thoughts that stretch boundary-line to us reach as a bird's treadle, the ocean is its our market, and heaven rather to be looked upon upon a market.

Dr. Newman said that the whole man will be a citizen of his true city, of which the type is laid up in heaven, and only secondarily of his earthly country.

The element of paternalism is not the only evil which we have to consider. We may see by defect as well as by excess. Herbert Spencer speaks of an "anti-paternalistic bias"; and it can hardly be disputed that many Englishmen who pride themselves on their lofty morality are suffering from this mental twist. The mainly reason is

belong to the Anglo-Saxon constitution, for it is hardly mentioned in other countries, while we had a *Great Disappointment* nation a hundred years ago, and the Americans had their 'Copperheads' in the Northern States during the civil war. In our very day, every corner of England, from the great Milton to the small Rother, has had its *adversaries at home*; and the champions of *Boer and Boer*, of *Africa and Africa*, of the *Booth* and the *Marichols*, have been usually the same persons. The English, it would appear, differ from other misguided nations in never being right even by accident. But the misapprehension of a few persons is far less important than the comparative immortality of which claims to the public's appeal, except when war is actually raging. This is not specially characteristic of our own country. The German Emperor has complained of his Social Democrats as 'people without a forehead'; and the cry 'A hat to prison' has been heard in France.

It is usual to explain this attitude by the fact that the manual workers 'have no stake in the country,' and might not find their conditions altered for the worse by acquisition to a foreign power. A few of our working-men have given advice to this change by exhibiting particularly that they could not be worse off under the Germans; but in this they have done themselves and their class less than justice. The anti-nationalism and cosmopolitanism of the masses in every country is a profoundly interesting but, a problem which demands its special investigation. It is our result of that comparison from traditional ideas, which makes the most important difference between the upper and middle classes on the one side and the lower on the other. We lament that the working-man takes but little interest in Christianity, and seek our brains to discover what we have done to discredit our religion in his eyes. The truth is that Christianity, as a dogmatic and systematic system, is unintelligible without a very considerable knowledge of the conditions under which it took shape. But what are the *poor* Rother, and the *Gravel and Rother*, in the working-man? He is simply cut off from the means of

reading intelligently any book of the Bible, or of understanding how the institution called the Catholic Church, and its adherents, came to exist. As our staple literature becomes more 'modern' and less literary, the custodians of organized religion will find their influence increasing. But the same is true about patriotism. Love of country means pride in the past and ambition for the future. Those who live only in the present are incapable of it. But our working-men become bent to looking about the past history of England: he has actually heard of our great men, and has read few of our great books. It is not surprising that the appeal to patriotism leaves him cold. This is an evil that has its proper remedy. There is no reason why a man and elevated love of country should not be stimulated by appropriate teaching in our schools. In America this is done rather hysterically; and in Germany—rather literally. The Jews have always made their national history a large part of their education, and even of their religion. Teaching has helped them more to retain their self-consciousness as a nation. Ignorance of the past and indifference to the future usually go together. Those who most value our historical heritage will be most desirous to transmit it unimpaired.

But the absence of traditional ideas is by no means an uncurable evil. The workman can more clearly than the majority of educated persons the desirability of international hatred and jealousy. He is conscious of greater solidarity with his own class in other European countries than with the wealthier class in his own; and as he approaches the whole question without prejudice, he cannot fail to realize how large a part of the product of labour is diverted from useful purposes by military institutions. International rivalry is in his eyes one of the great serious obstacles to the abolition of war and slavery. Taiter hardly exaggerates when he says: 'Patriotism in the popular expression is only a brightful beam; the fraternity of nations seems an ideal more and more accessible to humanity, and one which humanity desires.' Military glory has very little attraction for the working-man. The humanitarian instincts appear to be actually stronger than

class of the sheltered classes. To take life in any serious manner seems to him a shocking thing; and the harsh pressures of martial law and military custom is abhorrent to him. He sees no advantage and no result in continental aggrandisement, which he suspects is his prompter mainly by the desire to make money rapidly. He is therefore a convinced pacifist; though his doctrine of human brotherhood breaks down ignominiously when he finds his economic position threatened by the competition of cheap foreign labour. If an armed struggle ever takes place between the nations of Europe for their colonies and the yellow races, it will be a working-man's war. But on the whole, the last hope of getting rid of militarism may lie in the growing power of the working class. The poor, being intensely gregarious and very susceptible to all collective emotions, are still liable to fits of warlike enthusiasm. But their real minds are at present set against an aggressive foreign policy, without being clear against the appeal of a higher patriotism.

And yet the irritation which is felt against speakers of the brotherhood of man is not without justification. Some persons who condemn patriotism are deeply lacking in public spirit, or their loyalty is compromised by some bad or 'nausea,' which is a poor substitute for love of country. The man who has no sympathies in favour of his own family and his own country is generally an unreliable creature. So we need not condemn Beldier for saying, 'Quand les gens disent tout que la patrie n'est rien, les Français lui déclarent que "il n'est rien en France" et qu'ils ont autre chose que la patrie devant eux.' But French Nationalism, a bourgeois movement directed against all the 'ideas of 1789,' seems to have adopted the most servile kind of chauvinism. M. Paul Bourget wrote the other day in the *Revue de Paris*, 'This war must be the first of many, since we cannot exterminate sixty-five million Germans in a single campaign.' The women and children too! That is not the way to revive the religion of Christ in France.

The practical question for the future is whether there is any prospect of turning, under more favourable auspices,

is the universal ideal of the Middle Ages—the agreement among the nations of Europe to live together under one system of international law and right, binding upon all, and with the consciousness of an intellectual and spiritual unity deeper than political divisions. "The nations are the *Christi of humanity*," said Martini; and so they ought to be. Some of the nations are irreconcilable. Milverton has dug his own grave. The great powers increased their armaments till the burden became insupportable, and have now rushed into bankruptcy in the hope of shaking it off. In peacetime times the loads of creation were certain gigantic loads, presented by nature as monoliths which could only be carried by a creature sturdy as duty but long. Then they died, when neither earth, air, nor water could support them any longer. Such must be the end of the European nations, unless they learn wisdom. The lesson will be brought home to them by Treaty-lands competition. The United States of America had already, before this war, an initial advantage over the divided states of Europe, amounting to at least 50 per cent. in every contest; after the war this advantage will be doubled. It remains to be seen whether the next generation will honour the debts which we are piling up. Enough need to complain of what he called 'Dutch finance,' which consists in 'mortgaging the industry of the future against property in the present.' First paid for the great war of a hundred years ago in this manner; what a century we are still groaning under the burden of his debt. We may test some of the integrity of 'Dutch finance' when the descendants of the next generation have a chance of repudiating obligations which, as they will say, they did not contract. However that may be, international rivalry is plainly very bad business; and there are great possibilities in the Hague Tribunal, if, and only if, the signatures to the conference had themselves to use there against a recalcitrant member. The conduct of Germany in this war has shown that public opinion is powerful to sustain a nation which has strong enough to defy it.

Another cause which may give public opinion to turn their thoughts away from war is the fact that the 'evening'

period of the European races is coming to an end. The unparalleled increase of population in the last three quarters of the 19th century has been followed by a progressive decrease in the birth-rate, which will begin to tell upon social conditions when the reduction in the death-rate, which has hitherto kept pace with it, shall have reached its natural limit. Europe with a stationary population will be in a much happier position; and problems of social reform can then be tackled with some hope of success. Unhappy conditions in the arts of life may then take the place of desperate competition and antagonism. Wealth here will begin to have a positive value, and we may even think it fair to honour our workers more than our destroyers. The efforts of past labour will then soon be effaced; the nations' power much more quickly from wars than from internal dissensions. External imperils are rapidly waning; but 'these would lead all that were so given themselves.' The greatest obstacle to progress is not man's intellectual capacity, but his ineradicable tendency to passionism. The true patriot will keep his eye fixed on this, and will direct as the state's needs require those citizens who at the top and bottom of the social scale have no other ambition than to hang on and suck the life-blood of the nation. Great things may be hoped from the new colonies of opinion, when it has passed out of its tentative and experimental stage.

In the distant future we may reasonably hope that patriotism will be a sentiment like the loyalty which binds a man to his public school and university, or a British subject to all manner and jealousy, a stimulus to all honourable conduct and noble effort, a part of the poetry of life. It is so already to many of us, and has been so to the noblest Englishmen since we have had a literature. If Henry VI's speech at Agincourt is the splendid gemstone of a royal declamation, there is no later ring in the crown when John of Gaunt takes leave of his banished son; nor in the *Widow Poind's* 'Brethren there is none with need or death,' etc. 'If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.' We cannot quite manage to rehabilitate London for ever in singing psalms, though there are some places

in England—East, Winchester, Oxford, Cambridge— which do retain these feelings. These remnants of loyalty and devotion are to be found to be directed on despots. They have no definite passion for good. In spiritual things there is no conflict between authority and expansion. The deepest sympathy is potentially, also, the widest. He who loves not his home and country which he has seen, how could he love humanity in general which he has not seen? There are, after all, few questions of which our last two masters do not advocate that the Bible says is the threat which the Englishman feels when he has looked right at the white walls of Cairo.

THE BIRTH-RATE

[PART]

The numbers of every species are determined, not by the progressive power of its numbers, which always greatly exceeds the capacity of the earth to support a progress in breeding in geometrical progression, but by two factors, the number of its enemies and the available supply of food. Those species which survive over short periods in their struggle for existence mainly to one of two qualities, enormous fertility or parental care. The female cod spawns about 8,000,000 eggs at a time, of which at most one-third—perhaps much less—are afterwards fertilised. An individual proportion of those swarms being devoured by fish or food. An insect-eating bird is said to require for its support about 200,000 insects a year, and the number of such birds must amount to thousands of millions. As a rule there is a kind of equilibrium between the forces of destruction and of reproduction. If a species is nearly exterminated by its enemies, those enemies lose their food-supply and perish themselves. It soon declines upon the survivors of the various remains and increases till they begin to feed out various again. In some species, such as the mice in La Plata, and the hares and birds which devour them, there is an alternation of increase and decrease, to be accounted for in this way. But permanent destruction of equilibrium is uncommon. The rabbit in Australia, having found a virgin soil, multiplied for some time almost up to the limit of its natural fertility and is thereby controlled on that continent. The brown rat, *porco-pegu*, however, threatened our black rat and the Malay rat in New Zealand.

The plagues of the middle ages which the crews of Columbus brought back to Europe, after causing a devastating epidemic at the end of the fifteenth century, consolidated a kind of malarial climate with its hosts, and has remained as a permanent scourge in Europe. Other plagues, like those of cholera and plague, migrate from the lands where they are endemic, like a horde of Tartars, and after slaying all who are susceptible disappear from existence. The dying of the flea has driven the anopheles mosquito from England, and our countrymen no longer suffer from "ague." Cholera belts are breaking the levees and the accompanying typhoid fever.

Fertility and care for offspring seem, as a rule to vary inversely. The latter is the path of biological progress, and indiscrimination of all viviparous animals. That any degree of parental attention is incompatible with the maximum fecundity of the lower organisms needs no demonstration. Such fecundity is not necessary to keep up the numbers of the higher species, which find abundant food in the swarming progeny of the lower types, and are not themselves exposed to wholesale slaughter. Speaking of fishes, Huxford says:

Of species that exhibit no sort of parental care, the average of fertility gives 1,248,000 eggs to a female each year; while among those which make nests in one species the nests the number is only about 10,000. Among those which have any protective tricks, such as carrying the eggs in pouches or attached to the body, or in the mouth, the average number is under 1,000; while among those whose care takes the form of selection or symmetrical protection which brings the young into the world alive, an average of 40 eggs is quite sufficient.

There is no exception to these laws. The evolution has been steadily in the direction of diminishing fecundity and increasing parental care. This does not necessarily imply that the modern European loves his children less than the savage loves his. It is quite possible, not want of affection, which determines the treatment of children by their parents over a great part of the world, and through the greater part of human history. The human beings, who represent the lowest stage of savagery, are now almost

coldest. In these times the woman has to follow the man carrying her load. Under such conditions the chance of rearing a large family was small indeed. Very different is the life of the grassland nomads, who come over the Arabian plateau and the steppes of Central Asia. These tribes, who really live as the parasites of their flocks and herds, depending on them entirely for subsistence, often multiply rapidly. Their typical unit is the great patriarchal family, in which the adults may have scores of children by different mothers. These children soon begin to share their keep, and are taken care of. If, however, the patriarch is chosen, eager with his child to cast about, so that he may look to his own people, if the unit. The grasslands are usually almost or full in their own hold. A period of drought, or pressure by rivals, in former times sent a horde of these hardy nomads on a raid into the nearest settled province; and if, like the Tartars, they were mounted, they usually killed, plundered, and conquered wherever they went, until the discovery of gunpowder saved civilization from the constant peril of barbarian invasions. Barbarians of another type, hunters with dead horses, seldom increase rapidly, partly because the danger of hunting for young children was much greater than on the steppes.

In the primitive river-valley civilizations, such as Egypt and Babylonia, the conditions of increase were so favorable that a dense population soon began to press upon the means of subsistence. In Egypt the remedy was a centralized government which could undertake great irrigation works and intensive cultivation. In Babylonia, for the first time in history, foreign trade was made to support a larger population than the land itself could maintain. There was little or no industry in Babylonia, but the death-rate in these river-valley civilized places has always been very high.

When we turn to poor and mountainous countries like Greece, the conditions are very different. It was an old belief among the Romans that in the days before the Trojan War "the world was too full of people." The increase was doubtless made possible by the trade which developed in the Hellenic period, but the means of food-supply were liable to be interrupted with. There came the necessity for

active colonization, which lasted from the eighth to the sixth century B.C. This period of expansion came to an end when all the available areas were occupied. In the sixth century the Greeks found themselves hemmed off, in the west by Phoenicians and Etruscans, in the east by the Persian Empire. The problem of over-population was again pressing upon them. Increased civil wars between Hellenic leagues like the Achaean League in more recent times; but Greek battles were not as a rule very bloody, and every healthy nation has a surprising capacity of making good the losses caused by war. The slow effect of the attack on emigration was that the old ideal of the "self-sufficient life," which meant the practice of mutual sharing, had to be partially abandoned. The most flourishing States, and especially Athens, had to take to merchandise, which they exchanged for the food-products of the Indian States and South Russia. The result was an increasing urbanization, and a new population of less "rugged" elements. Conservatives hated this change and strove to revive the old ideal of a small self-sufficient State, with a maximum of 20,000 or 30,000 citizens. Plato, in his latest work, the "Lysis," wishes his model city to be not too near the sea, the proximity of which "fills the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and brings dishonour to the work of men." On the other side, however, the most far-seeing of Athenian politicians, realized that the day of small city-states was over, and that the limited, "self-sufficient" community would not long maintain its independence. He urged his countrymen to pursue a policy of peaceful penetration in Western Asia, so the Greeks were soon to be under the suzerainty of Alexander. But the prejudice against internationalism was very strong. Greece in the fifth century furnished a poor country; her exports were not more than enough to pay for the food of her existing population; and that population had to be artificially maintained. The Greeks were an exceptionally healthy and long-lived race; their great men for the most part lived to ages which have no parallel until the nineteenth century. The infant death-rate from natural causes may have been rather high, as it is in modern Greece, but it was compensated by systematic

inheritable. The Greek father had an absolute right to decide whether a new-comer was to be admitted to the family. In Ephesus alone of Greek cities a parent was compelled to prove that he was too poor to rear a child before he was allowed to get rid of it.¹ Even Hædæi, exclusive males, advised a father not to bring up more than one son, and daughters were sacrificed more frequently than sons. The usual practice was to expose the infant in a jar; anyone who thought it worth while might rescue the baby and bring it up as a slave. But this was not often done. At Delphi, in Sicily, there are 200 'pots' buried in an exposed graveyard, out of a total of 1472.² The proportion of female infants exposed must have been very large. The evidence of literature is supported by such letters as this from a husband at Oxyrhynchus: 'When—good luck to you—your child is born, if it is a male, let it live; if a female, expose it.'³ Besides infanticide, abortion was freely practised, and without blame.⁴ The Greek citizens married rather late; but as his bride was usually in her 'prime' this would not affect the birth-rate. But men do attach great importance, as a factor in checking population, to the pharmacutic Greek wife, not to prostitution, which throughout antiquity was dreadfully cheap and checked by no physical penalty. As her slaves, Sappho recommends that they should be allowed to have children as a reward for good conduct.⁵

A rapid decline in population set in under the rule of Alexander. Polybius ascribes it to earthquakes and a high standard of conduct, which in antiquity was of the upper and middle classes;⁶ but the depopulation of rural

¹ *Myra, Epistola Dione*, April, 1876.

² *At Delphi, Sicily, etc.*, *Journal des Savants*, 1744, p. 1.

³ *Chorus, Propertius, and Lucian* all had these sons, and apparently no daughters—*Myra*, *The Great Cyrenenensis*, p. 121.

⁴ *Plut.* (p. 2) *Philo*, *Plutarchus*, 120.

⁵ We may suppose that the depopulation of the towns, caused by female infanticide, was great, checked by the desire of mother to nurse and rear sons. We do not know that the Greeks had any children in India in 1876.

⁶ *Plutarch*, *de Sept. et Oct. Regibus* in *de mor. et leg.*, "In order to have these cities."

France can hardly be so accurately done. Perhaps the French were not so keen, and the results diminished. It was the general impression that the soil was far less productive than formerly. The decay of the Italian race had accelerated when the Roman Empire, until the old stock became almost extinct. This disappearance of the north gifted race that was inhabited our place in one of the manifold catastrophes of history, and in full of warnings for the modern world; the industrial decay, indifference to production, and addition to debt are now certainly drawn off the main current, which we prefer to regard the fact, but as symptoms of decadence about the future.

The same debate fell upon Italy, and was coincident not with the movement was against himself and the subsequent campaigns, nearly though they were, in Spain, Syria, and Macedonia, but with the illumination of social life. Lucan, under Nero, complains that the Roman have lost more than half their inhabitants, and that the country-side lies waste. Under Trajan it was estimated that whereas Italy under the Republic could raise nearly 2,000,000 soldiers, that number was now reduced to one-half. Strabo, writing plotted a large table of Macedonia on overgrown land in Italy. In the fourth century Bologna, Modena, Piacenza, and many other towns in North Italy were in ruins. The land of the Volturnus and Arapenna, once densely populated, was a desert even in later times. Cassiodorus testified the wilderness that Italy had left in; and Agrippa was a lonely sheep-walk.

The cause of this depopulation have been often discussed, both in antiquity and in our own days. Slavery, barbarism, military, vice and numerous large causes, and pestilence have all been named as causes; but I am inclined to think that all these influences together are insufficient to account for so rapid a decline. The soil of war was lighter by far than in periods when the population was rising; barbarism cannot reduce so rapidly, as some have suggested, that malaria became for the first time endemic under the Roman dominion; malaria the region, its venetian and destructive epidemics, but a healthy population recovered from pestilence, as from war, with

great rapidity. The huge grazing reaction displaced from Sicily was responsible, but there was a large supply of grain from Sicily, Africa, and other districts. Slavery undoubtedly accounts for a great deal. This institution is excessively wasteful of human life; it is never possible to keep up the numbers of slaves without slave-breeding in the countries from which they come. And we must remember that ancient civilization was almost entirely static. The barbarians found ample waste lands between the towns, which they did not as a rule care to visit, probably because those who did so were full victims to malarial diseases. The sanitary condition of ancient cities was better than in the Middle Ages; but the death-rate was probably too high to permit of any increase in the population. But after admitting that all these causes were operative, it may be that we shall be obliged to acknowledge also a psychological factor. If a nation has no hopes for the future, it is never doubtful whether life is worth living, if it is disposed to withdraw from the struggle for existence and to meet the problems of life in a temper of passive resignation, it will not regard children as a heritage and gift that comes from the Lord, but rather as an encumbrance. That such was the temper of the later Roman Empire may be gathered not only from the literature, which is singularly devoid of hopefulness and enterprise, but from the rapid spread of manichæism and asceticism in this period. The prevalence of this world-wearieness of course needs explanation, and the cause is rather obscure. It does not seem to be connected with unbearable external conditions, but rather with a racial exhaustion akin to senile decay in the individual. But there is no real analogy between the life of an individual and that of a nation, and it would be very rash to insist on the hypothesis of racial decay, which perhaps has no biological basis.

The influence of Christianity on population is very difficult to estimate. Nothing is more uncertain than to collect the ethical precepts and practices of nations which profess the Christian religion, and to label them as 'the results of Christianity.' The historian of religion would indeed be taxed by a strange task if he were compelled to

from the moral ideals of Homer, Hesiod and of Homer the philanthropist, of Euripides of Aeschylus and Oliver Cromwell, of Thomas Aquinas and Thomas à Becket, two common sources. The only ethical and social principles which can properly be called Christian are those which can be proved to have their root in the teaching and example of the Founder of Christianity. But the Gospel of Christ was a product of Jewish soil. It is historically connected with the Jewish prophetic tradition, which it carried to its fullest development and provided in an unswerving and spiritualised form. Its moral teaching consists chiefly of general principles which have to be applied to conditions unlike those contemplated by its first disciples, who were under the influence of the apocalyptic expectations prevalent at the time. Jewish morality was in its origin the morality of a tribe of nomad Bedouins; and we have seen that intense life is held sacred by these peoples. Marriage is regarded as a duty, and childlessness as a misfortune or a disgrace. The lowest bond, characteristic of the Hebrew Code the best, made every Jew desirous to have descendants who might witness happier times, and one of whom might even be the promised Deliverer of his people. An Hebrew of either sex was allowed to be a witness of this; abnormal practices, though screened by Canaanite religion, were far less common than in Greece or Italy. To this wholesome morality Christianity added the doctrine of the value, in the sight of God, of every human life, and of the sanctity of the body as the 'temple of God.' To the Pagans, the sanctities of the Christian were, until in their affection for each other, their most remarkable characteristics. From the first, the new religion set itself steadily against individualism and asceticism, and was one of its most signal moral triumphs in deriving underground and greatly diminishing importance. Its encouragement of celibacy, especially for those who followed the 'religious' vocation, was an effort to its healthy influence on family life, and ultimately on national life, which great mischief by diverting its creative energy of the greatest and richest in each generation; but this tendency was adventitious to Christianity, and would never have taken root on Palestinian soil. The cult of

legislative has looked on, with much else that belongs to the later Renaissance age, in Catholicism.

In the Middle Ages the population question stood on a miserable plane, into which the old civilization sank after the barbarian invasions, the rigors of manures and plagues, the almost total absence of medical science, and the pitifulness condition of the medieval walled town, which could be swept aside away, carried any risk of over-population. Families were very large, but the majority of the children died. Millions were swept away by the Black Death; millions more by the Crusades. Such facts as that of Luchaire, on France in the reign of Philip Augustus, being vividly before us the fearful condition of society in feudal times, and explain simply the quantity of the population.

The early modern period contains striking notable example of a sudden and considerable decline in population. The case is Spain, which, after playing an active and very prominent part in the world's history, sank quickly into the lethargy from which it has never recovered. It may be noted that here, as in the case of France, the decay of population and energy followed a great influx of plundered wealth. On the other hand, the increase of population in our newly-planted North American colonies must have been extremely rapid for two or three generations.

The enormous multiplication of the European race since the middle of the eighteenth century is a phenomenon quite unique in history, and never likely to be repeated.¹ It was rendered possible by the new labour-saving inventions which immensely increased the exports which could be exchanged for food, and by the opening up of vast new food-producing areas. The chief method by which the increase was effected, especially in the later period, has been the lengthening of human life by improved sanitation and medical science.² Since 1800 the average duration

¹ The population of England and Wales is said to have been 4,070,000 in 1800, and 2,500,000 in 1700. It was 8,000,000 in 1851, 22,000,000 in 1901, and approximately 25,000,000 in 1914.

² Diseases are causing the temporary period of demographic over-balance, but especially of contagious kinds, and so it may be that the average duration of life was considerably increased in the eighteenth century.

of life in England and Wales has been raised by a little more than one-third. Other European countries show the same rate of improvement. The astonishing result, as little known and as seldom observed in, was found to have a great effect on the birth-rate. So long as the remaining period continued at its height, a net annual increase of life of over 20 per thousand could be sustained; but the expansion of the European people has now passed its zenith, and a tendency to return to more normal conditions is almost everywhere observable. One of the most advanced nations, France, has already reached the equilibrium towards which other civilized nations are moving. The old-established families in the United States are believed to be actually dwindling.

The student of international vital statistics will be struck first by the very wide differences in the birth-rates of different countries. He will then notice that the more backward countries have on the whole a considerably higher birth-rate than the more advanced. Thirdly, he will observe the parallelism between the birth-rate and death-rate, which makes the net increase in countries with a high birth-rate very little larger than that of countries with a low birth-rate. The following figures will illustrate these points; they are taken from the Registrar-General's Blue Book for 1912.

	Birth-rate	Death-rate	Balance of increase
United Kingdom	22.4	12.2	10.2
Australia	20.7	11.2	9.5
Austria	31.3	20.5	10.8
Belgium	22.6	10.2	12.4
France	14.6	12.2	2.4
Germany	20.6	12.2	8.4
Italy	37.4	20.2	17.2
New Zealand	20.2	9.0	11.2
Norway	22.4	12.4	10.0
Sweden	27.4	12.4	15.0
Switzerland	22.4	12.4	10.0

It will be seen that Australia and New Zealand, with low birth-rates and the lowest death-rates in the world

increase more rapidly than Russia with its enormous birth-rate and proportionately high death-rate. No one can doubt that our colonies achieve their increase with far less blood and misery than the terrible but short-lived lives. Declination in a high state is incompatible with such conditions as those figures disclose in Russia. The figures for Egypt and India are similar to the Russian, but in India, which is awful, the mortality is greater than even in Russia, and the rates in some of China, in which we are told that even out of ten children die in infancy. It has been suggested that the lowest measure of a country's well-being, as regards its actual vitality, is the square of the death-rate divided by the birth-rate.

It is well known that a decline in the birth-rate set in about forty years ago in this country, and has gone on steadily ever since, till the fall now amounts to about one-third of the total birth. It thus corresponds very nearly to the fall in the death-rate during the same period. It is also well known that this decline is not evenly distributed among different classes of the people. Until the decline began, large families were the rule in all classes, and the slightly larger families of the poor were compensated by their somewhat higher mortality. But since 1871 large families have become increasingly rare in the upper and middle classes, and among the skilled artisans. They are frequent in the half-skilled ranks of unskilled labour, and in one section of well-paid workmen—the miners. The highest birth-rates at present are in the mining districts and in the slums. The lowest are in some of the learned professions. In the Bloomsbury Valley the birth-rate is still about forty, which is double the rate in the prosperous residential suburbs of London. In the case of the textile industry the decline has been very serious, although wages are fairly good; among the agricultural labourers the rate is also low. It will be found that in all trades where the women work for wages the birth-rate has fallen sharply; the women's wife does not earn money, and has therefore less influence to support her family. In agricultural districts the heavy drudgery is mostly responsible; in the upper and middle classes the heavy expense of education and the burden of

ruin and taxes are probably the main reasons why larger families are not desired. The map and list in almost all the publications old men are overpaid and young men underpaid. Mr. and Mrs. Whistham have found that, before 1870, 140 marriages of men whose names appear in 'Whistham's Who' resulted in 105 children, an average of 0.8 each; after 1870 the average is only 0.65. Childless also is common among the educated. "From the reports issued by two Women's Colleges, it appears that, excluding those who have left college within three years or less, out of 2000 women only 33 per cent. have married, and the number of children born to each marriage is undeniably very small." The writer considers that this state of things is extremely dangerous for the country, inasmuch as we are now breeding mainly from our worst stocks and badly-matched are very fertile, while our best families are stationary or declining. Without denying the general truth of the pessimistic conclusion,¹ it may be pointed out that the miners are, physically at least, above the average of the whole population, and that the very low birth-rate of residential districts is partly due to the presence in large numbers of unmarried domestic servants. The death-rate of the class is also very high.

The basis of the argument about the quality of the population can be more reasonable than the invention of the Malthus about its defective quantity. Of the latter class we may say with Harbord Will that "those who seek to restore the birth-rate of half a century ago are engaged in a task which would be criminal if it were not based on ignorance, and which is in any case hopeless." And yet I hope to show before the close of this article that for five or three generations the British Empire could absorb a considerable increase, and that the Government might with advantage stimulate this by schemes of colonization. The basis of the argument overruns in all reasonable cases.

¹ *The Family and the Nation*, p. 146.

² The birth per 1000 in 1880 was 32.5; in 1890 it was 28.5; in 1900 it was 24.5; in 1910 it was 20.5; in 1920 it was 16.5; in 1930 it was 12.5; in 1940 it was 9.5; in 1950 it was 6.5; in 1960 it was 3.5; in 1970 it was 1.5; in 1980 it was 0.5; in 1990 it was 0.5; in 2000 it was 0.5; in 2010 it was 0.5; in 2020 it was 0.5; in 2030 it was 0.5; in 2040 it was 0.5; in 2050 it was 0.5; in 2060 it was 0.5; in 2070 it was 0.5; in 2080 it was 0.5; in 2090 it was 0.5; in 2100 it was 0.5.

The German complains that the Polak, whom he considers an inferior race, breeds like rabbits, while the gifted representative of Kultur only breeds his kind. The American is nervous about the wisdom of the negro; he has more reason to be nervous about the boundary of the Slav and South Indian immigrant. Everywhere the tendency is for the superior stock to dwindle till it becomes a small minority. The Americans of Polish descent are threatened with this fate. Poland is a high standard of living, not biological nature. The man who works and spends little is the ultimate indicator of the north. I know of no instance in history by which a ruling race has not ultimately been ousted or absorbed by its subjects. Complete extermination or emigration is the only successful method of conquest. The Anglo-Saxon race has thus established itself in the greater part of Britain, and in Australia. In North America it has destroyed the Indian hunter, who could not be used for industrial purposes; but the temptation to replace the negro and the Chinese European races was too strong to be resisted, and Nature's inevitable penalty is now being exacted against the descendants of our sturdy colonists. We did not have America in the eighteenth century; we are losing it now. In the South Africa, the Kaffir can live like a gentleman (according to his own ideas) on six months' ill-paid work every year; the Englishman finds an income of £100 too small. There is only one end to this kind of colonization. The danger at home is that the larger part of the population is now beginning to insist upon a scale of compensation and a standard of comfort which are incompatible with any survival-value. We all wish to be privileged aristocrats, with no work to work for us. Hence Nature starts working for the battle of politicians and trade union regulations. She says to us what Florence, in a remarkable passage, makes her say: 'You should not ask questions; you should try to understand. I am not in the habit of talking.' In Nature's method is in a word and a blow, and the blow first. Before the close of this article I will return to the negro problem, and will consider whether anything can be done to solve it.

At the present time, when an apparently interminable

resulted in a gap between the British Empire and Germany, a more detailed comparison of the vital statistics of the two countries will be read with interest. In England and Wales the birth rate subsided in 1879 at a 50.6 per 10, after already rising from 53 in 1850. From 1879 the line of decline is almost straight, down to the present rate figure of about 34. In France, owing partly to wars, the fluctuations have been violent. In 1850 the figure (including deaths) was 50; in 1859, 54; in 1869, 49; in 1879, 54; in 1884, nearly 55. From this date, as in England, the steady decline began. In 1907 the rate had fallen to 33; in 1912 Germany surpassed it at 32.4. Here we may notice the abnormally high rate in the years following the great war of 1870, a phenomenon which was marked also throughout Europe after the Bazarbovic wars. We may also notice that the decline has been of late slightly more rapid in Germany, falling from a high birth-rate, than in England, where the maximum was never so high. Another fact which comes out when the German figures are more carefully examined is that urbanization in Germany has a sterilizing effect which is not operative in England. Printing gives the comparative figures of legitimate fertility for France as follows:

	1870-1879	1890-1899
Berlin	22.8	18.4 ¹
Urban great towns . . .	25.7	20.5
Towns of 20,000 or less . .	26.6	20.7
Rural towns	27.4	22.5
Countryside	28.6	23.6

Now urbanization is going on even more rapidly in Germany than in England. The death-rate in England and Wales rose from 23 in 1850 to 25.5 in 1914; what sharp fluctuations it reached 23.7 in 1880; since then it has declined to its present figure for normal times of 14. In France, after the war of 1870 and the small-pox epidemic of 1875, there has been a steady fall from 24 to 17 in German Empire in 1911. The net increase is only slightly larger (in proportion to the population) in Germany than in Eng-

¹ It must be remembered that the legitimate birth-rate in Berlin is undoubtedly high.

land : and the increase in our great colonies, especially in Australasia, is much higher than in Germany. There is therefore no reason to suppose that a rapid extension is going on to our disadvantage.

It is widely believed that the Roman Catholic Church, by strictly forbidding the artificial limitation of families, is increasing its numbers at the expense of the non-Catholic populations. To some extent this is true. The French figures for 1892-1900 give the number of children per marriage as :

Roman parents Catholic	5
Roman parents Protestant	4
Roman parents Jews	2.7

An examination of the tables in 'Who's Who' gives about the same proportion for well-to-do families in England. The Catholic birth-rate of the Irish is nearly six.¹ The French-Canadians are among the most prolific races in the world. On the other hand, their infant mortality is very high, and it is said that French-Canadian parents take these losses philosophically. It is quite a different question whether it is ultimately to the advantage of a nation which desires to increase its numbers to profess the Roman Catholic religion. The high birth-rates are all in unprogressive Catholic populations. When a Catholic people begins to be educated, the priests apparently lose their influence upon the habits of the laity, and a rapid decline in the birth-rate ensues. The most advanced countries which did not accept the Reformation, France and Belgium, are probably those in which parental procreancy has been curbed almost to excess. We must also remember that the Irish Jews, who are Protestants, but who live under simple conditions and under some of the French-Canadians, are equally prolific, as were our own colonists in the United States before that country was industrialised. The advantages in numbers gained by Roman Catholicism are likely to be confined to half-civilised countries, where

¹ The crude birth-rate of Ireland is wholly misleading, because so many young couples emigrate before the birth of their first child.

there is really room for more children, and where social conditions and the level of conduct are the chief factors in restricting the family.

The population of a settled country cannot be increased at will; it depends on the supply of food. The choice is between a high birth-rate combined with a high death-rate, and a low birth-rate with a low death-rate. The great saving of life which has been effected during the last fifty years owes much to the necessity of restricting the birth. The next question to be considered is how this restriction is to be brought about. The oldest methods are deliberate neglect and infanticide. In China, where conditions differ as to the extent to which female infants are exposed, the practice certainly prevents a loading of infants whose little mothers are unable to sustain on rice and water, which soon terminates their existence. Such methods would hardly find an advocate in Europe. The very ancient art of procuring miscarriage is a criminal art in most civilized countries, but it is practiced to an appalling extent. Hirsch, who quotes his own figures, estimates that 2,00,000 births are so prevented annually in the United States, 800,000 in Germany, 10,000 in France, and 15,000 in Lyons. In our own country it is exceedingly common in the mother's house, and attempts are now being made to prohibit the sale of certain preparations of herb which are used for this purpose. Added on grounds of public health and of morality, it is most desirable that this mischievous practice should be checked. Its great prevalence in the United States is to be attributed mainly to the drastic legislation in that country against the sale and use of preparations, to which many private sales adhere on moral or Catholic grounds, but which is surely on an entirely different level from the deterioration of life that has already begun. The "Comstock" legislation in America has done much harm. It is more than useless to try to get down by law a practice which a very large number of people believe to be innocent, and which must be left to the taste and conscience of the individual. To the general public it seems a pity after which high-minded married persons should avoid if they can practice still continued. Whatever

before the feeling of 'maritization and honor' with which Dr. Paul tells us to regard these estimates of life, whatever tends to produce or depress the maintenance of wedded love, is so far an evil. But this is emphatically a matter in which every man and woman must judge for themselves, and must refrain from judging others.

In every modern civilized country population is restricted partly by the deliberate postponement of marriage. In many cases this does no harm whatever; but in many others it greatly diminishes the happiness of young people, and may even cause minor disturbances of health. Nevertheless, it would not be so widely adopted, but for the influence, on the part of society, of the "great moral evil," the appearance of our civilization. In spite of the failure likewise of parents, medicals, and legislators to curb it out, and in spite of the acceptance of it as inevitable by the majority of Continental opinion, I believe that this domination will not long be tolerated by the conscience of the free and progressive nations. It is notorious that the whole body of women deeply resents the wrong and everywhere plans by it to be set right, and that, if democracy is to be a reality, the introduction of a considerable section of women drawn from the poorer classes cannot be suffered to continue. It is also plain to all who have examined the subject that the campaign against certain diseases, the malignity and wide diffusion of which are being more fully realized every year, cannot be successful through medical methods alone. If the restriction in question were abolished, medical science would soon reduce these scourges to manageable limits, and might at last exterminate them altogether; but while it continues there is no hope of doing this. I believe that the time will come when the trade in vice will cease; and if I am right, early marriage will become the rule in all classes. This will render the population question more acute, especially as the diseases which we hope to exterminate are the commonest cause both of sterility and of infant mortality. Under the pressure, no man expects to see preventive methods widely accepted as the least of unavoidable evils.

When we reflect on the whole problem in its widest

aspect, we see that civilised humanity is confronted by a Clash of Elements. On the one side, biological law insists its urge on forward in the struggle for existence and expansion. The nation is that race will have to be organised on the lines of greatest efficiency. A strong centralised government will develop itself largely in governing waste. All the resources of the nation must be used to the utmost. Power must be put up into abstractions; the unproductive labours of the whole and thinking must be judiciously controlled and limited. Individual whims must be crushed out; wages must be low and hours of work long. Moreover, the State must be expanded for war, for the neighbour, we must suspect, are following the same policy. Then the three great-group competition must come to its logical achievement in a life and death struggle. And war between two great-peopled countries, the both of which were efficient in a vital economy, must be a war of complete extermination or subordination. It must be so, the technical kind of war we achieve its object. The lesson of the present conflict will be as nothing compared with a struggle between two highly-organised State institutions, each of which knows that it must either colonise the territory of the other or starve. It is like to pretend that such a necessity will never arise. Another century of increasing Europe like that of the nineteenth-century would bring it very near. If this policy is adopted, we shall see all the principal States organising themselves with a perfection far greater than that of Germany to-day, but taking Chinese methods as their model; and the end will be the extermination of the smaller or lesser organisations. Such a prospect may well fill us with horror; and it is terrible to find some of the ablest thinkers of Germany, such as Ernst Trotsky, writing calm dogmas over 'the death of liberalism' and predicting the advent of an era of cut-throat international competition. Journal speaks of the folly of people whom friends profess to love; and who would care to live in such a world? But does Nature care whether we enjoy our lives or not?

The other choice is that which France has made for herself; it is on the lines of Plato's ideal State. Each country

is to be, as far as possible, self-sufficing. If it cannot grow sufficient food for itself, it must of course export its coal or its gold, or the products of its industry and ingenuity. But it must, above everything else, be "the master of its fate;" for this must be its aim. It must limit its population to that number, and the limit will be fixed, not at the maximum number who make their way here, but at the maximum number who can "live well." The object aimed at will not be constant expansion, but well-being. The energies liberated from the physical struggle for existence will be devoted to making social life wise, happier, more harmonious and more beautiful. Have we any reason to hope that this policy is not contrary to the law here which Nature imposes on every species in the world?

In the last place, would such a State escape being devoured by more brutal "expanding" neighbors? What would have happened to France if she had stood alone in this war? The danger is real; but we may answer that France, as a matter of fact, did not stand alone, because other nations thought her too precious to be sacrificed, and the completely organized competitive State which I have imagined would be a far more valuable place than Germany, and more pleasant to live in. The spectacle of a state not happier (than next door) would break up the purely competitive State here within; the strain would be too great for human nature. We cannot escape comfortably from the struggle for existence among the lower animals to our own species. For a long time past, human evolution has been directed, not to living anywhere, but to living in a certain way. We are guided by ideals for the future, by purposes which we clearly see before ourselves, in a way which is impossible to the brutes. These purposes are common to the large majority of men. No State can long maintain a rigid and oppressive organization, except under the threat of danger; and a nation which aims only at perfecting its own culture is not dangerous to its neighbors. It is probable that without the expected success of another military France on its eastern flank German civilization would have begun to crumble.

In the second place, would the absence of sharp compe-

times within the group lead to racial degeneration? This is a different question to answer. Perhaps a distinction of property and of the means to gratify the instincts would not be a misfortune. But it is certainly true that, if the question of natural selection is considered, rational selection must take its place. Facing this, important to a lesser type is inevitable. The infant science of eugenics will have much to say on this subject hereafter; at present we are only discussing how complex and obscure the laws of heredity are. The state of the future will have to step in to prevent the propagation of undesirable variations, whether physical or mental, and will doubtless find means to subvert the increase of families that are well endowed by Nature.

Assuming that a nation as a whole pursues a policy of this kind, and aims at such an equilibrium of birth and death as will set free the energies of the people for the higher objects of civilized life, how will it manage the counter-acting effects of family variations in the better classes correlated with endemic multiplication among the others which always exists in a large community? This is a problem which has not yet been solved. Public opinion is not ready for legislation against the multiplication of the rich, and it is not easy to see what form such legislation could take. Many of the very poor are not unwholesome parents; we must not confound economic prosperity with biological fitness. The 'retarded birth' should be raised, where it is possible, into a condition of self-respect and responsibility; but they must not be allowed to be a burden upon the efficient; and the upper and middle classes should simplify their habits so far as to make marriage and parenthood possible for the young psychological man. Special care should be taken that taxation is so adjusted as not to penalize parenthood in the socially valuable middle class.

For some time to come we are likely to see, in all the leading nations, a restricted birth-rate, prompted by desire for social betterment, combined, however, with responsiveness to the civil policy of commercial expansion, growing wealth, and military preparation. The nation will not cease

to fear and suspect each other in the twentieth century, and any uncertainty which thereon is to be a menace to Europe will keep back the progress and happiness of the east. The prospect is not very bright: a few progress-maddened might bring some nations into inevitable disaster. But the towering influence of national danger may perhaps be beneficial. For we have to remember the pitiable decay of the ancient classical civilization, which was partly due, as we have found, to a desire for comfortable and easy living. There have been signs that many of our countrymen no longer think the strenuous life worth while; part of our sentiment against Germany resembles the uncertainty of an old-fashioned lion, disturbed in his comfortable security by the competition of a young and more vigorous rival. It is even suggested that there should be no should protect ourselves against German competition by tariff walls. This abandonment of the free trade policy on which our prosperity is built would soon bring our over-populated island to ruin.

In conclusion, if we leave the distant future to find its path when the time comes, what should be our policy with regard to population for the next fifty years? I am led to an opinion which may seem to run contrary to the general purport of this article. For though the British Isles are even dangerously full, so that we are liable to be starved out if we lose the command of the sea, the British Empire is very far from being over-populated. In Canada and Australasia there is plenty room for nearly 500,000,000 people. There cannot do we considerably healthy for North American Europeans; there is no reason why they should not be as rich and powerful as the United States are now. We hope that we have saved the Empire from German rapidity—for the time; but we cannot tell how long we may be undisturbed. It would be criminal folly not to make the most of the empire granted us, by populating our Dominions with our own stock, while yet there is time. This, however, cannot be done by casual and unregulated migration of the old kind. We need an Imperial Board of Emigration, the officials of which will work in co-operation with the Governments of our Dominions. These Governments, it may

be questioned, will be anxious, after the war, to strengthen the colonies by increasing their population and developing their resources. They, like ourselves, have had a severe fight, and know that prompt action is necessary. Systematic plans of colonisation should be worked out, and our greatest drawback to the Dominions as work men, be found for them. Young women should be sent out in sufficient numbers to keep the women-quest. We know now that our young people who migrate are by no means lost to the Empire. The Dominions have shown that in times of need they are able and willing to defend the mother-country with their full strength. Indeed, a young couple who migrate are, likely to be of more value to the Empire than if they had stayed at home, and their chances of happiness are much increased if they find a home in a part of the world where new human beings are wanted. But serious official advice and help migration is difficult. There is no home where to send them now, not what training to give them. It takes too much money to send, and little disappointment spread. All this may be changed if the Government will take the matter up seriously. The real issue of this war is whether our great relations are to continue British, and this question will be decided not only on the field of battle, but by the action of our Government and people after peace is declared. The next fifty years will decide for all time whether these magnificent and rich empire countries were to be the home of great nations speaking our language, carrying on our institutions, and holding our traditions. When the future of our Dominions is secure, the part of England as a World-Power will have been played to a successful issue, and we may be content with a position more continuous with the small area of these islands.

I believe, then, that if facilities for migration are given by Government action, it will be not only possible, but desirable for the increase in the population of the Empire, which is a thing to be maintained during the twentieth century. It is, of course, possible that chemical discoveries and other scientific improvements may greatly increase the yield of food from the soil, and that in this way the food

limit to the population of the earth may be farther off than we now judge possible. But within a few centuries, at least, this limit must be reached; and after that we may hope that the world will agree to maintain an equilibrium between births and deaths, that being the most stable and the happiest condition in which human beings can live together.¹

¹ The possible effect of the labor movement in moderating the population is considered in the next Essay. The last two pages here, in my opinion, make the outlook less formidable.

THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN RACE

[THE GAZETTE LITERARY, 1885]

In the year 1885 Sir Charles Elliot ended his survey of 'Greater Britain' and his problems with the prediction that 'the world's future belongs to the Anglo-Saxons, the Russians, and the Chinese races.' This was in the heyday of British imperialism, which was inaugurated by Bunsen's 'Representative of England' and Froude's 'Queen,' and which inspired Mr. Chamberlain to predict at Toronto in 1881 that the 'Anglo-Saxon stock is relatively destined to be the predominant force in the history and civilization of the world.' It was an arrogant, but not uneducated, mood, which reached its climax at the 1883 Jubilee, and rapidly declined during and after the Boer war. These writers and statesmen were surely blind to the German peril, though the disciples of Treitschke were already working out a theory about the future destiny of the world, in which neither Great Britain nor Russia nor China counted for very much. There was disaster on both sides of the North Sea, which had to be paid for in blood. In both countries imperialism was a movement violently repugnant to idealism and humanity, and supported by very doubtful science. In the case of Germany the direction of herism was deliberate and conscious. Not only was every schoolboy taught up on coded population statistics and belated geography, but the high-art, book-peddler Otto von Guericke provided himself that he belonged to the great Berlin race, the great blood house of Prussia, which, as he was taught, had already produced nearly all the great men in history, and was now

show to show its proper place as master of the world. Political anthropology is its genuine mission. Race and nationality are determinants for which values had then their subjects are willing to fight, as they fought for what they called religion four hundred years ago. In reality, if we wish to find a pure race, we must visit the Esquimaux, or the Finns, or the Pygmies; we shall certainly not find one in Europe. Our own imperialists had their illusions too, and we are not rid of them yet, because we do not realize that the fate of races is decided, not in the council-chamber or on the battle-field, but by the same laws of nature which determine the distribution of the various plants and animals of the world. It may be that by approaching our subject from this side we shall arrive at a more realistic, if a more chastened, anticipation of our national future than was acceptable in the enthusiasm of expansion in the last twenty years of Queen Victoria's reign.

The history of the world shows us that there have been three great human invasions which from time to time have burnt their tracks and scorched neighbouring countries. There are the Arabian peninsula, the steppes of Central Asia, and the lands round the Baltic, the original home of the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon peoples. The invaders in each case were pastoral folk, who were driven from their homes by over-population, or drought and famine, or the pressure of enemies behind them. It is easy for nomads to 'pack,' even for great distances; and till the discovery of gunpowder they were the most formidable of foes. The Arabs and Northern Europeans have founded great civilisations; the Mongol hordes have been an unmitigated curse to humanity. The invaders never kept their blood pure. The famous French race is probably Fleming, and certainly not Breton. There are no pure Swedes in Europe, and the Hungarians have lost all connection to Magyar. The modern Germans seem to belong mainly to the north-lashed Alpine race, which migrated into Europe in early times from the Asiatic highlands. In England there is a larger proportion of Nordic blood, because the Anglo-Saxons partially exterminated the natives; but the old

Madagascar, where, which had made its way up the coast, among the coast, with little or even no knowledge of the French, and the Western Highlands, and where the last limited years, owing to frequent rebellions, has failed to thoroughly with the Anglo-French view that the Negroes are becoming better in their generation. This is not the story of a racial decay of the Negro, as the American Dr. Charles Woodhull suggests, but to be he suggested to be the fact that there are some to be a "Madagascar movement" and have lost a great power character than before. The influence of these schools are nearly all now faded, the being a characteristic of both the French and Anglo-American races. The transformation process, who perhaps brought with them the so-called "color" language as a racial shield, and showed them upon the white skin, seem to have left no other mark upon the population, though their type of head is prevalent over a great part of France.

The study of race in French is almost other than that one is a question of language importance for language and language, and it may not be said to language. But it is only lately that it has been studied systematically, and the French are not interested. Between the language of what we may call the anthropological school, already so fitted to, which is so one of the language of French that the latter might have to think that their language does not have to particular requirements. In accordance with this are the anthropological language derived in French, the language of French, the French in Spain and Africa. With a few generations of life in a more distant the French made systematic discovery. We shall show reasons for thinking that this study is much exaggerated, but there is undoubtedly some truth in it. It has been found to be impossible to make any the language of French, French, tropical French, and the French. It has been said that "there is no thing as racial generation of pure French blood." It is extremely difficult to bring up any one generation of white children in India. The French cannot maintain themselves without two admixtures in Madagascar and Chadabanga, but the French

in Java, though it is said that the expectation of life for a European in Java is as good as in his own country. It seems to be also true that the blood race suffers most in a hot climate. In the Philippines it was observed that the fair-skinned soldiers in the American army succumbed most readily to disease. In Queensland the Italian soldiers are said to stand the heat better than the English, and Mr. Rensselaer, among other hosts of good advice which he bestowed on liberty on the European nations, advised us to populate the tropical parts of Australia with immigrants from the Latin races. In India the English families who are settled in the country would to be exterminated by the climate; and on the high plateaus of the interior our countrymen find it necessary to pay periodical visits to the coast, to be refreshed. The early deaths and yet independent colonies of South America may indicate that the air of the Tropics is too stimulating for a life of high tension and excitement. There are some signs that the same may be true in a minor degree of the United States of America. Both the capitalist and the working man, if they come of English stock, seem to wear out more quickly than at home; and the mortality of marriages among the long settled American families is so pronounced that it can hardly be due entirely to voluntary restriction of procreation. The effects of an unhealthy climate are especially shown in nervous disorders, and are therefore likely to tell most heavily on those who engage in intellectual pursuits, and perhaps on women rather more than on men. The shocking effects of women's higher education in America are incontrovertible, though this influence is lately denied in England. At Wellesley College it was found that only half the lady graduates afterwards married, and the average family of those who did marry was less than two children. At Bryn Mawr only 42 per cent. married, and had 0.54 children each; the average family per graduate was therefore 0.23. If it be objected that new immigrants and their children are healthy and vigorous in America, it may be truly answered that the effects of an unhealthy climate are manifested fully only in the third and later generations. The sym-

most men is further supported by the loss of black men who try to settle in Europe. Their strongly pigmented skin, which seems to protect them from the selfish rays of the tropical sun, no longer is Europeans, and their local controls, which include a large number of colored people, find that the warmer climates of the West Indies are disadvantageous in a temperate climate. In any case, of the many thousands of negro servants who lived in England in the eighteenth century, it would be difficult to find a single descendant.

But there are other factors in the problem which should make us beware of large generalizations. It is obvious that since the American Republic contains many climates in its vast area, there may be parts of it which are perfectly healthy for Anglo-Americans, and other parts where they cannot live without degenerating. Very few additions, we are told, come from north of the latitude parallel of latitude. But the decline in the birth-rate is more marked in the older colonies, the New England States, where for a long period the English colonists, living mainly on the land, not only thrived and developed a singularly virile type of humanity, but multiplied with almost unexampled rapidity. The same is true not only of the French Canadian frontier, but of the South African River, who now numerous families in a climate very different from that of Holland. The inference is that Europeans living on the land may flourish in any tolerably healthy climate which is not tropical.

There are, in fact, two other causes besides climate which may prevent immigrants from multiplying in a new country. The first of these is the presence of malarial disease to which the old inhabitants are wholly or partially immune, but which had a virginal and in the history of the settlement. The strongest example is the West Coast of Africa, of which Miss Mary Kingsley writes: 'I remember, before you start to cast your lot with the West Coast, that the great bulk of them die of fever, or return home with their health permanently wrecked. Also remember that there is no getting acclimated to the Coast. There are, it is true, a few men out there who,

although they have been resident in West Africa for years, have never had fever, but you can count them on the fingers of one hand.' There is to be no acclimatization where the working-out is as drastic as this. Unless the tropical tropics of the European meet quit. There are parts of tropical America where the natives have actually been protected by the malaria, which keeps the white folk at one's length. But more often the malaria is on the side of the civilized man, killing off the natives who have not run the gauntlet of malarial life. The extreme reluctance of the barbarians who occupy the Roman Empire to settle in the towns is easily accounted for if, as is probable, the towns killed them off whenever they attempted to live in them. The difference is considerable between the fate of a conquered race which has become accustomed to town-life, and that of one which has not. There are no 'native questions' in the towns of any country where the aborigines were nomads or tillers of the soil. To the North American Indian, residence in a town is a sentence of death. The American Indians were accustomed to none of our epidemic diseases except malaria. In the north they were decimated wholesale by yellow fever; in Mexico and Peru, where large towns existed before the conquest, they had killed. Pp were decimated by measles; other barbarians by small-pox. Slaves have acquired, through various natural selection, a certain degree of immunities to diseases; but even now it is said that 'every other negro dies of consumption.' There are, however, two races, both long accustomed to town-life under terribly unhealthy conditions, which have shown that they can live in almost any climate. These are the Jews and the Chinese. The medieval Church exterminated all who were not naturally resistant to every form of malarial disease; the modern Jew, though abject of poor physique, is hard to kill. The same may be said of the Chinese, who, when at home, live under conditions which would kill most Europeans.

The other factor, which is really promoting the gradual disappearance of the Anglo-Saxons from the United States, is of a very different character. The descendants of the

old immigrants are on the whole the survivors of the struggle. Now is a time which hardly admits of exceptions, that circumstances do not maintain their uniformity. The ruling two rules would not, nothing else like success. Elders has called attention to the extreme respect paid to long descent in the French Empire, and to the strange fact that, in the fourth century, no immigrant of political modern could long hold all the great families of the Republic were extinct, so that the modern was plainly family of the state, whose name did appear in the state, rejected a people as greater than that of the French and English in this country. The own people, coming chiefly of persons, that is of our noble families, it is said, can trace their descent to the main line without a break to the French colony. The people of France take the same rule. According to France, the custom of her of prime-grains, combined with the habit of marrying late, and, as the last representatives of breeding families, tend to be better, is mainly responsible for this. Additional causes may be the greater danger which the other class meets in war, and, in French times, the executioner's axe. It is not that the treatment of this old independent women in French times is necessarily a factor in the inferiority of the mixed class.

This brings us naturally to the second part of our discussion—the consideration of the causes which lead to the increase or decrease of population. It is the most important part of our inquiry; for it is easily assumed that the French have still continued to send out colonies in large numbers, as it did in the last century, and the hope of the supposition that a large part of the world will speak English, let all that depend on the naturalization that the remaining time of our race is not yet over. Our starting-point must be that the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence is a constant fact in the human race, as in every other species of animals and plants. There is no species in which the numbers are not kept down, far below the natural capacity for increase, by the limitation of available food. It may not always be easy to trace the connection between the appearance

of new lives and the passing away of old, not to say whether it is the birth-rate which determines the death-rate, or the death-rate the birth-rate. But it is well known that, wherever statistics are kept, the numbers of births and of deaths rise and fall in nearly parallel lines, so that the net rate of increase hardly alters at all, unless some change, which can easily be traced, occurs in the habits of the people or in the amount of the food supply. In civilized countries the greatest care taken of human life, and its consequent prolongation, has reduced the birth-rate, just as in the higher mammals we find a greatly diminished fertility as compared with the lower, and a much higher survival-rate among the offspring born. The average duration of life in this country has increased by about one-third in the last sixty years, and the birth-rate has fallen in almost exactly the same proportion. The position of a nation in the scale of civilization may almost be gauged by its birth- and death-rates. The order in Europe, beginning with the lowest birth-rate, is France, Belgium, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Germany, Spain, Austria, Italy, Hungary, the Russian States, Russia. The order of death-rates, again beginning at the bottom, is Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Russia, Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania, Russia. These two lists, as will be seen, correspond very nearly with the scale of descending civilization, the only notable exception being the low position of France in the second list. This anomaly is explained by the fact that France having a stationary population, the death-rate in that country corresponds fairly with the gross expectation of life, whereas in countries where the population is increasing rapidly, either by means of birth-rate double or by immigration, the preponderance of young lives brings the death-rate down. We must, therefore, be on our guard against supposing that statistics with the lowest death-rates are necessarily the most healthy. In New Zealand, for example, the death-rate is under 16 per 1000, the lowest in the world; and though that country is undoubtedly

ladies, we are supposed that the average duration of life in New Zealand is a hundred years. To ascertain whether a nation is long-lived, we must correct the crude death-rate by taking into account the average age of the population. When this correction has been made, a low death-rate, and the low birth-rate which necessarily accompanies it, is a sign that the doctors are doing their duty by keeping their patients alive. If our physicians desire more maternity cases, they must make more work for the undertaker. Large families almost always mean a high infant mortality; and it is significant that a twelfth child has a very much poorer chance of survival than a first or second. The agitation for the improvement of motherhood and the reduction of infant mortality is therefore false, because, while other conditions remain the same, every baby 'nursed' made similar baby out of the world as prevents him from coming into it. The number of the people is not determined by philanthropists or even by parents. Children will come sometimes whenever there is room for them, and go when there is none. But other conditions do not remain the same, and it is in these other conditions that we must seek the cause of expansion or contraction in the number of a community.

At the end of the nineteenth century the population of England and Wales amounted to about five millions, and a hundred years later is about six. There is no reason to think that under the conditions then existing the country could have supported a larger number. The birth-rate was kept high by the pastoral state of the towns, and when the pressure of numbers was less felt than it is now, there it was possible to have, though not to rear, unlimited families. Gradually, from accidental circumstances, England was for a short time under-populated, and there were the periods when, according to Professor Thorold Rogers, Archbishop Coningtonham, and other authorities, the labourer was well off. The most striking example was in the half-century after the Black Death, which carried off nearly half the population. Wages increased threefold, and the Government tried in vain to prevent employers by enforcing pre-pledge acts. Not only were

wages high, but food was so abundant that farmers often gave their men a square meal which was not in the custom. The other period of prosperity for the working man, according to our authorities, was the second quarter of the eighteenth century. It has not, we think, been noticed that this also followed a temporary set-back in the population. In 1680 the population of England and Wales was 2,500,000; in 1710 it was more than a quarter of a million less. The cause of this decline is obvious, but its effects were showed themselves in wider conditions of life, especially for the poor. Such periods of under-nutrition, which admit new conceptions in still enjoying, are necessarily short. Population flows in as naturally as water finds its level.

It was not till the accession of George III. that the increase in our numbers became rapid. No one would then would have thought of singling out the Englishman as the embodiment of the good appetitive. However, in the nineteenth century found our countrymen 'as happy as Spaniards'; most foreigners were struck by our fondness for solid food and strong drink. The industrial revolution came upon us suddenly; it changed the whole face of the country and the apparent character of the people. In the far future our descendants may look back upon the period in which we are living as a strange episode which disturbed the natural habits of our race. The first impetus was given by the glander of Bengal, which, after the victories of Clive, flowed into the country in a broad stream for about thirty years. This ill-given would play the same part in stimulating English inclination as the 'pet millards' imported from France, did for Germany about 1810. The half-century which followed was marked by a series of inventions, which made England the workshop of the world. But the type of our industrial supremacy was, and is, our evil. Those who are in the habit of comparing the progressiveness of the North-Western European with the stagnation or decadence of the Latin races, forget the fact, which is obvious when it has once been pointed out, that the progressive nations are those which happen to have valuable real fields.

Canadian which have no soil are obliged to import it, paying the freight, or to make their land with charcoal. This process makes excellent steel—the superiority of Swedish reapers is due to wood-bushings—but it is a waste of wood that the Midwestern people very early in history injured their climate by cutting down their woody forest, thereby diminishing their wealth, and allowing the soil to be washed off the hillside. The result of the Midwestern act, in consequence, has been productive than they were two thousand years ago. But in England, when the steel was once made, all circumstances conspired to turn our once beautiful island into a chaos of heathen and mossy wastes, ridding of smoke, millstones, and people. We were no longer able to give our own food; but we made masses of goods which the manufacturers were eager to exchange for it; and the population grew like crops on a newly-irrigated desert. During the nineteenth century the numbers were nearly quadrupled. Let those who think that the population of a country can be increased at will, reflect whether it is likely that any physical, moral, or psychological change came over the nation coincidently with the inventions of the spinning-jenny and the steam-engine. It is too obvious for dispute that it was the possession of capital enabling employment, and of natural advantages for using it, that raised these multitudes of human beings into existence, to use the land which they paid for by their labour. And it should be equally obvious that the colonies of forty-six millions of people upon 121,000 square miles of territory depend entirely upon our finding a market for our manufactured goods, for we only are we able to pay for the food of the people. It is most unfortunate that these exports need, with our present population, include coal, which, if we had any thought for posterity, we should guard jealously and use sparingly; for in five hundred years at the outside our stock will be gone, and we shall sink to a third-rate Power at once. We are sacrificing the future in order to provide for an excessive and uncontrolled population in the present. During the present century we have begun to be conscious that our foreign

birth is decreased; and as sensitive to the birth-rate to economic conditions that it has begun to curve very slightly downward in relation to the death-rate, instead of descending with it in parallel lines.* This may be partly due to the curtailment of facilities for emigration, owing to the falling up of the new countries. For emigration does not diminish the population of the country which the emigrants leave; it only increases the birth-rate.

We get now in a position to enumerate the causes which actually lead to an increase in the population of a country. The first is an increase in the amount of land produced in the country itself. If the parks and gardens of the gentry were ploughed up or turned into allotments, a few hundred thousands would be added to the population of the United Kingdom, at the cost of one of the few remaining beauties which make our country attractive to the eye. The introduction of the potato into Ireland added several millions of spacial inhabitants to that ill-fortunated island, and when the crop failed, large numbers of them collected themselves on the United States, to the detriment of that country. The richest countries today are those which produce more food than they require, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Russia, and the Argentine. (We need hardly say that throughout this survey we are using the statistics of the years immediately before the war.) But this state of things cannot last long, for the net increase in such countries is incredibly high, either by reason of a very high birth-rate, as in Romania, or because governments seek to to enjoy a land of plenty. Another condition which leads to abnormally rapid increase is found when a civilized nation conquers and administers a backward country, introducing better methods of agriculture, and especially irrigation, and the reclamation of waste lands. The alien Government also gives greater security, without raising the standard of living among the natives, since the dominant race usually monopolizes the land.

* In the small islands round the coast increase has ceased for some decades. The chief attraction of these islands turned as natural centres of retirement adjustment to a state of equilibrium.

cause. In this way we are directly responsible for increasing the population of Egypt from seven millions in 1880 to nine and three-quarter millions in 1900, an augmentation which, in the absence of immigration, illustrates the great natural fertility of the human race in the rare circumstances when unchecked increase is possible. Still more remarkable is the rise in the population of Java from five millions in 1825 to twenty-eight and a half millions in the first decade of this century. The cause of this increase is the unimpaired supply of food combined with a very low standard of living, a combination which is specially characteristic of India, where intense super-saturation exists in India and China. A third cause is production of goods which can be exchanged for food grown abroad. This exchange, as we have seen, is stimulated by the presence of capital seeking employment. Our large towns are the creation of the capitalist, much more than if he had populated their depressing slums with his own children. Finally, a reduction in the standard of living of seven makes a larger population possible. The misery of the working class in the generation after the Napoleonic Wars was a condition of the prosperity of our export trade at this period; and conversely, the prosperity of our export trade was necessary to the existence of the low institutions. Deposition in the case of our dense population; and the proletarian would infinitely out their own friends by destroying it.

It is an important question whether a crowded population adds to the strength of a nation or not. Doubtless are undoubtedly of great importance in modern warfare. The French would have been less able to resist the Germans without allies in 1914 than they were in 1870. But we must not suppose that France could support a much larger population without reducing her standard of living to the point of under-feeding; and an under-fed nation is no longer of the endurance required of first-class soldiers. A nation may be so much weakened in physique by under-feeding as to be inept from a military point of view, in spite of great numbers; this is the case in India and China. Delicate workmen also diminish the day's

work. If European and American capital goes to China, and provides proper food for the workmen, we may have an early opportunity of discovering whether the supporters of the League of Nations have any real conscientious objection to violence and bloodshed. We may surmise that the European man, the father of all hosts of prey, is not likely to abandon the weapons which have made him the lord and the bully of the planet. He has no other opportunity in the time which he arrogantly despises. Unless a plague of peace the League would probably be his master. To believe that a short digestion, or even more better, that a nation with a low standard has no reserves to fall back upon: is like on the margin of civilization, which may easily fall in war-time, especially if much food is imported when conditions are normal. It was hardly by an accident that in this war the nations with a high birth rate broke up in the order of their fecundity, while France stood like a rock. The method of conquest by numbers, which we have seen to be possible by maintaining a low standard of living, not only diminishes the happiness of a nation, and keeps it low in the scale of civilization: it may easily prove to be a source of weakness in war.

The arguments often advanced to encourage dense population—which shows who says them thoughtlessly seems to be a good thing—such as maintenance of parent-land, and better housing at the expense of the taxpayer—have no effect except to penalize and mutilate those who pay the debt, for the benefit of those who receive them. They are intensely dyed in their opinion, for they struggle not at all to eliminate just those stocks which have shown themselves to be above the average in ability. The process has already advanced a long way, even without the reckless legislation which is now advocated. The lowest birth-rate, less than half that of the unskilled laborers, are those of the doctors, the teaching profession, and ministers of religion. The position of this class, intellectually and often physically the best in the kingdom, is rapidly becoming untenable, and it is the workers who mainly benefit by their depletion.

The causes of shrinkage in population are the opposition of those which we have found to promote its increase. The production of food may be diminished by the exhaustion of the soil, or by the progressive aridity caused by cutting down woods. The manufacture of goods to be exchanged for food may fall off owing to foreign competition, a result which is likely to follow from a rise in the standard of living, for the labourers then demand higher wages, and consume more food per head, which of itself must check fertility, since the same amount of food will now support a smaller number. The diffusion abroad by the whole working class that they can make work for each other, at wages fixed by themselves, is likewise a considerable indirect solvent 'by taking in each other's working.' On the supply of importable food may fall by the peeling up of the countries which grow it. Any conditions which make it no longer worth while to harvest capital in business, or which destroy credit, have the same effect. One of the causes of the decay of the Roman Empire was the drain of specie in the East in exchange for portable commodities. When trade is including a general European system over the industrial world, and the output falls still further. There have been alleged instances of people which have declined and even disappeared from denser soils. This is said to have been the cause of the extinction of the Franks of the Canary Islands; but the symptoms described rather suggest an epidemic of sleeping sickness.

Provisional as it may seem, neither voluntary restriction of births, nor famine, nor pestilence, nor war, has much effect in reducing numbers. Birth-control, instead of diminishing the population, now only lowers the death-rate. France in 1711, with a birth-rate of 28, had much the same net increase as in the years before the war with a birth-rate of 25. The parallel lines of the births and deaths in this country have already been mentioned. Famine and pestilence are followed, as usual by an increased number of births. India and China, though frequently ravaged by both these scourges, remain super-saturated. Of course, if the disease is chronic, the

population must fall to the point where the food is sufficient; and a syphilitic disease which has become endemic may be too strong for the natural breeding of the nation studied, as has happened in several Indian States; but an invasion of plague, cholera, or influenza, has no permanent effect on the numbers of Europeans. The immediate plague is its action upon population. When, as in the late war, nearly the whole of the able-bodied men are on active service, the loss of population caused by cessation of births is greater than all the total consumption of the battlefield. A rough calculation gives the result that twelve million lives have been lost to the belligerent nations by the operation of husbands and wives during the war. And yet it may be predicted that these losses, added to the eight millions or so who have been killed, would be made good in a very few years had not the destruction of capital and credit which the war has caused. If we study the vital statistics of a country like Germany, which has engaged in several wars more than births and deaths began to be registered, we shall find that the constant line representing the destructions of the birth-rate indicates a steep curve in the past or future while the war lasted, followed by a bump or high table-land for several years after. In a short time, as far as numbers are concerned, the war is as if it had never been. When we remember that the number of possible births is much reduced by casualties, this rise in the birth-rate after a war offers a strong confirmation of the thesis which we have been maintaining, that the rise and fall of population are not affected by conscious intention, but by increased or diminished pressure of numbers upon subsistence. If the German people, who before the war consumed more food than was good for them, have been habituated by our blockade to a systematic abstinence, we shall have contributed to the eventual increase of the German people, in spite of all their soldiers whom we killed in France, and the millions whom we starved in Germany. And if our success leads to a greater consumption by our working class, our population will show a corresponding decline. Emigration, as we have seen, does not diminish the home

population, by a single unit, and so, while there are empty lands available for colonisation, is in by far the best method of adding to the numbers of our race.

It should now be possible to form a judgment on the prospects of the English-Born race in various parts of the world. In India, Burma, New Guinea, the West Indian Islands, and tropical Africa there is no possibility of ever planting a healthy European population. These circumstances may prove fatal for us, or need no activities which we can exchange for land, but they are not, and never can be, colonies of English-Born men. The prospects of South Africa are very dubious. The white man is there an absentee, directing remunerative labour. The white population of the gold and diamond fields will wear thin till the mines give out, and no longer. Large tracts of the country may at last be occupied only by Kaffirs. The United States of America are becoming less Anglo-Born every year, and this process is likely to continue, since its unskilled labour the Italian and the Pole seem to give better value for their wages than the Englishman or Irishman, with his high standard of needs. In Canada, the temperate part of Australia, New Zealand, and Tasmania the chances for a large and flourishing English-speaking population seem to be very favourable. Though in these dominions the high standard of living is a check to population, and in the case of Australia the possibility of foreign conquest, while these political limits are still half-empty, cannot be altogether excluded.

Even more interesting to most of us is the future of our race at home. As regards quality, the outlook for the present is bad. We have seen that the destruction of the upper and professional classes by taxation directed expressly against them has already begun, and this destruction is certain to become more and more acute, till these classes are practically extinguished. The old aristocracy showed a tendency to decay even when they were actually favoured by legislation, and a little more pressure will drive them to voluntary sterility and emigration. Even more to be regretted is the decay of the professional aristocracy, a race almost peculiar to our country. These

families are often slow larger, and usually much better educated than the average; the persistence of marked ability in many of them, for several generations, is the delight of the superior. They are perhaps the last specimens of humanity to be found in any country of the world. Yet they have no prospects except to be gradually squeezed out of existence, like the patricians of the later Roman Empire. The power will apparently be grasped by a new highly privileged class, the aristocracy of income. This class, being intelligent, energetic, and intensely selfish, may retain its domination for a considerable time. It is a matter of course that, having won the privilege of monopolising the community, it will use all its efforts to preserve that privilege and to prevent others from sharing it. In other words, it will become an exclusive and strongly conservative class, on a broader basis than the aristocratic and commercial aristocracies which preceded it. It will probably be strong enough to discontinue the system of state debt which encourages the married to multiply, as it does multiply, much faster than the valueless part of the population. We are at present breeding a large parasitic class subsisting on the labour and harpings the Government. The comparative fertility of the lower class as compared with the better classes has greatly increased, and is still increasing. The competitive working-class families, as well as the rich, are far less fertile than the waste products of our civilisation. Dr. Tredgold found that 42 couples of the parasitic class averaged 7·2 children per family, while 51 representative couples from the working class averaged only 2·1 per family. Mr. Sidney Webb examined the statistics of the Members of Oaklands Society, which is patronised by the best type of merchants, and found that the birth rate among its members has fallen 46 per cent. between 1881 and 1891; or, taking the whole period between 1880 and 1894, the falling off is 52 per cent. This decline proves that the period of industrial expansion in England is nearly over. It would be far better if our birth-rate were as low as that of France, as it would be but for the excessive propagation of the "submerged tenth." England being now a paradise for brutes

where, the afterthoughts of Europe (175,000 in 1900) take the place of the better stock, whose position is made artificially unobtainable. These debts are at present paid by the minority, and this method may be repeated in elections until the losing of the proportional element comes to an ordered end. This will not take long, for it is certain that the amount of wealth available for plunder is very much smaller than is usually supposed. It is easy to destroy capital values, but very difficult to distribute them. The time will soon arrive when the patient sheep will be found to have lost not only his throat but his skin, and the privileged wolfman will then have to choose between tearing himself and shattering nations. There is little doubt which he will prefer. The result will be that the breeding stock of our sheep population will dry up, and the gradual disappearance of this element will be some compensation, from the negative point of view, for the destruction of the intellectual class. This process will necessarily, and inevitably, diminish the population; and there are several other factors which will operate in the same direction. High wage industry can only maintain itself against the competition of cheaper labour abroad by introducing every kind of labour-saving device. The number of hands employed in a factory must progressively diminish. And so, in spite of all that ingenuity can do, the competition of the cheaper races is certain to cripple our foreign trade, the trade unions will be obliged to provide for a shortage in their numbers. We may expect that every national will be allowed to place one son, and only one, in the privileged corporation. A man will become a minor or a subvaporar "by paternity," and it will be difficult to gain admission to a union in any other way. The position of those who cannot find a place within the privileged circle will be no unhappy that most nations will take care to have one son only. Another change which will tend to discourage families will be the increased employment of women in bread-winning. Nothing is more remarkable in the study of vital statistics than the comparative lateness of those districts in which women earn wages, and of those in which they do not. The per-

of increase among the miners is as great as that of the Polish rural laborers, and the obvious reason is that the miner's wife keeps making big children, since she does not earn wages. Contrast with these high figures (running up to 40 per thousand) the rate for Scotland of towns like Fifehead, where the women are engaged in the textile industry and earn regular wages in support of the family budget. If the time comes when the majority of women are wage-earners, we may even see the process of population entirely reversed. There is every sign of the nation's inclination to at last coming to a progressive decrease in our national fertility. It must be anticipated, however, that to prevent the natural increase, in years past, is 8 or 10 per thousand, so that it may be some time before an equilibrium is reached. But if our production rate ceases, it probably declines, and probably a rapid rate, is likely to follow. For our ability to exchange our native fertility for food will grow steadily less, as the self-indulgent and "wasteful" laborer succeeds in gaining his wishes. If the coal begins to give out, the wheat will become a cost.

We are witnessing the decline and fall of the social order which began with the industrial revolution 150 years ago. The master of industrialism has begun to mortify, and the end is in sight. Within 200 years, it may be—for we must allow for hurricanes and crop-ravages which will retard the flow of the stream—the laborer and towns which disfigure our landscape may have disappeared, and their sites may have been reclaimed for the grove. Manumission legislation, as far from averting this misfortune, is more likely to accelerate it, and the same may be said of the humane greed of our new masters. It is indeed imperative to observe how rapidly and consistently which twice generations are the only passions which the practical politician needs to consider, namely desire their own ends. The working man is making all the trouble on which he is created. He may bask for a time in a minority of his own class, but only by making the dream of the rich. A densely populated country, which is unable to feed itself, can never be a working-man's paradise, a land of cheap houses and high wages. And the sentimentalist, blind only

to be cruel, unwittingly producing precisely the results which he most deplored, though they are often much more beautiful than his own time. The evil that he would be done not; and the good that he would not, that his successors do.

But, much as we must regret the apparently inevitable relations upper and upper middle classes, in which England in the past has used the major part of her produce, we cannot regret the trend of events as an essential malformation. The industrial revolution has no doubt had some beautiful results. It has founded the British Empire, the most interesting and perhaps the most successful experiment in government in a large scale that the world has yet seen. It has led two formidable attempts to place Europe under the heel of military domination. It has brought order and material civilization to many parts of the world which before were barbarous. But these achievements have been counterbalanced by many evils, and in any case they have done their work. The aggregation of mankind in large towns is itself a misfortune; the life of great cities is wholesome neither for body nor for mind. The separation of classes has become more complete; the country has even be divided into the picturesque counties whose poetry is spent, and the ugly counties where it is made. Except London and the suburbs, the whole of the South of England is more or less ghostlike. We need not add that in the early days of the movement the workman and his children were exploited ruthlessly. It is true that if they had not been exploited they would not have existed; but a root of bitterness was planted which, according to what seems to be the law in such cases, sprang up and bore its poisonous fruit about two generations ago. It is a striking fact that the worst trouble is now made by the youngest generation. The huge fortunes which were made by the industrialists were not, on the whole, well spent. Their luxury was not of a refined type; literature and art were not intelligently encouraged; and even science was much inadequately supported. The great achievements of the nineteenth century in science and letters, and to a less degree in art, were independent of the industrial world,

and were chiefly the work of that class which is now suffering helplessly under the blows of predatory taxation. Capitalism itself has degenerated; the typical millionaire is no longer the captain of industry, but the international banker and company promoter. It is more difficult than ever to find any rational justification for the inequalities which are in the hands of a few persons. It is not to be expected that the working class should be less greedy and unscrupulous than the aristocracy; indeed it is plain that, now that it realises its power, it will be even more so. In some ways the spiritual character has stood the strain of these monstrous conditions very well. Those who feared that the modern Englishman would make a poor soldier have had to see that they were entirely wrong. But so long as individualism continues, we shall be in a state of likely disquiet and war. There can be no industrial peace while our urban population remains, because the large towns are the cradle of the system which their inhabitants now want to destroy. They can and will destroy it, but only by destroying themselves. When the martial war is over we shall have a comparatively small population, living mainly in the country and cultivating the fruits of the earth. It will be more like the England of the eighteenth century than the England which we know. There will be no very rich men; and if the hierarchy is regulated there should be no pauper. It will be a far pleasanter age to live in than the present, and more favourable to the production of great intellectual work, for life will be more leisurely, and social conditions more stable. We may hope that some of our best families will determine to survive, *enle guen* *enle guen*, until there better times arrive. We shall not attempt to prophesy what the political constitution will be. Every existing form of government is bad; and our democracy can hardly survive the two diseases which generally kill democracies—reckless plunder of the national wealth, and the impotence of the central government in face of revolutionary and predatory combinations.

Nevertheless, we must understand that although the introduction of socialism in the near, and the reduction

of conduct based on dignity and courage, must lead us to somewhat pessimistic and cynical views of human nature, there is no reason why individuals, when they wish to make a career out of politics since it is the sad lot of politicians always to deal with human nature of its worst, should condemn themselves to the low standards of the world around them. It is only "in the lump" that humanity, whether poor or rich, "is bad." There are materials, though far less abundant than we could wish, for a spiritual reformation, which would sweep the transition to a new social order, and open to us unending sources of happiness and inspiration, which would not only enable us to tide over the period of dislocation, but might make the whole world our debtor. No nation is better endowed by nature with a healthy set more idealistic than the English. We were never intended to be a nation of shopkeepers, if a shopkeeper is deemed to be merely a shopkeeper, which of course he is not. Our loyal consideration has been a temporary aberration; the sentimental Englishman is not the hero of fiction "Gull-ible"; he is Shalsh, Davis, Shakespeare, Milton, Johnson, or Wordsworth, with a pleasant spot of Dickens. He is, in a word, an idealist who has not quite forgotten that he is descended from an independent race of seafarers, accustomed to think and act for themselves. Mr. Harcourt Ellis, one of the stoutest and most honest of our people's leaders, quotes from an anonymous journalist a prediction which may come true: "London may not be the spiritual capital of the world; when Asia-rick is all that gold can buy and power can give, lord of lands and lord of ladies of railways and promulgator of police regulations, glorious in all material glories—power, splendour and show, before a foreign customer in the possession of all these nations." For, as the Greek poet says, "the world's wealth is the only real wealth." The spirit creates values, while the demagogue derives his strength like dew from wheels of them. "All that matters" is that the world can neither give nor take away. The spiritual integration of society which we desire and intend after all must be illuminated by the dry light of science, and warmed by the rays of idealism.

a white light but not cold. And idealism must be compensated as a religion, for it is the function of religion to prevent the lights of the flowering-trees of the spirit from being lost. Science has not yet come to its own in shaping the beliefs and practices of mankind, because it has long so much excluded from higher education, and so much repressed by sentimentalism, under the wing of religion. The nation that does find a practical reconciliation between science and idealism is likely to take the first place among the peoples of the world. In England we have to struggle not only against ignorance, but against a deep-seated intellectual laziness, which is our worst national fault. The Englishman takes no risk, which he has never met before, as he takes the direction of his journey in a steamship cabin; and he takes opportunities of making things unpleasant for those who stir inconvenient truths. As Samuel Butler says: "We hold it needed to have a certain number of unshakable examples whose unerring fidelity shall serve as a warning to those who do not cultivate a power of inward self-control which shall prevent them from saying, or even thinking, anything that shall not be to their immediate and palpable advantage." To do our countryman justice, it is often not self-interest, but a tendency to deal with the concrete instance, in disregard of the general law, that blinds them to the larger aspects of great problems. Those who are able to trace causes and effects further than the majority seem apt to be unpopular, but they will not mind it, if they can do good by speaking. The light of events will justify them, and science has a new weapon in official statistics which will register at once the disastrous effects upon wealth and trade which the insane theories of the demagogue will bring about. No agitator can explain away unexplained figures; if we go down hill, we shall do it with our eyes open. It may be that reactions will be set up which will make the anticipations in this article erroneous. Things never turn out either as well or as badly as they logically ought to do. Prophecy is only an assumption; what does concern us all deeply is that we should see in what direction we are now moving.

MURDOCK COLE AND THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

[1889]

THE strength and the weakness of the Anglican Church lie in the fact that it is not the best representative of any well-defined type of Christianity. It is not strictly a Protestant body: for Protestantism is the democracy of religion, and the Church of England retains a hierarchical organization, with an order of priests who claim a divine commission not conferred upon them by the congregation. It is not a State Church as the Russian Empire has¹ a State Church. There is a position which it has neither the will nor the power to occupy. Still less could it ever justify a claim to separate existence as a purely Catholic Church, independent of the Church of Rome. A community of Catholics whose claim to be a Catholic and not a Protestant Church is denied by all other Catholics, by all Protestants, and by all who are neither Catholics nor Protestants, could not long retain sufficient prestige to keep its adherents together. The destiny of such a body is written in the history of the "Old Catholics," who seceded from Rome because they would not accept the dogma of Papal infallibility. The seceders included many men of high character and abilities, but in numbers and influence they are quite insignificant. The Church of England has only one title to exist, and it is a strong one. It may claim to represent the religion of the English people as no other body can represent it. "The Church," Giffinger wrote in 1871, "is an national, so deeply rooted in popular affection, so bound up with the institutions and manners of the country,

1889.

or as presented in its influence on national character.' These words are still partly true, though it is not possible to make the country with so much confidence as when Deighton wrote. The English Church represents, on the religious side, the conservatism, taste, and prejudice of the English gentleman, that truly national ideal of character, which has long since lost its adventurous connection with knighthood and property in land. A love of order, cleanliness, and good taste has led the Anglican Church along a middle path between what a seventeenth-century divine called 'the monstrous greatness of the Church of Rome and the equalled sterility of fanatic sectarians.' A love of order and respect for personal uprightness, a hatred of rapacity and lawlessness, created and long maintained in the English Church an intense repugnance against the priestcraft of the Roman hierarchy, feelings which have only died down because the latter members of the sacerdotal clergy have at last become few. A passion for liberty, combined with contempt for division of opinion, produced a system of graduated rules in Church government which left a large measure of freedom, both in speech and thought, even to the clergy, and encouraged its respect for what Catholics mean by authority. The Anglican Church is also characteristically English in its desire for legal and intellectual consistency and in its distrust of unbridled emotionality, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was known and denuded under the name of 'enthusiasm.' This type is not essentially aristocratic. It does not ignore the higher kinds of the working class, which respects and admires the qualities of the 'gentleman,' though it wants the privilege long connected with the name. But it has no attraction for what may be loosely called the vulgar class, where religious feelings find a natural vent in an unvarnished mysticism and sentimental romanticism. This class, which forms the backbone of Dissent and Liberalism, is instinctively antipathetic to Anglicanism. Not even the Anglican type of Christianity appeal at all to the 'Globe Village,' whose temperament is radically opposite to that of the English, not only in religion but in most other

RELIGION. The Irish and the Welsh are no more likely to become Anglicans than the husband British are to adopt Roman Catholicism. Whether Roman is a permanent minority in England is a most difficult question, in spite of the class differences of temperament above mentioned. If the Anglican representation were strong enough to permit the order of laymen to be developed on strictly Evangelical lines, the lower middle class might feel within the Church the mental food which is now made in Nonconformist chapels, and might gain in breadth and dignity by belonging once more to a great historic body.

The Church of England, then, was justified in existence as English Christianity, and in no other way. It began its separate career with a series of shoddy and illegal compromises, in the belief that there is an underlying unity, though not uniformity, in the religion as well as in the character of the English people, which would be strong enough to hold a national Church together. The discussions from the Reformation settlement were essentially insignificant, and their existence was not regarded as a peril to the Church, for it was recognized that in a few century absolute agreement cannot be secured. The Roman Catholics, after some drastic persecutions, were allowed to remain loyal to their old allegiance in spiritual matters, while the Independents and similar bodies were separated on principle, and upheld the 'disunity of Christ' as a thing desirable in itself. But the debility of the Wesleyan Methodists was another matter. This was a blow to the Church of England as irreparable as the loss of Northern Europe to the Papacy. It finally upset the balance of parties in the Church, by detaching from it the larger number of the Evangelicals, particularly in the tradesman class. It gave a great stimulus to Nonconformity, which now became for the first time an important factor in the national life. Till the Wesleyan movement, the Nonconformists in England had been a feeble folk. From a schism made in the Church in 1700, it appeared that the Romanists numbered almost one in twenty of the population. There they are as numerous as the Anglicans. Their prestige has also been largely augmented by their

dominating position in the United States, where the Episcopal Church, long viewed with disfavour as tainted with British sympathies, has never recovered its lost ground, and is a comparatively small, though wealthy and influential sect. Within the Anglican communion, the inevitable religious revival of the nineteenth century began an Evangelical line, but went with a bent determined by other influences than those which created England with the unambiguously biblicist shape of the Wesleyans. The extent of the revival has indeed been much over-gestimated by the numerous apologists of the Catholic movement. The undoubted increase of professional regularity and efficiency among the clergy has been taken as proof of a corresponding access of enthusiasm among the laity, for which there is not much evidence. In spite of clerical services and an easy standard of clerical duty, the observance of religion held a larger place in the average English home before the Oxford Movement than it often occupies, larger, indeed, than they do now, when family prayers and Bible reading have been abandoned in most households.

The Oxford Movement claimed to be, and was, a revival of the principles of Anglo-Catholicism, which had not been left without witness for any long period since the Reformation. The continuity is certain, as is the continuity of the Revolution of our day with the Transcendence of seventy years ago; but the development has been rapid, especially in the last thirty years. Those who can remember the High Churchmen of Pusey's generation, or their disciples who in many country parsonages preserved the faith of their Transcendent teachers whole and unbroken, must be struck by the divergence between the principles which they then held predominantly maintained, and those which the younger generation, who use their names and enjoy their wealth, strive to be their own.

In the Transcendence the Puritans seemed to have recovered life again, and one might easily find enthusiastic Jacobites among them. Unlike their successors, they showed no sympathy with political Radicalism. Their love for and loyalty to the English Church, which found malicious expression in Keble's poetry, were intense. They were not

limits in Evangelism within the Church, until the ultra-Protestant party declared war against them; but they showed Diems with more and abhorrence. They would gladly have excluded Romanists from any status in the Universities, and opposed any measures intended to moderate their prejudices or remove their disabilities. Archbishop Benson, in his steady opposition to the 'conscience clause' in Church schools, was a typical representative of the old High-Church party. But still more intense was their animosity against religious Liberalism. Even when the feud with the Evangelists had developed into open war, they were ready to join with Lord Shaftesbury and his party in bitter anathemas against the authors of 'Essays and Reviews.' The beginnings of Old Testament criticism evoked an outburst of fury almost unparalleled. When Bishop Gray, of Cape Town, solemnly 'discommunioned' Bishop Colenso, of Natal, and enjoined the laity to 'treat him as a heathen man and a publican,' the exposing of the unbalanced character of portions of the Pentateuch, he became a hero with the whole High Church party, and even the more liberal among the bishops were moved by the impulse of feeling which the issue aroused. In the same period, many Oxford men rose to remember Bishop Nicholson's attack upon Darwinism, and, some what later, Dean Burgon's University sermon which ended with the stirring peroration: "Leave me my anathemas in Paradise, and I leave you yours in the Ecological Gardens!" From the same pulpit Kidder, a little before his death, uttered a potent reinforcement against the course which his younger disciples were taking about inspiration and Creation.

Moreover his tradition was a very prominent feature in the theology of the older generation. They spent an immense amount of time, learning, and ingenuity in such. Being a nation of priests and scholars, valuing for their principles, reaching back to the earliest times, and handed down in this country by a series of Anglo-Catholic divines. This ultraliberal tradition was composed of an 'pious state,' a 'mechanical unpacking,' as Father Tyrrell puts it, of the doctrine that delivered to the Apostles.

The Church, according to their theory, was supernaturally guided by the Holy Ghost, and its decisions were consequently infallible, so long as the Church remained undivided. Thus the earlier General Councils, before the schism between East and West, may not be appealed against, and the Church itself is by them not never to err. Since the great schism, the infallible inspiration of the Church has been in abeyance, like an old English peasant when a year has no two or more daughters and no sons. This historicist theory condemns all later developments, and leaves the Church under the weight of the dead past. On the question of the Establishment the party was divided, some of its members attaching great value to the union of Church and State, while others made claims for the Church, in the name of self-government, which were hardly compatible with Establishment. Their bond of union was their conviction of 'the necessity of impressing on people that the Church was more than a merely human institution; that it had privileges, sacraments, a ministry, sustained by Christ Himself; that it was a matter of highest obligation to remain united to the Church.'¹

As compared with their successors, the Tractarians were academic and learned; they preached thoughtfully and carefully prepared sermons; they copied letters in the ecclesiastical authority, and often required in very simple and 'backward' countries. Their theory of the Church, their personal piety and self-discipline, were of a thoroughly medieval type, as may be seen from certain chapters in the life of Pusey. They taught the laity a high Catholicism, at Oxford and elsewhere, with a whole-hearted conviction that there are no schisms or heresies. Oxford has not forgotten the election, in 1851, of an orthodox moral officer to a chair of history for which Freeman was a candidate.

A change of tone was already noticeable, according to some Church men after Newman's conversion. Many High Churchmen, in speaking of the English Church, became apologetic or parading or incoherent. Progressive

¹ *Salmon's Formation*, p. 16.

members of the party professed a dislike for the same language, and wished to be styled the better part and whole. The cause then began to speak of their opponents in the Church as Protestants; no longer as ultra-Protestants. Other changes were manifested themselves. The ecclesiastical side of the movement had collapsed; the appeal to antiquity became only a convenient argument to defend practices adopted on quite other grounds. The spirit of the Catholic revival was not learned; they knew more less of the Fathers than of their Bibles. Their chief literature consisted of a weekly penny newspaper, which spoke only too well their passions and aspirations. On the other hand, they are far less than the other generation. The movement has become democratic; it has passed from the quadrangles of Oxford to the streets and lanes of our great cities, where hundreds of devoted clergymen are working valiantly, without care for remuneration or thought of recognition, among the poorest of the populace. Of late years, the more energetic section of the party has not only abandoned the "Church and King" Toryism of the old High Church party, but has plunged into socialism. The Methodist community is said to be strongly imbued with collectivist ideas; and the Christian Social Union, which is chiefly supported by High Churchmen, tends to become more and more a Union of Christian Socialists, instead of being, as was intended by its founders, a non-political association for the study of social duties and problems in the light of the Sermon on the Mount. This attitude is partly the result of a close acquaintance with the sufferings of the urban proletariat, which moves the persons who minister among them to a generous sympathy with their lot; and, partly, it may be, to an unavowed calculation that an alliance with the most rapidly growing political party may in time become beneficial to the Church. Their methods of teaching are also more democratic, though many of them make the fatal mistake of despising preaching. They rely partly on what they call "colloquial Catholic teaching," including frequent exhortations in the practice of confiding and partly on appeals to the eye, by symbolic ritual and

eloquence recommended. Their more remote members are often admirably performed from a spontaneous point of view, and are far superior to most Roman Catholic functions in fervour, honesty, and good taste. The extreme section of the party is extravagantly hostile, not only repudiating the membership of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but flooding the bishops with studied abuse. A glaring instance is to be found in the correspondence between Mr. Albanian Eley and the Bishop of Oxford, which informed the Report of the Royal Commission on ritual practices.

Obviously, the modern Ritualist is prepared to reconsider the old theory of inspiration. He takes, indeed, but little interest in the Bible; his motto is not the *Scripta*, but 'the Church.' What he means by the Church is a mystery to say. The old English theory of the infallible undivided Church is not repudiated by him, but does not appeal to minds which feel devoted much more than he does; he is not yet, except in a few instances, disposed to accept the modern Roman Church as the abode of divinity; and the English Church has no living value to which he pays the slightest respect. The 'tradition of Western Catholicism' is a phrase which has a meaning for him, and he probably hopes for a reunion, at some distant date, of the English Church with a reformed Rome. It is therefore essential, in his opinion, that no alteration shall take place in the formulation which we share with Rome; the Bible may be thrown to the winds, but the Creed is inviolable. The Thirty-nine Articles he passes by with silent disdain. They are, he thinks not unjustly, a document to which no man, High, Low, or Broad, can now subscribe without mental reservation.

The theory of development in divinity, which, in its latest application by 'Modernists' like Loisy and Tyrrell, is now ignoring the Roman Church, is meeting interest in a few of the more thoughtful Anglo-Catholics; but the majority are bound to the difficulties for which the theory of two kinds of truth is a desperate remedy. Not in a kindly, perhaps, but the plain Englishman will ever allow that an universally historical proposition may be taken as a matter of fact, but true for faith.

The party in the Church here is by Pope, who represents the opinions of the more enterprising among the laity and clergies, and is president of their society, the English Church Union. It has the able conducted weekly newspaper above referred to, and it has the general sympathy and support of the strongest man in the English Church, Charles Gore, Bishop of Birmingham. This partly, partly by his personal qualities—his eloquence, high-minded disinterestedness, and splendid generosity, and partly by knowing exactly what he wants, and having full sway of his opinions, has of present an influence in the English Church which is probably far greater than that of any other man. It is therefore a matter of public interest to ascertain what his views and intentions are, as an ecclesiastical statesman and reformer, and as a theologian.

Bishop Gore exercised a strong influence over the younger men in Oxford before the publication of *'Faint Words.'* But it was his advocacy of this book, and his contribution to it, which first brought his name into prominence as a leader of religious thought. The religious public, with rather more hesitation than usual, looked on the pages about inspiration, and the limitations of Christ's human knowledge, which are from the editor's own pen, as the most significant part of the book. The authors are believed to have been amazed by the disproportionate attention paid to this short section. But as these three pages indicated a new departure among the High Church party, a change more important than the acceptance of the doctrine of evolution, which was being made acceptable for the religious public by the brilliant writings of Asquith Moore. The acceptance of the reading of modern criticism as to the authenticity of the 110th Psalm, in the face of the recorded testimony of Christ that it was well known by David, was a concession to *'Modernism,'* which staggered the old-fashioned High Churchman. Liddon did not conceal his distress that such doctrine should have come out of the Prayer House. But the manifesto was well timed; it enabled the younger men to go forward more boldly, and modified nothing that was in any way essential to the Anglo-Catholic position. There

ENGLISH HOME AND CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN

the appearance of 'Last Week,' the High Church clergy have been able without fear to prove their belief in the scientific theories associated with Darwin's name, and their rejection of the rigid doctrine of verbal inspiration, while the Evangelicals, who have not been constituted by their leaders, adhere under the approach of serious examinations in their attitude towards biblical studies.

In Canon of Westminster, and then in Faculty of Westminster, and of Birmingham, Dr. Gore has written and spoken much, and has defined his position more clearly in relation to Anglo-Catholicism, to Church Reform, and to the social question. It will be convenient to take these three heads separately.

THE Bishop regards the existence of the Ritualists as a deplorable but probably inevitable incident in a great movement. He quotes Newman's remonstrance against some half-headed members of his adopted Church, who, 'having done their best to set the house on fire, have to retire the next day recognising the flames.' But he reminds us that there has always been 'intemperance and' in the Church, from the time of St. Paul's letters to the Church at Corinth to our own day. 'It must needs be that offences come,' wherever persons of limited wisdom are very much in contact. The remedy for intemperance is to give due scope for the legitimate principle. In the case of the so-called Ritualist movement, the inspiring principle or motive is really found. It is the idea of a visible Church, asserting heral authority over its members.

This is the key to Bishop Gore's whole position. It rests on the conviction that Jesus Christ founded, and meant to found, a visible Church, an organized society. It is reasonable, the Bishop says, to suppose that He did intend this, for it is only by becoming embodied in the constitutions of a society, and inhering in its actions, that ideas have reality and power. Christianity could never have lived if there had been no Christian Church. And, from the first, Christians believed that this society, the Catholic Church, was not left to organize itself on any model

¹ Contemporary Review, April 1886.

which from time to time might seem to ponder the Lord's supper, but was instituted from above, as a Divine ordinance, by the authority of Christ himself.' The witness of the early Christian writers is unanimous that the representation of a visible Church was a prominent feature in the Christianity of the sub-apostolic age, and it is plain that the civil power supported the Christians just because they were so well organized. The Roman Empire was accustomed to tolerate superstitions, but it was part of her policy to suppress college districts. The witness of the New Testament points in the same direction. Jesus Christ recommended His message, not by writing, but by a 'little flock' of devoted adherents. He instituted the two great sacraments (Bishop Doane will admit no uncertainty on this point) to be a token of membership and a bond of brotherhood. He instituted a status *Dei* which was to be wide enough to embrace all, but which makes the fact an exclusive claim. The "heaven" of the first century was a city, a new Jerusalem; Christians are spoken of by St. Paul as citizens of a heavenly commonwealth. The distinction between the universal invisible Church and particular visible Churches is 'clearly misapprehended,' and was well known long ago by William Law in his controversy with Hoadley.

As for the 'Apostolical Succession,' Dr. Doane thinks that its principle is more important than the form in which it is embodied. The succession would not be broken if all the presbyters in the Church governed as a college of bishops; and if something of this kind actually happened for a time in the early Church no argument against the Apostolical Succession can be based thereon.¹ The principle is that no ministry is valid which is assumed, which a man takes upon himself, or which is delegated to him from below. That this theory is Sacramentalism in a sense may be admitted. But it does not imply a vicarious priesthood, only a representative one. It does not deny the priesthood which belongs to the Church as a whole. The true meaning of the doctrine, namely that Christianity is the life of an organized

¹ *The Church and the Ministry*, pp. 4, 16.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

society, in which a graduated body of ordained ministers is made the instrument of unity. It is no doubt true that in such a Church spiritual gifts are made to mediate spiritual gifts, but happily we may distinguish character and office. Nor must we be deterred from entering our restrictions by the independent position which we are sure to lose, that we are 'unhitching' the non-episcopal leaders. We do not assert that God is tied to His covenant, but only that we are so.

Dr. Gore has no difficulty in proving that the ecclesiastical history of the Christian ministry took shape at an early date, and has been consistently maintained in the Catholic Church from ancient times to the present. It is much more difficult to trace its back to the Apostolic age, even if, with Dr. Gore, we accept as certain the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles, which is still not proven. The 'Dilemma' is a standing-thing to those who wish to find Catholic practice in the century after our Lord's death; but that dilemma is dissolved as compared by a Jewish Christian for a Jewish Christian community. After the second century, the apologetic for the priesthood are in number waters.

The conclusion is that 'the various presbyterian and congregationalist organizations, in disregarding with the episcopal succession, violated a fundamental law of the Church's life.' 'A minister not episcopally received is invalid, that is to say, it falls outside the conditions of sustained unity, and cannot justify its existence in terms of the covenant.'¹ The Anglican Church is not asking for the cause to be divided all her own way; she has much to do to recall herself to her true principles. 'God's promise to Israel was that she should remember her ways and should be ashamed, when she should receive her sisters Samaria and Sodom, and that she would give them to her daughters, but not by her covenant.'² The 'covenant' which the Church is to be content to keep in order to receive Samaria and Sodom this 'Pro-Churchian' can hardly be expected to which this method of opening

¹ *The Church and the Ministry*, p. 125.

² *Ibid.*, p. 122.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

capitalized) is apparently the movement between Church and State. 'In the future the Anglican Church must be content to act as that of all, part and parcel of the Catholic Church, ruled by her laws, empowered by her spirit.' The bishops are to be ready to maintain, at all costs, the highest spiritual independence which belongs to their office.

Such a theory of the constitution of a true Church necessarily requires, as a corollary, a rejection of the Roman Catholic theory of orders, which reduces the Anglican clergy to the same level as the ministers of other national sects. Bishop Gore answers the objection that the Roman Church is the logical expression of his theory of the ministry, by saying that Roman Catholicism is not the development of the whole of the Church, but only of a part of it; and moreover, that spiritually it does not represent the whole of Christianity as it finds expression in the first Christian age or in the New Testament.¹ The Roman Church is a one-sided development of the religion of Christ—a development of those qualities in Christianity with which the Latin genius has special affinity. It has remained itself in substantial decisions, involving a different appreciation of the intellectual and moral claims of truth to be valued for its own sake no less than for its results. Much of its teaching can only be explained on the basis of an 'over-skillful accommodation to the spontaneous natural instincts in religion.'² The fact that the highest section of Christendom has become what Rome now is, is no proof that there is the line of true development. We can see this clearly enough if we consider the case of Buddhism. The main existing developments of Buddhism are a more intensity of the spirit of *Nirya. Muni*.³ In this way Dr. Gore anticipates and rejects the argument since then put forward by Lecky, and other Liberal Catholic apologists, that history has proved Roman Catholicism to be the proper development of Christ's religion. In short, the Anglican Church, which

¹ *The Religion of the Church*, p. 161.

² *Church Temporal Rights*, 1886, p. 128.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

BISHOP COLE AND CRISIS OF ENGLAND IN

Indisputably possess the Apostolic Succession, has no reason to go bravely to Rome to obtain recognition of her Orders.

So far, in reviewing Bishop Gore's published opinions, we are on familiar English Anglican ground. But what is the Bishop's test of authority in doctrine? He has shown himself willing, within limits, to apply critical methods to Holy Scriptures. He has very little respect for the infallible Pope. And he would be the last to trust in private judgment; the infallible *Spiritus Sanctus* as understood by some Protestants. Where, then, is the ultimate Court of Appeal? Bishop Gore finds it in the true tradition of the true Church, 'in which Catholic reason is especially expressed';¹ and in a full apologetic manner he adds that this Catholic basis has been 'generally understood' to imply 'an irreducible but not therefore closed appeal to a General Council.'² In various, therefore, of the Church's doctrinal formulations can be made except by the authority of a court which can never, by any possibility, be constituted! The unique sanctity and obligation which Bishop Gore considers to attach to the Church have been asserted by him again and again with a vehemence which proves that he regards the matter as of vital importance. 'There must be no compromise as regards the Church . . . If those who live in its atmosphere of intellectual conviction become incapable of such sincere public profession of belief as the Church contains, the Church must look to recruit her ministry from classes still capable of a more simple and unadorned faith.'³ And, again, in his most recent book: 'I have taken occasion before now to make it evident that, as far as I can arrange it, I will select as our laity this church, or later Holy Orders, to minister for the congregation, who does not or cannot believe the Creed.'⁴ Dr. Gore has not spared no obligation so morally dishonest about who desires to serve the Church as its ministers while harboring doubts about the physical miracle known as the Virgin

¹ *Church Congress Report*, 1898, p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

³ *The True Theology and the Old Religion*, p. 144.

Black, and one of his clergy was a few years ago induced to resign his living by an expression of this kind, to which the Bishop gave publicity in the daily press.

Now it has been generally supposed that the Anglican clergy are bound to declare their allegiance not only to the Creed, but to the Thirty-nine Articles, and to the infallible words of holy Scriptures. Bishop Gore, however, holds that when a man becomes, on the day of his ordination, solemnly declared that he "consents to the Thirty-nine Articles," and that he "believes the doctrine therein set forth to be agreeable to the word of God," he "can no longer fairly be regarded as bound in particular phrases or expressions in the Articles."¹ And further, when the same man declares against his "undisputed belief in all the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments," "that expression of belief can be fairly and justly made by anyone who believes heartily that the Bible, as a whole, records and contains the message of God to man in all its stages of delivery and that each one of the books contains some element or aspect of this revelation."²

The Bishop himself has affirmed his personal belief that some narratives in the Old Testament are probably not historical. It may fairly be asked on what principle he is prepared to evade the plain sense and intention of a statement that in two cases while signifying an equally dangerous attempt to do the same in a third. For it is questionable that a general assent to the Articles does not mean that the man who gives that assent is free to repudiate any "particular phrases or expressions" which do not please him. A witness who admitted having signed an affidavit with this intention would not a poor figure in a law court. And in his efforts to evade his admission to the antiquated theory of inspiration could he demand more eloquently than by the loss of words which was thrown up, as some can doubt, to secure it. These things being so, either the assumption of total truth applies to the statement which the Bishop makes in the case of the Articles and the Bible, or it should not be brought against

¹ Church Inquirer, Sept. 1, 1891, p. 10. ² Ibid.

those who apply to one class in their view the principle which is admitted and used in two others.

There are some honourable men who have declined from entering the service of the Church on account of these requirements. But there are many others who recognize that knowledge grows and opinions change, while fundamental for the good part remain unaltered; and who consider that, so long as their general position is understood by those among whom they work, it would be unreasonable to refuse an outward call to the ministry because they know that they will be asked to give a formal assent to something written some dozens of thousand years ago. In *Confessions* would probably have been refused ordination fifty years ago on the ground of his lax views on inspiration; and the Bishop who opposed it the condemnation of Calvin, who condemned "Rome and Reform," and who would have condemned "Last Words," was more "honest" in the truth than their successors. But an exclusive position even in that kind of honesty would have excluded from the ministry all except deak, law, and logic. Again, it might have been supposed that the layman, who at their baptism and confirmation made the same declaration of belief in 'all the articles' of the apostolic Creed, and who are bidden by the Church to repeat the same Creed every week, are in the same position as the clergy. But the Bishop again attempts to draw a distinction. 'The responsibility of joining in the Creed is left to the conscience of the layman,' but not to the conscience of the clergyman, nor, we suppose, of the choir! This plan seems to us a very lame one. The Church of England has never thought of imposing severe doctrinal tests on the clergy than on the laity, and even to the laity is no longer a part of the implication of the ordination vows.

The loyal Christian wishes to impose a discipline which touches as closely the life of the Believer as the record of His miraculous conception, which appears, in our faith, in two books of the New Testament. If the tradition is as old as the Church, which is very doubtful, it must, from

* *The Free Church and its Old Religion*, p. 109.

the name of the man, and on the unsupported assertion of Mary, the mother of Jesus; for Joseph could only testify that the child was not his. It is therefore curious to witness the Gospel narrative by appealing to 'Catholic tradition,'¹ as if it could add anything to the evidence. It is significant, however, of the Bishop's own feelings about tradition, that he quickly sets aside the plain statement of the Synoptic Gospels that Joseph and Mary had a large family of four sons and more than one daughter by their marriage. This statement, which is distinctly historical, became intolerable to the conscience of the Church during the long history of asceticism, when marital relations were regarded as impure and degrading; and in consequence the perpetual virginity of Mary, though contradicted in the New Testament, became as much an article of faith as her conception of Jesus by the Holy Ghost. We have no wish to witness the arguments for the Virgin Birth which Dr. Gore has collected in his 'Discussions.' But witness strenuous effort is made to exclude from the ministry of the Church all who cannot declare on oath that they believe it to be a certain historical fact, it becomes a deep mistake to think that, on ordinary principles of evidence, the story itself about the uncertainty which hangs over other strange and unsupported narratives. The Bishop expresses his doubt whether those who regard this miracle as necessary can be considered of the Ministry of Christ. This only shows how difficult it is for an ecclesiastic in his high position to believe either story or holy to talk frankly to him. To most educated men there would be no difficulty in believing that the Son of God became incarnate through the agency of two earthly parents. The analogy of hybrids in the animal world is not likely to apply to the union of the human and divine natures, except by persons of very low intelligence. We should have preferred to be silent on this delicate subject, but for the fact that some men whom the Church can ill spare have been advised officially not to apply for ordination, on account of their views about this miracle. Fortunately, the practice of demanding

¹ *Discussions*, pp. 21-22.

more specific declarations than the law requires has not been adopted in most dioceses.

The question of the miraculous element in religious truth has indeed reached an acute stage. The Catholic doctrine is and always has been that there are two 'orders'—the natural and the supernatural—in the same plane, and distinguishable from each other. The Catholic theologian is prepared to define what occurrences in the lives of the Saints are natural, and what supernatural. Miracles are of frequent occurrence, and are established by ordinary evidence. These miracles have to be placed in the ranks of such evidence for supernatural belief as would be entitled to have the title of *mirac*, and the evidence for these miracles is called by a *testimonium*. This theory has been particularly elaborated in the English Church. There are few things our ecclesiastical and theological writers would spend five minutes in investigating any alleged supernatural occurrence in our own time. It would be assumed that, if true, it must be recorded in some church natural record. The result is that the miracles in the Bible, or in the New Testament, are isolated as they have never been before. They seem to form an order by themselves, a class of their belonging neither to the world of phenomena as we know it, nor to the world of spirit as we know it. From this situation has arisen the tendency, increasingly prevalent both in the Roman Church and in Protestant Germany, to distinguish 'miracles of fact' from 'miracles of fact.' The former, it is said, have a representative, symbolic character, and are only degraded by being placed in the same category as physical phenomena. This contention is open to very serious objections, but it at least indicates the actual state of the problem, viz. that to most educated men the miraculous element in Christianity seems to float between earth and heaven, no longer sensually connected with either, while on the other hand the majority of religious people, including a few men of high intelligence, find it difficult to retain their faith without the help of the miraculous. Superstitionism, which from the scientific point of view is the most unsatisfactory of all theories, becoming as it does the

And whether for the good or for ill—the unity of the one—given, after all, a kind of crude synthesis of the natural and the spiritual, by which it is possible to live: it is, for many persons, an indispensable bridge between the world of phenomena and the world of spirit. But when the heavy-headed dogmatist requires a spiritual ascent to the level truth of the minutiae, in exactly the same sense in which physical facts are true, is bridge between faith and reason cannot be avoided. And it is in this moral sense that Bishop Doan requires all his clergy to attend to the minutiae in the Creed.

The fact is that the Catholic party in the Church are in a hopeless impasse with regard to dogma. They cannot take any step which would divide them from 'the whole Church,' and the whole Church no longer exists except as an ideal—it has long ago been divided into fragments. The Roman Church is in a weak, better position. The Pope may at any time 'absolve' himself, in such a manner as to change it completely—there is no appeal from his authoritative pronouncements; but for the High Anglicans there is no living authority, only the dead hand, and a Council which can never meet. It is such as if no important legislation could be passed in this country without a joint session of our Parliament and the American Congress. It is difficult to see any way of escape, except by accepting the principle of development in a sense which would repudiate the Unchangeable 'apostle to all ages.'

We have now to consider Bishop Doan as a Church. Following. We have seen that he desires an autonomous Church, which can legislate for itself. The dead hand, which weighs so lightly upon him when it forbids any attempt to revise the boundaries of the faith, weighs to him immensely heavy when it obliges the Church to conform to 'the laws, canons, and statutes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which it cannot alter or add to.' The only remedy, he thinks, is a really representative assembly, of bishops, parsons, and laymen. In the early Church, as he points out, the laity were always recognized

¹ Church Congress Report, 1886, p. 22.

as constituent members of the government of the Church. In a democratic age, the laity as a body should exercise the powers which in the Middle Ages were delegated to, or usurped by, 'emperors, kings, clerics and laity.' The parish might be left the real centre of the Church's building, except the diocese; the Church servants ought to be appointed and removed by the parish meeting. It would be a step forward if these parish councils could be organised under diocesan regulation, and invested with the control of the parish finances, except the vicar's stipend; the right to object to the appointment of its vicar pastor; and some power of determining the ceremonial at the Church services. The diocesan synod should become a reality; there should also be provincial synods, which could become national by fusion. But in the last resort the declaration of the mind of the Church on matters of doctrine and morals ought to belong to the bishops.¹

But who are the laity? 'By a layman,' he says, 'I mean one who holds the status of Church membership—one who is baptised into the Church, who has been confirmed if he has reached years of discretion, and who is a communicant.' A roll of Church members, he suggests, should be kept in each parish, on which should be entered the name of each confirmed person, male or female. The names of those who had passed (say) two years without communicating should be struck off the roll. Further, names should be removable for any scandalous offence.²

It is easy to see that the 'communicant franchise' would work entirely in favour of that party in the Church which attaches the greatest importance to that Sacrament. It would exclude a large number of Protestant laymen who subscribe to Church books, and who in any other franchise would have a share in its government. But we need not suspect Mr. Gore of any sinister motive of this kind. His ideal of parochial life is one which must appeal to all who wish well to the Church. We will quote a few characteristic sentences:

¹ Church Congress Report, 1889, pp. 54-55.

² *Ibid.*, 1896, pp. 342-343.

"don't we let us be made to realize the reality of the life of a Church? If so, what we need is not more Christians, but better Christians. We want to make the moral meaning of Church membership understood and the conditions appreciated. We want to make men understand that it costs something to be a Christian; that to be a Christian, that is, a Churchman, is to be an intelligent participator in a corporate life consecrated to God, and to oneself. Therefore, as a member of a church, in all that touches the corporate life, we entered as well as the spiritual conditions . . . We Christians are fellow-workers together in the commonwealth that is consecrated to God, a commonwealth of moral men with God as well as men."¹

With regard to church, he will not allow that the disputes are unimportant. The vital questions of self-government is at stake. From this point of view, a "mere ceremony" may mean a great deal. Mr. Deal, who said "Churchism is nothing," also said, "If a Churchman Christ shall profit you nothing." This is quite consistent with his hearty disapproval of the independence of purely literary commonwealth.

From this ideal of a free Church is a free State in view disestablishment? Not necessarily. Dr. Chase thinks. Why should not legal authority be retained in domestic cases, with a right of appeal in a court of bishops, substituting the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee in spiritual cases? It is the paralysis of spiritual authority, in his opinion, which makes here prominence all controversy, and exceeds the vast amount of agreement which exists in principle. "We are weary of debating societies; we want the healthy discipline of co-operative government."² The policy of the self-governing Church is to be an "Liberal Catholic," a type which "responds to the moral needs of our great race."

Such is the scheme of Church reform towards which the Bishop is working; and he has told us, in the sentence just quoted, what kind of Church he looks forward to see. But what kind of Church would it actually be, if his designs were carried out? It would not be a National Church;

¹ *Speeches in the Synodical*, pp. 113, 114.

² *Contemporary Review*, April 1899.

³ *ibid.*

For his belief that Catholicism "responds to the moral needs of our race" is contradicted by the whole history of modern England. The laity of England may not be quite "as Protestant as ever they were," though we often hear that they are so; but they show no disposition to become Catholics. Catholicism as we know it is Latin-Christianity, and even in the Latin countries it is not a free-born plant, dependent on a special situation in Catholic schools and seminaries, with an index librorum prohibitionum. Such a system is impossible in England. Restrictions for the early teaching of Latin doggyms may indeed be established; but beds of mignonettes bred by keeping the geraniums in greenhouses while the young plants are in the open air. The "Liberal Catholic" Church, accordingly, would shed, by degrees, the very large number of Churchmen who still call themselves Protestants. Nor would the adjective "Liberal" secure the adhesion of the "intellectual" Bishop Gore's Liberalism would exclude most of them as effectively as the most rigid Conservatism. It would also be a disestablished and disendowed Church; for surely it is building castles in the air to think of episcopal seats occupied by laymen. The prospect of disestablishment does not alarm the Bishop. Some of his adherents suggest that he would almost welcome it. Indeed, disestablishment is viewed with complacency by an increasing number of High Church clergy. They feel that they can never carry out their plan for de-Protestantizing the Church while the Crown has the appointment of the bishops. For even if, as has lately been the case, their party gets more than its due share of preferment, there will always, under the existing system, be a sufficient number of Liberal and Evangelical bishops on the bench to make a consistent policy of Catholicizing impossible. And the Catholic party are so admirably equipped that they are confident in their power to carry their schemes under any form of self-government, even though the mass of the laity are intimidated by their views. Moreover, the town clergy, among whom are to be found advocates of disestablishment, find in many places that the parochial rate has completely broken down. The work is too onerous, too large

the parish, and the clergy are supported by pew-money and voluntary offerings, not by endowments. In such parishes, disabilities might, they think, give them greater liberty, and would make little difference to them in other ways. But in the country districts the case is very different. Thirty years after disabilities, the quiet country parson, sitting in the house of peace and solitude, with all that it has meant for centuries in English rural life, would in most villages be a thing of the past.

For these reasons, the Bishop's policy of reconstituting the Church of England as a self-governing body, professing distinctly Catholic principles and requiring Catholic practices, seems to us an impossible one. The chief danger to it would be the Church of Rome, which would gather in the most consistent and energetic of the Anglo-Catholics, who would be distinguished on the contrary between the pretensions of their own Church and its isolated position. The non-episcopal bodies would also gain momentum from it, among the ranks of the Evangelical and Liberal parties in the Church.

But, it may be said, this dismal harvest may be avoided if the Anglican Church can win the masses. The English population are at present neither Protestant nor Catholic; they are, if we count heads, mainly heathen. May not the working man, who has no leaning to either, welcome it to the 'very best of Christianity' of the Salvation Army, be brought into the Church?

Bishop Gore has always shown an warm sympathy with the aspirations of the working class to improve their material condition. He is also profoundly impressed by the apparent discrepancy between the teachings of Christ about wealth and the principles which His professed disciples really follow and in part avow. These anxious questionings form the subject of a fine sermon which he preached at the Church Congress of 1884, on the text about the camel and the needle's eye. Jesus Christ shows to be born of poor and humble parents, in a low village free from the taint of political or intellectual influence, and in the circle of labouring men. He shows to belong to the class of the respectable artisans, and most of the twelve

speeches come from the post-war level. In his teaching, he plainly associated bloodiness with the lot of poverty, and suffering, danger with the lot of wealth. All through the New Testament the assumption is that God is on the side of the poor against the rich. As Jesus once said, there is more in the New Testament against being rich, and in favour of being poor, than we like to recognise. And is not this the reason of our failure to win the masses? Is it not because we are the Church of capital rather than of labour? The Church ought to be a community in which religion works upward from below. The Church of England expresses that point of view which is particularly not that which Christ chose for His Church. The incomes of the bishops escape them with the wealthier classes; the clergy associate with the gentry and not with the artisans. We must acknowledge with deep pain that we are on wrong lines. For himself, the Bishop admits that he has 'a permanently unsettled conscience' in the matter. Then, with that attractive courage and practicality which is the mark of much of his influence, he proceeds to indicate how 'lines of hopeful recovery.' First, the Church must get rid of the administration of poor relief. Where the dignity of the Church is concerned to meet the patronage of the rich, it can do nothing without disaster. All will be in vain till it has ceased to be a plausible pretext that a man or woman goes to church for what can be got. Secondly, we must give the artisans their true place in Church management, and give councils that touch in all non-essentials. Thirdly, the clergy should 'concentrate themselves upon bringing out the social meaning of the sacraments,' and giving voice in the spirit of Christian brotherhood. Lastly, we ought to lose the clerical profession entirely from any association of class.

The Bishop is not a Collectivist, but he has great sympathy with some of the aims of Socialism. In a 'Ten-shilling Paper' just issued, he condemns the attitude of the Church towards Socialism. Christianity, he says, must remain independent of State-Socialism, as of other organisations of society. Socialism would make a far deeper demand on character than most of its opponents

justice. 'An experiment in State Socialism, based on the average level of human character as it exists at present, would be doomed to disastrous failure.' (Bishop Creighton said the same thing more epigrammatically. 'Socialism will only be possible when we are all perfect, and then it will not be needed.') But what we have is no Socialistic State, but a great body of aspiration, based on a great demand for justice in human life. The indictment of our present social organisation is indeed overwhelming, and with this indictment Christianity ought to have the predominant sympathy, for it is substantially the indictment of the Old Testament prophets. The prophets were on the side of the poor; and so was our Lord. Where is the prophetic spirit in the Church today? We need 'a fundamental act of penitence.' Our churches have been more ambulance-work; but 'the Christian Church was not created to be an ambulance-corp.' We have followed the old school of political economy instead of the prophets and Christ. Briefly, we may confess two kinds of sinfulness: individualism, which means in the long run the right of the strong; and socialism, which means that the society is superior over the individual. "On the whole, Christianity is with Socialism."

This 'Pan-Anglican Paper' is a fair representation of the views which are spreading rapidly among the High Church clergy. The party is in fact making a determined effort to win the sympathy of the working man with the Church, by offering him in return its sympathy and co-operation in his struggle against capitalism. This is a phase of the movement which it is very difficult to judge fairly. Dr. Lloyd's sermon was calculated to give our Christian who heard it, whether Conservative or Liberal, 'a troubled conscience'; and his practical suggestions are as encouraging as any suggestions that are not platitudes are likely to be. But in making largely this sympathy with the cause of Labour to its great danger of becoming one of the most malignant temptations that can strike a religious body. The Church of England has been truly accused of too great complacency to the powers that be, when those powers were despotic. Some of the

things are now trying to spread, rather than reduce, this error, by an obsequious attitude to King Working-man. But the Church ought to be equally good against the vulgar materialism and the vicious order given to socialism. The position of a Church which should not lead to the Labour party would be truly ignominious. It would be used so long as the politicians of the party needed moral support and eloquent advocacy, and spurned as soon as its services were no longer necessary. The worst of blots on a diplomat is the third book of the 'Lied'—some very appeals when we read the questions of some clerical 'Christlich Sozialists,' who had to move nothing to regulate provisions of the unemployed than to attend to their professional duties.

For such noble labor, that I desire nothing,
 and the golden offering (unwilling) "Glorious,
 and the gold which gives me a pleasure,
 and I of it I desire nothing, (I) ya (Lied)?

It is as a duty, not as an honored helpmate, that the Social Democrats would treat any Christian body that helped them to overthrow our present civilization. And rightly; for Christ's only injunction in the sphere of economic man, 'Take heed and beware of all covetousness.' He refused positively to have anything to do with disputes about the distribution of property; and in the parable of the Poulter he set the demand, 'Give me the portion of goods that belongeth to me,' in the parable to a journey to that "far country" which is beyondness of God (how dangerous and subtle this Christ unquestionably meant. He believed to think but little of the economics of life. He believed that if men could be induced to accept the true standard of values, economic relations would adjust themselves. He promised His disciples that they should not want the necessities of existence, and for the rest, He said that the business from anxiety, covetousness, and envy, which He regarded as a duty, would also make their

¹⁻² He said of them by his side, and depart from the way of the good; neither as are they ever from their back to Olympus; but still he would be his side and guard him, till he made that his will—on which his name.

the lawyer. This is a very different spirit from that which makes Buckham a force in politics.

Being laws, we may be sure, will not willingly allow the High Church party to be entangled in corrupt alliances. When he handles what may be called applied Christianity, he does so in a manner which tends to reduce to the popularity of his books. The little commentaries on the Sermon on the Mount, and on the Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians, are admirable. They are simple, practical, and profound. We subjoin a short analysis of the notes on the first page of the Sermon on the Mount, as an illustration of the teaching which runs all through the three commentaries.

The Sermon on the Mount is not the whole of Christianity. It is the source of law, of the laws that inform. The Divine requirement is passed down with unqualified force upon the conscience; yet not in the form of mere law of conduct, but in a type of character. It is promulgated not by an incarnate God, but by the Divine Law, translated in mankind. The basic demand of the law is closely connected with the promise of the Spirit. We are told that many of the people in the world were corrupted by Pagan and Jewish beliefs. But this we might have expected, since all men are rational and moral through following with the Word, which is the Reason of God. Christ is the light which in conscience and reason lights every man throughout the history of the race. But the Sermon is comprehensive where other commentaries are fragmentary, it is pure where they are mixed. It is teaching for grown men, who require principles, not rules. And it is self-sufficient, sustained by the majestic Presence of the speaker. The Beatitudes are a description of character. Christ requires us not to be with and with things, but to be with and with people. . . . True blessedness consists in membership of the kingdom of heaven, which is a life of perfect relationship with man and nature based on perfect fellowship with God. . . . The Beatitudes describe the Christian character in detail, in particular, they describe it in contrast with the character of the world, which, in the religious sense, may be defined as human working on its egoistic self apart from God. The first Beatitude requires detachment, such as life accomplished himself, as being nothing and yet possessing all things. We are all to be detached; there are none whom we have reason to be intensely poor. — *Summit*

and they find means' means that we are not to receive ourselves from the common lot of pain. We must deliberately 'pull away' from the painful discomfort and discomfort which St. Paul calls the pains of the world, and which is national misery in sacred words. 'Pulled into the world' means that we are not to accept ourselves unless it is our duty to do so. The true Christian is a man who in his private capacity cannot be purified. On a general view of life, though not always in particular cases, we must allow that we cannot be more than we desire. The words *Matthew* tell us that if we want righteousness entirely, we can have it. The old position the inward of heart, that is, compassion in action. For which does nothing to stop hypocrisy or emotional self-indulgence. On the whole, we can determine men's actions by the way attitude to them; the world's the whole story. 'Purity of heart' means singleness of purpose; but in the narrower sense of purity is in words which say that there who prefer to live in 'impossible' to lead a pure life might perhaps find that if they could say to be *Christians* *Christians*, instead of struggling with their own heart separately. 'Impossibility' and 'unpossessable' *impossible* cannot. On the contrary... there are many kinds of false purity, which Christ came to break up; but here, which is impossible in any other way a Christian nation. The last shows what we cannot be likely to be in this world, if we follow these commands. What the *Christian* character is not achieved, it is lost.

From the later sections a few characteristic comments may be given in an abridged form.

There are not many who have seen and many sections of the Divine Fatherhood. To call God our Father, we must sometimes be sure; and it is only those who are led by the Spirit of God who are the sons of God. . . . Ask for great things, and small things will be given to you. This is exactly the spirit of the Lord's Prayer. . . . Ask for God. Think your thoughts and intentions Godward, and your intelligence and affections will gradually follow along the line of your action. . . . You must put God first, everywhere. . . . It is a perfect and being that we have only to follow our conscience; we have no obligation and conscience and keep in righteousness. . . . There is no greater phase of our generation than the narrowest society which characterises all its efforts. We ought to be increasingly united, and therefore truly forward in the power of God. . . . Our Lord

did not mean to make of his disciples a new kind of Platonists. . . . 'Judgment,' means, for me, judgment. The condemnation of one who is always looking half-heartedly on moral weight. It is those who have the lowest and vaguest standards of what is right who are often the most critical in judgment of other people. . . . We ought not to look our disciples that what we mean for ourselves we can reasonably expect also for others. . . . A man who wants to do his duty must always be prepared to stand alone. . . . Christianity is not so much a statement of the true end or ideal of human life, as a great spiritual instrument for realizing the end.

These extracts will be sufficient to show what are the characteristics of these little commentaries. They exhibit extreme honesty of purpose, honest recognition of Christ's teaching honestly interpreted, honesty of morality and simple words, and a determination never to allow preaching to be divorced from practice. No more stimulating Christian teaching has been given in our generation.

The valuable treatise on the Holy Communion, called "The Body of Christ," is too theological for detailed discussion in these pages. The points in which the Roman Church has perverted and degraded the really Catholic sacramental doctrine are lucidly exposed, and the true nature of the sacrament is exhibited in a masterly and beautiful manner.

A study of the whole body of theological writings from the pen of this remarkable man leaves us with the conviction that he is one of the most powerful spiritual forces in our generation. It is the more to be regretted that in certain points he seems to be hampered by false presuppositions and misled by mistaken ideas. His loyalty to 'Catholic truth,' as understood by the party in the Church to which he belongs, prevents him from understanding where the true really lies among those of the younger generation who are both thoughtful and devout. He makes little of the Councils, documents which only represent the opinions of a majority at a meeting; and what number of meetings Church Councils sometimes were, is known to history. He is still impressed with the grandeur of the Catholic idea, as embodied in the Roman Church, and will

BISHOP COLE AND CHURCH OF ENGLAND 175

do nothing to preclude reason, should a more religious policy ever prevail at the Vatican. But this country has done with the Roman Empire, in its spiritual as well as its temporal form. The dominions of that proud dominion have shrunk with the expansion of knowledge; new worlds have been opened out, geographical and mental, which never ceased to creep; the pope's voice has become provincial, and his authority is applied even within his own borders. There is no likelihood of the English people ever again accepting "Catholicism," if Catholicism is the thing which history calls by that name. The movement which the Bishop hopes to lead to victory will remain, as it has been hitherto, a theory of the ministry rather than of the Church, and this struggle will be carried, as it is now, mainly in clerical circles.

Catholicism and Protestantism, in so far as they are more than names for institutionalism and dogmatism, which are permanent types, are both decadent phases in the evolution of the Christian religion. "The time cometh when neither in this mountain nor yet at Jerusalem shall men worship the Father."

A profound reorientation is demanded, and for those who have eyes to see has been already for some time in progress. The new type of Christianity will be more Christian than the old, because it will be more moral. A number of governing beliefs about God are being slowly dropped, and they are so treated because they are unworthy of Him. The realm of nature is being cleared for His more moral; the distinction between natural and supernatural is repudiated; we hear less frequent complaints that God "does nothing" because He does not accept Himself by looking out of His own hair. The divinity of Christ implies—we might almost say it means—the virtual supremacy of those moral qualities which He exhibited in their perfection. "Catholicism is not Dominion of Spirits," as Engel said. The value of Catholic Church is not the name of an institution which has the privilege of being governed by bishops. It is "dispersed throughout the whole world," under many names and many disguises. Its political position is (Plato would say) as is *polity* right.

and least promptly subject to be expected overland. Among those who are by right citizens of the spiritual Kingdom, there only are in danger of being lost those of who propose themselves in a little boat of their own and weak harness, which may make them their own prisoners, but which will not hinder the great commensurability of orders after truth from reaching out modern problems by modern lights, until the whole of our new and old inheritance, intellectual, moral, and aesthetic, shall be brought again under the shadow of Christ.

ROMAN CATHOLIC MODERNISM

(1886)

THE Liberal movement in the Roman Church is viewed by most Protestants with much the same mixture of sympathy and misgiving with which Englishmen regard the ambition of despotic reformers to establish a unitary Central government in their country. Freedom of thought and freedom of speech are almost always desirable; but here, without a violent revolution, can they be established in a State which exists only as a spiritual authority, held together by authority and tradition? This sympathy, and these fears, are likely to be strongest in those who have studied the history of Western Catholicism with most intelligence. From the Edict of Milan to the Encyclical of Pius X. the evolution which ended in papal absolutism has proceeded in accordance with what looks like an inner necessity of growth and decay. The task of predicting the policy of the Vatican is nearly as difficult as M. Renan suggested, when he remarked to a friend of the present writer, "The Church is a woman; it is impossible to say what she will do next." For where is the evidence of caprice in the history of the Roman Church? If any State has been guided by a fixed policy, which has inspired itself inspirably on its successive rulers, in spite of the almost divergences in their personal character and aims, that State is the Papacy.

Remark all the ridges which have before the surface, the great stream has flowed on, and has flowed in one direction. The same logic of events which transformed the constitutional principles of Augustus into the imper-

ness of Theodosian and Valentinian, has brought about a parallel development in the Church which inherited the traditions, the policy, and the territorial sphere of the dead Empire. The second World-War which had its seat on the Green Hills has followed closely in the footsteps of the first. It is not too harmful to trace, as Schmitt has done, the resemblance in detail—Friedrich First in the place of Maximian and Maxim; the bishops and anti-bishops instead of the praetorians; the troops of priests and monks as the legions; while the Jesuits are the Imperial bodyguard, the patriarchs and sometimes the masters of the sovereigns. One might carry the parallel further by connecting the union between the Eastern and Western Churches, and the later defection of northern Europe, with the disruption of the Roman Empire in the fourth century; and in the sphere of thought, by comparing the scholastic philosophy and casuistry with the *Summa* of Thomas Ist in the thirteenth.

The fundamental principles of such a government are imposed upon it by necessity. In the first place, progressive centralisation, and the substitution of a graduated hierarchy for popular government, came about as inevitably in the Catholic Church as in the Byzantine Empire of the Caesars. The primitive colleges of presbyters were led under the rule of the bishops, the bishops under the patriarchs; and then Rome achieved her first great defeat in losing the Eastern patriarchates, which she could not subjugate. The triumphant Church, no longer 'universal,' found itself obliged to continue the same policy of centralisation, and with such success that, under Innocent III, the triumph of the literary central authority. The Papacy dominated Europe de facto, and claimed to rule the world de jure. Boniface VIII, when the church was already gathering, issued the famous Bull 'Unam sanctam,' in which he said: 'Believe Romans—patriarch—emperor

¹ Bishop Gifford always emphasised this view of Roman Catholicism. 'The Roman Church,' he wrote, 'is the most complete exponent of despotism, for it is not a Church at all, but a state in its organisation; and the more formal than any monarchy.' (*Life and Letters*, II, 188.)

Immunis omnium debitorum, delictorum, et peccatorum, cuius non de necessitate saluti. The claim is logical. A theory (of the religion is truly monarchical) : must claim to be universal in place; and its ruler must be the infallibly inspired and veracious dispenser of the Almighty. He is the rightful lord of the world, whether he gives a continent to the King of Spain by a stroke of the pen, or whether his verbal proclamation is limited by the walls of his palace. In the historical century the Pope is already called "dominus domini nostri" — precisely the style in which Medieval scholars treated God. In the Bull of Pius V (1568) the claim of universal dominion is reiterated; it is asserted that the Almighty,

"cum deus sit creator et conditor et conservator, immutabilis dominus et gubernator universi, cuius legem omnes homines, omnesque gentes et nationes, omnesque principes, omnesque principes, omnesque principes in potestate plenius iuris, gubernantur."

But the final victory of infallibility was the achievement of the nineteenth-century Jesuits, who completed the dogmatic apothecosis of the Pope at the moment when the last vestiges of his temporal power were being snatched from him.

Now a government of this type is always in want of money. The spiritual Roman Empire was as costly an institution as the court and the bureaucracy of Constantinople and its successors. The same severity which suppressed democracy in the Church drove it to elaborate an apparatus of taxation, in which every weakness of human nature was systematically exploited for gain, and every means of divine grace played on a raffle. But this method of raising revenue is only possible while the priests can persuade the people that they really control a treasury of grace, from which they can make or withhold grants at their pleasure. It stands or falls with a non-rational and magical view of the divine economy which is hardly compatible with a high level of culture or morality. The

¹ In contrast with "ecclesiastic" or "monarchy," such as the monarchy of the early Church.

Catholic Church has thus been obliged, for purely local reasons, to discourage secular education, particularly of a scientific kind, and to keep the people, so far as possible, in the mental and moral condition most favourable to such transactions as the purchase of indulgences and the payment of various taxes against hell and purgatory.

Another tendency of absolute government is the suppression of free criticism directed against itself. Heresy and schism in an absolute Church take the place of treason against the sovereign. Cyprus, in the third century, had already laid down the principles by which alone the central authority could be maintained.

'di archæ hauri rationem; hauris gentium non potest. Et inde provide vivas; provide moris. . . . Omnia et omnes separatim rationibus legibus, a provide divina separatur. Aliqua res, ratio est. Nichil non potest Deus potius, qui rationem non habet naturam.'

Reformations are therefore whole, whose roots are justified under the laws of reason. Heretics are in the better case; for the Church is the only infallible interpreter both of Scripture and of tradition; and its doctrine from her teaching is as developed as is needed from her jurisdiction. Even Augustine could say, 'I should not believe the Gospel, if the authority of the Church did not determine me to do so'; a statement which a modern ultra-Roman has copied by saying, 'Without the authority of the Pope, I should not place the Bible higher than the Koran.' Reformers claim an absolute monopoly of inspiration for the Roman Church on the ground that Rome alone has preserved the apostolic succession beyond dispute.¹ As for the treatment which Ignatius deserves, the same authority is very explicit.

'In the first place, Ignatius is more mischievous than any pirate or brigand, because they rob wealth; nay more, they rob the foundations of all good and all the civilisational work

¹ *'Vnde debet esse scriptum in omni ecclesia apostolica, presbiterum in Roma, et ibi in tantis hinc inde ecclesiis non potest esse consensus et probatio apostolicæ institutionis'* (Bellarmine, *De Fide* *et* *scriptis* *et* *actibus*, vi, 14, 15).

the blindfoldness which necessarily follows religious difference. In the second place, capital punishment inflicted on them has a good effect on very many persons. Many whose ignorance was making indifferent are moved by these executions to consider what is the nature of the felony which attracts them, and to take care not to end their earthly lives in crime and loss their future happiness. Thirdly, it is a blindness to challenge heaven to punish them from this life. For the longer they live, the more crime they do, the more pain they prevent, and the greater damnation they acquire for themselves.¹

In all matters which are not essential for the safety of the monarchy, an absolutist Church will resemble the average tastes of its subjects. If the population are as heart-pugns, and hanker after enormous ritual, dramatic magic, and a rich mythology, these must be provided. The 'intellectuals,' being few and weak, may be safely neglected or disregarded until their numbers are thoroughly populationised. The pronouncements of the Roman Inquisition in the case of Galileo are typical.

¹ The theory that the sun is in the centre of the world, and stationary, is absurd, false in philosophy, and formally heretical, because it is contrary to the express language of Holy Scripture. The theory that the earth is not the centre of the world, nor stationary, but that it moves with a daily motion, is also absurd and false in philosophy, and, theologically considered, it is, in any the least, erroneous in faith.

The expansion of despotic government thus supply the key to the whole policy and history of the Papacy. 'The most form of State' can only be followed up by the most form of government. There should therefore be no difficulty in distinguishing between the official policy of the Roman See—which has been almost uniformly odious—and the history of the Christian religion in the Latin countries, which has added few lustre to human nature. The Catholic saints did not fly through the air, nor were their heads pierced with supernatural darts, as the mendacious hagiology of their Church would have us believe; but they have a better tale to be remembered

¹ Bellarmine, *De Jure*, III. c. 15, 16.

by mankind, as the best examples of a beautiful and generous kind of human civilization.

The papal infallibility has now passed its heyday and period of decadence. During the Middle Ages Catholicism suited the Latin race very well on the whole. Their medieval paganism was allowed to remain substantially unchanged; the *nomina*, but not the *res* were allowed; their awe and reverence for the sacred office, ingrained in the populations of Europe by the history of a thousand years, made submission to Rome natural and easy; a host of myths "abounding in points of attachment to human experience and in genial interpretations of life, yet linked beyond dispute nature and fitting a reported world believed in as truth,"¹ absorbed religion with an artistic and poetical sublimity very congenial to the nations of the North. But a nationality essentially Oriental in its constitution is quarrelled in modern Europe. Its whole culture is based on keeping the body in conscious ignorance and submission; and the body have emancipated themselves. The Southern nations broke the yoke as soon as they attained a national self-consciousness. They respect their a system which had educated, but never ruled them. Now the challenge has been mainly spiritual. The Pyralis victories over Gallicanism, Anglicanism, Catholic democracy (Glossolamites, Historical Society [Lollards] and the Old Catholics), each introduced a section of thinking men to the Catholic tradition. The Roman Church can no longer be called Catholic, except in the sense in which the kingdom of Francis II remained the Holy Roman Empire. It is an exclusive sect, which possesses much more political power than its numbers merit in its own, by means of its excellent discipline, and by the sinister policy of fomenting political dissension. Examples of this last are furnished by the contemporary history of Ireland, of France, and of Poland.

These considerations are of primary importance when we try to answer the question: To what extent is the Roman Church believed by her own past? Is there any

¹ *Encyclopædia, Science & Religion*, p. 108.

impossible obstacle to a modification of policy which might give her a new lease of life? His late and now much important attachment to the Church's tradition, its traditions, a fatal obstacle to reform? Theoretically, the tradition which she traces back to the apostles gives her a fixed constitution. So the Catholic Church has always maintained, 'Regula apud nos habet esse immutabilem, sola immutabile et immutabilis.' The rule of faith may be better understood by a later age than an earlier, but there can be no addition, only a sort of unpacking of a treasure which was given whole and entire in the first century. In reality, of course, there has been a steady evolution in our history: in type, the type being not the 'latin stock' of Christ or the Church of the apostles, but the absolute immutability above described. It has long been the aim of Catholic apologists to reconcile the theoretical immutability of dogma with the actual facts.

The older method was to rewrite history. It was convenient, for example, to forget that Pope Boniface I had been anathematised by three ecumenical councils. The legend of Constant gave a more positive sanction to absolute claims; and interpolations in the Greek Fathers derived St. Thomas's dogmas into giving his powerful authority to infallibility. This method cannot be called obsolete, for the present Pope recently informed the laity that 'the Eastern patriarchs were familiar with the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and found confirmation in the thought of Mary in the solemn moments of their life.'¹ But such simple devices are hardly practicable in an age when history is scientifically studied. However, other considerations, besides controversial stress, have suggested a new theory of tradition. A theory which, like the kings of the Indies and Persians, is based by the force of its performance, is not obsolete. Acceptance of the theory of development in dogma would relieve the Pope from the weight of the dead hand.

The new apologetic is generally said to have been inaugurated by Cardinal Newman. His work 'The

¹ *Sacrosanctae R. E. Cong. Decr.* Feb. 1.

² *Encyclical* of October 25, 1894.

Development of Christian Doctrine,¹ is no doubt an epoch-making book, though the idea of tradition as the product of the living spirit of a religious society, preserving its moral identity while expressing itself, from time to time, in new forms, was already familiar to students of Schleiermacher. Newman gives us several "tests" of true development. These are...preservation of type; continuity of principles; power of assimilation; logical sequence; anticipation of needs; tendency to conserve the old; change of aspect. These tests, he considered, differentiate the Roman Church from all other Christian bodies, and prove its superiority. The Church has its own genius, which lives and works in it. This is indeed the Holy Spirit of God, promised by Jesus Christ. Through the operation of this spirit, old things become new, and fresh light is shed from the sacred pages of Scripture. Catholic tradition is, in fact, the glorified but ever-present Christ Himself, re-animating Himself, generation after generation, in the Mystical Church. It is unnecessary to enquire whether there is apostolic authority for every new dogma, for the Church is the moribound of the living Christ.

This theory works, on one side, the complete and final apothecosis of the Pope and the hierarchy, who are thereby made independent even of the past history of the Church. Pius IX. was not slow to realize that the only court of appeal against his decisions was closed in 1870. "La tradition nous le dit," he said, in the manner of Louis XIV. The Pope is henceforth not the interpreter of a closed cycle of tradition, but the pilot who guides the course always in the direction of the truth. This is to destroy the old-function of tradition. The Church becomes the source of everlasting instead of its custodian. On the other side, it is a positive concession to modern ideas. There is no obvious danger that, as the result of this doctrine, the structure of the Church may come to have only a relative and provisional validity. For, if such governments were absolutely true, there would be no real development, and the appearance of it in history would become impossible.

This new and, in appearance, more liberal attitude towards modern ideas of progress has raised the hopes of

mony in the Roman Church whose minds and consciences are troubled by the over-riding claim which separates traditional dogma from scientific knowledge. While dogma was stationary—immutable or inflexible—there seemed to be no prospect except that the progress of human knowledge would leave theology further and further behind, till the rupture between Catholicism and civilization became absolute. The idea that the Church would ever modify her teaching in bring it into harmony with modern science seemed utterly chimerical. But if the static theory of evolution is abandoned, and a dynamic theory substituted for it; if the divine part of Christianity is placed, not in the dogmatic foundations of revealed fact, but in the living and emerging spirit of the Church; why should not dogmatic theology become elastic, changing periodically in correspondence with the development of human knowledge, and so never stand in irreconcilable contradiction with the unchanging laws of nature?

Thus the delinquent of tradition by the Pope was believed to make the Modernist movement possible. The Modernists have even claimed Newman as on their side. This appeal cannot be sustained. "The Development of Christian Doctrine" is mainly a polemic against the high dogmatic position, and an answer to attacks upon Roman Catholicism from this side. Inflexibility as such does not constitute proof of a thoroughly stationary view of evolution. Its 'appeal to antiquity'—a period which, in accordance with a convenient theory, is linked to the records of the 'undivided Church'—was intended to prove the antiquity and orthodoxy of the English Church, as the faithful guardian of apostolic tradition, and to condemn the national and modern theories sustained by the Church of Rome. The entire theory of evolution left the Roman Church open to damaging criticism on this side; no ingenuity could prove that all her doctrines were 'primitive.' Even in those early days of historical criticism, it must have been plain to any candid student of Christian 'origins' that the Pauline Churches were far more Protestant than Catholic in type. But Newman had no himself to prove that 'the Christianity of history

is not Protestantism; I saw there was a safe truth, it is this." Accordingly, he argues that "Christianity came into the world as an idea rather than an institution, and had in its birth with it some of its own providing." Such expectations would very like the expectations of the Mohammedans; but Newman scarcely ever contemplated that they would be turned against the policy of his own Church, in the interests of the rational rationalism which he abhorred. His attitude towards dogma is after all not very different from that of the older school. "There was needed," he says "for the discipline of dogmas some motivated men for all through inspired persons"; his examples are prophets and the great experimenters. He knows that his "idea" of free development are only counter-revolutional, "indispensable rather than warrants of right decisions." The only real "warrant" is the authority of the infallible Church. It is highly significant that one of the features in Roman Catholicism to which he appeals as preserving its catholicism distant from antiquity is its exclusiveness and intolerance.

"The Fathers (he says emphatically) mechanized doctrine, not because they were old, but because they were new; for the very characteristic of being is novelty and originality of manifestation. Such was the character of the Christianity of old. I need not insist on the doctrines with which that principle has been maintained ever since."

The Cardinal is right; it is quite unnecessary to insist upon it; but, when the Mohammedans claim Newman as their prophet, it is fair to reply that, if we may judge from his writings, he would gladly have sent some of them to the stake.

The Moslemist movement, properly so called, belongs to the last twenty years, and most of the literature dates from the present century. It began in the region of ecclesiastical history, and more passed to biblical exegesis, where the new heresy was at first called "modernism." The scope of the debate was enlarged with the aid produced by Loisy's '*L'Evangile et l'Eglise*' and '*questes d'un Faut. Nève*'; it spread over the field of Christian origins

problems, and problems connected with them, such as the revival of archaeological proof and the evolution of dogma. For a few years the mission in France generally spoke of the new tendency as *dogmatism*. It was not till 1900 that Edmond Le Roy published his '*Quintessence du dogme*,'¹ which carried the discussion into the domain of pure philosophy, though the studies of Littré and Labergherie in the psychology of religion may be said to involve a metaphysics closely resembling that of Le Roy. Mr. Tyndall's able works have a very similar philosophical basis, which is also assumed by the group of Italian priests who have communicated with the Pope.² M. Le Roy protests against the classification made in the papal Encyclical which connects biblical critics, metaphysicians, psychologists, and Church reformers, as if they were all partisans in the same enterprise. But in reality the same presuppositions, the same philosophical principles, are found in all the writers named; and the differences which may easily be detected in their writings are comparatively superficial. The movement appears to be strongest in France, where the policy of the Vatican has been uniformly unfortunate of recent years, and has brought many limitations upon French Catholics. Italy has also been moved, though from slightly different causes. In the protests from that country we find a tone of disgust at the constitution of the Roman hierarchy and the character of the papal message, about which Italians are in a position to know more than other Catholics. Catholic Germany has been almost silent; and Mr. Tyndall is the only Englishman whose name has come prominently forward.

It will be convenient to consider the position of the Modernists under three heads: their attitude towards New Testament criticism, especially in relation to the life of Christ; their philosophy; and their position in the Roman Catholic Church.

The Modernists themselves desire, for the most part, that criticism rather than philosophy should be regarded as the starting-point of the movement. "We far from ever

¹ In *The Progress of Modernism*, and *How to Oppose it*.

philosopher detecting our critical method, it is the critical method itself that has of its own accord forced us to a very tentative and uncertain formulation of various philosophical conclusions. . . . The independence of our criticism is evident in many ways.¹ The writers of this manifesto, and H. Lecky himself, appear not to perceive that their critical position rests on certain very important philosophical presuppositions; nor indeed is any criticism of religious origins possible without presuppositions which involve metaphysics. The results of their critical studies, as bearing on the life of Christ, we shall proceed to summarize, departing as little as possible from the actual language of the writers, and giving references in all cases. It must, however, be remembered that some of the group, such as Mr. Tyrrell, have not connected themselves to the more extreme critical circle, while others, such as the Abbot Lubenowicz, the most brilliant and attractive writer of them all, hold a moderate position on the historical side. It is perhaps significant that those who are specialists in biblical criticism are the most radical members of the school.

The Gospels, says H. Lecky, are for Christianity what the Pentateuch is for Judaism. Like the Pentateuch, they are a patchwork and a compound of history and legend. The differences between them proved in many cases to be considerable contradictions. In Mark the life of Jesus follows a progressive development. The first is when His Baptism is given by John at Caesarea Philippi; and Jesus himself first declares it openly in His total belief the Messiah. In Matthew and Luke, on the contrary, Jesus is presented to the public as the Son of God from the beginning of His ministry; He comes forward at once as the supreme Lawgiver, the Judge, the mediator of God. The Fourth Gospel goes much farther still. His heavenly origin, His priority to the world, His co-operation in the work of creation and salvation, are ideas which are foreign to the other Gospels, but which the author of the Fourth Gospel has set forth in his prologue, and, in part, put into

¹ *The Progress of Modernism*, p. 14.

the mouth of John the Baptist.¹ The difference between the Christ of the Synoptic Gospels and the Christ of John may be summed up by saying that 'the Christ of the Synoptics is historical, but is not God; the Palestinian Christ is divine, but not historical.'² But even Mark (according to H. Lohy) probably only incorporates the statement of an eye-witness; his Gospel belongs Pauline tradition.³ The Gospel which bears his name is later than the destruction of Jerusalem, and was issued, probably about A.D. 70, by an unknown Christian, not a native of Palestine, who wished to write a book of evangelical instruction in conformity with the views of the Hellenistic-Christian community to which he belonged.⁴ The tradition connecting it with Peter may indicate that it was composed at Rome, but has no other historical value.⁵

The Gospel of Matthew was probably written about the beginning of the second century by a Jew-Palestinian Jew residing in Asia Minor or Syria. He is before all things a Catholic theologian, and may well have been one of the presbyters or bishops of the churches in which the institution of a monarchical episcopate took root.⁶ The narratives parallel to Mark have the character rather of legendary developments than of genuine reminiscences. The historical value of these additions is nil. As a witness to fact, Matthew ranks below Mark, and even below Luke.⁷ In particular, his chapters about the birth of Christ seem not to have the slightest historical foundation. The legendary character of the genealogy is proved by the fact that Jesus seems not to have known of his descent (from David). The story of the virgin birth turns on a text from Isaiah. Of this part of the Gospel, Lohy says, 'rien n'est plus certain qu'une certaine origine, et plus haute certaine inspiration divine.'⁸ Luke has taken more pains to compare a literary tradition than Mark or Matthew. The

¹ *The Fragments of Papias*, pp. 10-12.

² *Ibid.*, *Synoptic Synthesis*, p. 125.

³ *Ibid.*, *The Gospel of St. Peter*, pp. 14-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, p. 122.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 130.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

and that in which he follows most, to be—the words of our Mark, the so-called Matthean logia, and some other source or sources. But he treats his material more freely than Matthew. “The language of Luke runs the full range, his basis is the women of Jerusalem, his prayer for his hearers, his passion to the present hour. His last words are very touching words, which may be in conformity with the spirit of Jesus, but which have no traditional basis.” “The brilliant character of the narrative of the infancy is less apparent in the Third Gospel than in the First, because the stories are much less constructed as legend, and do not resemble midway upon Matthew’s prophetic.” “In generalization on his native land is more evident. It reads everywhere impossible to have mentioned one place greater value in kind.”¹

The Gospel of Luke was probably written just by a disciple of St. Paul between 80 and 100 A.D.; but the earliest tradition, which dates the descent of Jesus from David through Joseph, has been interpolated in the narrative of the later idea of a virgin birth. The first two chapters are interesting for the history of Christian beliefs, not for the history of Christ. In his *Fourth Gospel*, it is enough to say that the author had nothing to do with the son of David, and that he is in no sense a biographer of Christ, but the true and genuine of the Christian narrative.”

The study of this striking treatment of the sources must be confined by referring chapter 10 of Luke’s ‘*San Evangelio Sinoptico*’. The following is a brief summary of this chapter, entitled ‘*La Parola di Gesù*’. Jesus was born at Nazareth about four years before the Christian era. His family were certainly poor, but some of His relatives must have accepted the Gospel during His lifetime. Later many others, the young Jesus was attracted by the spreading preaching of John the Baptist, from whom He received baptism. When John was imprisoned He was compelled to take his place. He began to preach

¹ *Luke, An Evangelist-Preacher*, p. 120.

² *Ibid.* p. 120.

³ *Ibid.* in *Quintus Evangelio*, 1000.

round the lake of Galilee, and was compelled by the persistent demands of the crowd to 'work miracles.' This mission only lasted a few months; but it was long enough for Jesus to send twelve apostles, who prepared the villages of Galilee for His coming, travelling two and two through the north of Palestine. Jesus found His audience rather among the disciples of Judaea than among the Pharisee. The style of His teaching was the advent of the 'kingdom of God'—the sudden and speedy coming of the promised Messiah. This teaching was acceptable neither to Herod Antipas nor to the Pharisees; and their hostility obliged Jesus to fly for a short time to the Perea, a territory north of Galilee. But a conference between the Master and His disciples at Caesarea Philippi ended in a determination to visit the capital and there proclaim Jesus as the promised Messiah. As they approached Jerusalem, even the ignorant disciples were frightened at the risks they were running, but Jesus rebuked their fears by promising that they should soon be set on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel. 'Alors n'est-ce pas à Jérusalem passé y month?'¹

The Council project made his public entry into Jerusalem as Messiah, and, as a last act of authority, cleared the temple courts by an act of violence, in which He was decisively assisted by His disciples. For some days after this He preached daily about the coming of the kingdom, and filled with great dignity the days which His enemies laid for Him. 'But the situation could only end in a miracle or a catastrophe, and it was the catastrophe which happened.'² Jesus was arrested, after a brief struggle between the satellites of the High Priest and the disciples; and the latter, without waiting to see the end, fled northwards towards their homes. When brought before Pilate, Jesus probably answered 'Yét' to the question whether He claimed to be a king; but 'la parole du Christ Jésus-Christ, Dieu éternel n'est pas de ce monde, n'est-ce jamais pas Dieu Dieu pas le Christ

¹ Jesus, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, p. 104.

² *Ibid.* p. 117.

d'Alembert.¹ This conclusion led naturally to His immediate execution; after which

'on peut supposer qu'on eût été débarrassé de ce pestiféré de la terre avant le cas où le saint, dont quelques-uns prétendent qu'il est, eût été présenté au saint qui supplie. Les conclusions de signature furent alors qu'on l'eût de quelques jours de mort et l'impossibilité de reconnaître la dignité du défunt, quand même on l'eût eût.'

The disciples, however, had been too profoundly stirred by Jesus to accept defeat. Some of them had even seen Him die; and though they knew that He was dead, they hardly realised it. Besides, they were fellow-countrymen of those who had called a traitor Jesus was not High, or even John the Baptist, come to life again. 'What more natural' than that Peter should see the Master one day while fishing on the lake? 'The impulse was given, this belief grew' by the very need which it had to strengthen itself. Christ 'appeared like to the eleven.' So it was that their faith brought them back to Jerusalem, and Christianity was born.

'The supernatural life of Christ in the faithful and in the Church has been studied in an historical form, which has given birth to what we might somewhere hardly call the Christ of legend.' So the Italian medieval sums up the result of this reconstruction or denudation of the Gospel history.² 'Such a criticism,' say the editors not less frankly than truly, 'does away with the possibility of finding in Christ's teaching even the embryonic form of the Church's later theological teaching.'³

Students unfamiliar with Modernist literature will probably have read the foregoing extracts with other amazement. It seems hardly credible that such views should be propounded by Catholic writers, who claim to remain in the Catholic Church, to repeat her words, submit as her slave, and share her faith. What more, it may well be asked, have Modernist opponents of Christianity

¹ *Œuvres de D'Alembert*, t. viii, p. 373.

² *The Progress of Theology*, pp. 161, 162.

³ *Ibid.* p. 162.

ever said, in their efforts to tear up the Christian religion by the roots, than we had here admitted by Catholic apologists? What is left of the object of the Church's worship if the Christ of history was but an enthusiastic Jewish peasant whose pathetic ignorance of the future appeared to him but him to the almost enterprise of attempting a new *Exodus* at Jerusalem? Is not Jesus reduced by this criticism to the same level as Thomas or Judas of Galilee? and, if this is the true account, what sentiment can we feel, when we read His tragic story, but compassion tinged with contempt?

And on what principles are such theories taken with our authorities? What is the criterion by which it is decided that Christ said, 'I am a King, but not *'* His kingdom is not of this world *'*? Why must the passionists have been only a subjective hallucination in the minds of the disciples? To these questions there is a plain answer. The non-intervention of God in history is an axiom with the Modernists. 'L'histoire,' says M. Loisy, 'n'a pas d'empêcher de l'agencement pour deus. Dieu de l'histoire; il ne l'y remue jamais.'¹ It would be more accurate to say that, whenever the meeting takes place, 'the historian' gives the Christ the *carte blanche*.

But now comes in the peculiar philosophy by which the Modernists claim to rehabilitate themselves as loyal and orthodox Catholics, and to turn the back of the rationalist position, which they have seemed to occupy themselves. The warlike against Modernism in philosophy has long since established itself in Germany and France. In England and Scotland the battle still rages; in America the quarrel has been so violent that an extreme form of anti-modernism is now the dominant fashion in philosophy. It would have been easy to predict—and in fact the prediction was made—that the new world-construction in terms of will and action, which dispenses speculation in theoretical truth and gives the primacy to what Kant called the practical reason, would be rejected

¹ Loisy, *Simple Histoire*, p. 111.

advanced by Christian apologists, has passed by the acceptance of science and liberal criticism. Protestantism, in fact, has recourse to the method of apologetic before the Modernist movement arose. The Romanist theology in Germany in spite of its 'static' view of revelation, and the Synodal theology of Salazar and Biedau, have many affinities with the position of Tyrrell, Le Bonhomme, and Le Roy.

It is exceedingly difficult to compress into a few pages a fair and intelligible statement of a Molinist which shows the whole conception of reality, and which has great ramifications. There is an additional difficulty in the fact that few of the Molinists are more than amateurs in philosophy. They are quick to see the strategic possibilities of a theory which separates faith and knowledge, and declare that truths of faith can never come into collision with truths of fact, because they "belong to different orders." It asks them to follow the pragmatists in talking about "loosely chosen beliefs," and "voluntary certainty"; Mr. Tyrrell even maintains that "the great mass of our beliefs are reversible, and depend for their stability on the action or permission of the will." But philosophy is for them but only a controversial weapon. I give them the motto of justifying their position as Catholics who wish to remain such in their Church and her traditions, but no longer believe in the miracle which the Church has always regarded as matters of fact. Nevertheless, an attempt must be made to explain a point of view which, in the plain man, is very strange and unfamiliar.

Two words are constantly in the mouth of Molinist controversialists in speaking of their opponents. The adherents of the traditional theology are 'intellectualists,' and their conception of reality is 'static.' The meaning of the latter charge may perhaps be best explained from Le Bonhomme's brilliantly written essay, "*Le Mystère Chrétien et l'Intellectuelisme*." The Greeks, he says, were inevitable in their desire to see, like children. Nonetheless, for them, consisted in a complete vision of reality; and, since thought is the highest kind of vision, education

was absorbed of by them in the subjective contemplation of the perfectly true, good, and beautiful. Hence arose the philosophy of 'concepts': they idealized nature by contemplating it sub specie eternitatis. Reality resided in the unchanging ideas; the mutable, the particular, the individual was for them an enhancement, a 'series of thoughts.' The sage always tries to escape from the moving world of becoming into the static world of being. But an ideal world, as conceived, can only be an abstraction, an impermanentness of reality. Such an idealism gives us neither a science of origin nor a science of ends. Greek wisdom sought eternity and forgot time; it sought that which never dies, and forgot that which never lives.

¹ An excellent description like that of Greek philosophy as *atylotous*, constant always in substituting for reality, by simplification, ideas of concepts which thus turn statically by their logical relations, regarding them at the same time as adequate representations and as sources inexhaustibly defined."²

Hellenized Christianity, presents our critic, regarded the incarnation statically, as a fact in past history. For the real Christ is an object of faith. 'He introduces into us the principles of that which we ought to be. That which He reveals, He makes us possessing it.' In other words, Christ, and the God whom He reveals, are a power or force rather than a fact. 'A God who has nothing to become has nothing to do.' God is not the idea of ideas, but the being of beings and the life of our life. He is not a supreme action, but a supreme life and an immortal action. He is not the 'unmoved mover,' but He is in the movement itself as its principle and end. While the Greeks (perceived) the world sub specie eternitatis, God is conceived by modern thought sub specie temporis. God's eternity is not a sort of arrested time in which there is no more life; it is, on the contrary, the maximum of life.

It is plain that we have here a decided emphasis on the dynamic aspect of reality as contrasted to static philosophy than the exclusively static view which has

¹ *Introduction, Le Mystère Chrétien et l'Éthique des, pp. 22, 23.*

have already suffered) to the Greeks. A little close thinking might be enough to convince anyone that the two aspects of reality which the Greeks called *poiesis* and *praxis* are correlative and necessary to each other. A God who is merely the principle of movement and change is an absurdity. There is always existing its own products into nothingness. Unless there is a being who can say, 'I am the Lord, I change not,' the 'sons of Jacob' cannot flatter themselves that they are 'not converted.'¹ But Rahel Levinson and his friends are not much concerned with the ultimate problems of metaphysics; what they desire is to shake themselves free from 'heavenly cares' in the past, to be at liberty to deal them as facts, while retaining them as representative ideas of faith. If reality is defined to consist only in life and action, it is a meaningless abstraction to strip off a moment in the process, and ask, 'Did it ever really take place?' This abstracted question may therefore be ignored as meaningless and irrelevant, except from the 'abstract' standpoint of physical science.

The remedy against 'intellectualism' across the same road. M. Le Roy and the other Christian pragmatists have grouped to the 'Rationalism of Emma Nozou'. The following words of Fraenkel, one of Brother's disciples, might serve as a motto for the whole school:

'Theology means now not science. Theological speculation still, and dogmatical practice. Theological education now not speculative, and operative. Qualified to live on problems not reports made.'

M. Le Roy also seems to know only these two categories. Whatever is not 'practical'—having an immediate and obvious bearing on conduct—is designated as 'theoretical' or 'speculative.' But the whole field of scientific study lies outside this classification, which pretends to be exhaustive. Science has no 'practical' aim, in the narrow sense of that which may serve as a guide to moral action; nor does it deal with 'theoretical' or 'speculative' ideas,

¹ *Isaiah*, li, 4.

except provisionally, until they can be verified. The aim of science is to determine the laws which prevail in the physical universe; and its motive is that purely disinterested curiosity which is such an outstanding phenomenon in progressists. And since the faith which has lulled national science is at least as strong as any other faith now active in the world, it is useless to frame regulations in such a way as to exclude the question, "Did this or that occurrence, which is presented as an event in the physical order, actually happen, or not?" The question has a very definite meaning for the man of science, as it has for the man in the street. To call it 'theoretical' is ridiculous.

What H. Le Roy means by 'interpreting dogmas in the language of practical religion' may be gathered from his own illustrations. The dogma, "God is our Father," does not define a 'theoretical relation' between Him and us. It signifies that we are to believe in Him as men believe in their fathers. "God is personal" means that we are to believe in Him as if He were a human person. "Jesus is risen" means that we are to think of Him as if He were now contemporary. The dogma of the Real Presence means that we ought to have, in the presence of the consecrated Host, the same feelings which we should have had in the presence of the risen Christ. "Let the dogmas be interpreted in this way, and no one will dispute them."

The same treatment of dogmas is advocated in Mr. Tyndal's very able book '*Lessons in Chemistry*.' The test of truth for a dogma is not its correspondence with phenomenal fact, but its 'pragm-value.' This writer, in my view, follows his companion by the Society of Jesus, to which he belonged, in his attitude in his treatment of history than the French critics whom we have quoted. Although in application the criterion for the acceptance of dogmas must, he thinks, be a moral and practical one, he sometimes speaks as if the 'pragm-value' of an ostensibly historical proposition varied with the necessity of its truth as matter of fact.

¹ Le Roy, *Dogma et Critique*, p. 125.

'Between the inward and the outward, the world of reality and the world of appearance, the relation is not merely one of symbolic correspondence. The distinction that is manifested by the division of our mind implies and presupposes a causal and dynamic unity of the two. We should look upon the outward world as being an affected symbol of the inward, its correspondence of the material and causal connection destroyed.'

But Mr. Tyrell does not mean to mean all that these sentences might imply. He speaks repeatedly, in the '*Lost Oracle*,' of the '*will-world*' as the only real world.

'The will (the eye) cannot make that true which in itself is not true. . . . But it can make that a fact relative to our mind and genius which is not a fact relative to our understanding. . . . It casts with unity of its eye an act of will to create the world of truth to which we shall accommodate our thought and action. . . . It does not believe that harmony of faith with the truths of reason and facts of experience is the best or necessary condition of its credibility. . . . It instructs the values in the world as known to inward are single only because they are known hence created by the mind itself. Truth and doubt have a common element in the deep sense of the insufficiency of the human mind to grasp ultimate truth. . . . The world given to our outward sense is darkness and form, except so far as we assimilate to it some of the characteristics of will and spirit. . . . The world of appearance is simply subordinate to the real world of our will and affections.'

Because the '*abstract*' sciences cannot and do not attempt to reach ultimate truth, it is assumed that they are altogether '*barren forms*.' This is the error of much Oriental mysticism, which judges all value by what it regards as the lower categories. In his later writings Mr. Tyrell objects to being classed with the American and English pragmatists—the school of Mr. William James. But the division of these passages is misapprehension. The will, which is illegitimately restricted to include feeling,¹ is

¹ *Lost Oracle*, p. 112 (italics).

² But it is not intention in the part of the writer. Perhaps the word '*intention*' is unfortunate, p. 112. 'It is impossible to separate feeling and willing from each other. . . . Only in the highest stage of spiritual life, to wit, does a partial separation of feeling from willing occur.' But it is the highest stage of spiritual

limited as the reader as well as the discoverer of reality. The 'world of appearance' is placed in its group. It is this methodological pragmatism which is really newsworthy to Modernism. If the categories of the understanding can be so disposed as to be altered as independent truth, value, or importance, all collisions between faith and fact may be avoided by discovering in advance any conclusions at which science may arrive. Sometimes about 'brute fact' which are absolutely false may then not be untrue when taken out of the scientific plane. Science teaches that facts they are human world-pictures, superimposed thereon by the practical consciousness of faith. Any question about fact which concerns itself in the will and affection and which is proved by experience to furnish sustenance to the spiritual life, may be settled in without scruple. It is not only useful, but true, in the only sense in which truth can be predicated of anything in the higher sphere.

The obvious criticism on this action of religious truth as purely moral and practical is that it is itself abstract and excluded. The universe as it appears to discursive thought, with its vast system of meaningfully uniform laws, which operate without such consideration for our wishes or feelings, must be at least an image of the real universe. We cannot accept the irreconcilable division between the will-world and the world of phenomena which the philosophical Modernists assume. The division, or rather the contradiction, is not in the nature of things, nor in the constitution of our minds, but in the consciousness of the unhappy man who are trying to combine two wholly incompatible theories. On the critical side they are pure rationalists, much as they dislike the name. They claim, as we have seen, to have advanced to philosophy through criticism. But the Modernist critics start with two well-defined presuppositions. They believe the intellect that

life, the human, with which we are alone concerned; and in this sense it is hardly possible unnecessary to distinguish between feeling and reason. Since 'discreetness, hard pressed by facts, try to make "right" out of the chaos of emotions and philosophical life, what the conception of logical reasoning, which is excluded as a sort of patch!

"God is a personage in history", they assume that for the historian "He cannot be found anywhere"; that He is as though He did not exist. On the strength of this presupposition, and for no other reason, they proceed to rule out, without further investigation, all alleged instances of divine intervention in history. Undaunted by any of the misgivings which prodigiously the ordinary believe to conservatism, they follow the rationalist argument to its logical conclusion with starting enthusiasm. And then, when the whole edifice of historical religion seems to have been overwhelmed in the very foundations, they turn round suddenly and say that all their critical labours mean nothing for faith, and that we may go on repeating the old formulas until nothing had happened.

The Modernists pour scorn on the scholastic "heresy-psychology," which resolves human personality into a multitude of partially independent agents; but, in truth, their attempt to blow hot and cold with the same mouth seems to have involved them in a more disastrous self-deception than has been witnessed in the history of thought since the fall of the Romantics. It is typical and disheartening to their disappointment of "individualism," or rather of discursive thought in all its operations, might find a response. But in the twentieth century the witness which, as critics, they follow so unconsciously will not refuse to be heard out of the room as soon as matters of historical fact are questioned. Our contemporaries believe that matters of fact are important, and they insist, with ever-increasing emphasis, that they shall not be called upon to believe, as part of their religious faith, anything which, as a matter of fact, is not true. The Methodist critic, when pressed on this side, says that it is natural for faith to represent its ideas in the form of historical facts, and that it is in this inevitable tendency which causes the difficulties between religion and science. A sane criticism will allow that this is very largely true, but will not, as we are persuaded, be contented to believe with R. Lohr that the historical origin of the Christian Theism was the poet-derived enthusiasm which he portrays in "Das Evangelium Synopticum."

However this may be—and it must remain a matter of opinion—the very serious question arises, whether it is really natural for him to represent his ideas in the form of historical facts when it knows that these facts have no historical basis. The writers with whom we are dealing evidently think it is natural and inevitable, and we must assume that they speak from their own spiritual experience. But this state of mind does not seem to be a very common one. Those who believe in the divinity of Christ, but not in His supernatural birth and bodily resurrection, do not, as a rule, make these articles the subject of their meditations, but find their spiritual satisfaction in communion with the Christ who is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Those who regard Jesus only as a prophet sent by God to reveal the Father, generally grieve only in the God whom He revealed, and cherish the memory of Jesus with no other feelings than respect, gratitude and veneration. Those, finally, who worship in God only the Great Unknown who speaks to righteousness, find myths and anthropomorphic symbols hardly satisfying in such devotion as they are still able to practice. In dealing with modern Voluntarists it is perhaps not disrespectful to suggest that the difficult position in which they find themselves has produced a peculiar activity of the will, such as is seldom found under normal conditions.

We pass to the position of the Modernists in the Roman Catholic Church. It is well known that the advance of Pius X. have committed the Pope to a wholesale condemnation of the new movement. The reasons for this condemnation are thus summed up by a distinguished ecclesiastic of that Church:¹

• Why has the Pope condemned the Modernists? (1) Because the Modernists have denied that the divine facts related in the Gospel are historically true. (2) Because they have denied that Christ the savior of the whole world, the one God, and that He was born that He was the Son of the world. (3) Because they have denied the divine mission and the personality

¹ Mgr. L. Ryan, in *The Irishman's Chatelain*, (December), 1909.

at the great danger which enters into the Christian creed. (ii) Because they have stated that Christ himself personally was founded the Church or instituted the Sacraments. (iii) Because they had severed the divine constitution of the Church, by teaching that the Pope and the bishops derive their powers, not directly from Christ and His Apostles, but from the Christian people.¹

The official condemnation is contained in two documents—the decree of the Holy Inquisition, 'Inammiabili esse vultis,' July 3, 1867, and the Encyclical, 'Familiaris querelæ,' September 2, 1867. These pronouncements are intended for Catholics, and their tone is that of authoritative denunciation rather than of argument. In the main, the summary which they give of Modernist doctrine is as fair as could be expected from a judge who is passing sentence; but the papal Encyclicals have not always resisted the temptation to arouse prejudice by misrepresenting the views which they condemn. We have not space to cite the three documents, nor is it necessary to do so. It will be more to the purpose to consider whether, in spite of their official condemnation, the Modernists are likely in the future to make good their footing in the Roman Church.

Even before the Encyclical the Modernists had used very bold language about the authority of the Church.

'The visible Church professes His Verdict in his "Most-cherished Letter"': is but a means, a way, a channel, to his end where it helps, to his left where it hinders. . . . Who have taught us that the command of the Church cannot err, but the Encyclicals themselves? Errors, faults, ignorance may be corrected! . . . Their present limitation is but a passing episode in the Church's history. . . . May not history repeat itself? (as in the transition from Judaism to Christianity). Is Christ now declared that He should not again rise out of the very stones rising up now to Judaism? May not Christianity, like Judaism, have to die in order that it may live again in a greater and grander form? This not only requires, but the fruits of development, after which it must die; and be reborn to continue in its progress! Whence does death, but only within Nature; but there again at last is something which men may not be provided!

It is told he explains: 'The Church of the Catacombs became the Church of the Vatican; who can tell what the Church of the Vatican may not turn into!'

It is thus on a very elastic theory of development that the Modernists rely. 'The difference between the initial and final stages of many an object may often be greater than those which separate kind from kind.' And so this Proteus of a Church, which has changed its form so completely since the Gospel was first preached in the subterranean galleries of Rome, may undergo another equally startling metamorphosis and come in future to a God who never intervenes in history. We may have reached our version of Newman's view of true development, and mark the enormous difference.

Mr. Tyrrell's 'Much-Abused Latin' makes, perhaps, the high-water mark of Modernist claims. Not all the writers whom we have quoted would view with complacency the prospect of the Catholic Church dying to live again, or being content to live only in its progeny. They proceed about the new visionism in one of similar manner as with a conversion. If the Catholic Church is really in such an advanced stage of decay that it must die before it can live, why do those who grasp the situation wish to keep it alive? Are they not precisely pouring their new wine into old bottles? Mr. Tyrrell himself draws the parallel with Judaism in the first century. Paul, he says, "did not feel that he had broken with Judaism." But the Synagogue did feel that he had done so, and history proved that the Synagogue was right.

Development, however great the changes which it entails, can only follow certain laws; and the development of the Church of Rome has actually followed a direction opposite to that which the Modernists demand that it shall take. Newman might plausibly claim that the doctrine of purgatory and of the papal supremacy are logically involved in the very claims of the Roman Church. The claim is true at least in this sense, that, given a political Church required as an authority, these useful doctrines were necessary in the interests of the government, to be promulgated sooner or later. But there is

and the slightest reason to suppose that the next development will be in the direction of that previous kind of Liberalism favoured by the Modernists. It is difficult to see how the Vatican could even meet the reformers half-way without making religious-conscience. 'This super-natural mechanism,' M. Lohy says in his last book, 'Modernism leads to ruin completely.' Just so; but the Roman Church lives safely on the high in supernatural mechanism. Her sacramental and sacerdotal system is based on supernatural mechanism—on divine interventions in the physical world conditioned by human agency; her theology and books of devotion are full of supernatural mechanism; the lives of her saints, her tales and holy plays, the whole language of Catholic mysticism, the living piety and devotion of the faithful, wherever it is still to be found, are based entirely on that very theory of supernaturalistic deities which the Modernists, when he acts as critic, begins by ruling out on demand of any historical or scientific actuality. The effectiveness of Catholicism as a cult depends almost wholly on its frank admission of the supernatural as a matter of daily experience. To rationalise even contemporary history as M. Lohy has rationalised the Napoleonic world is suicide for Catholicism.

It is tempting to give a concrete instance by way of illustrating the impossible chain which divides Catholicism as a working system from the academic scheme of transformation which we have been considering.

* The French Catholic *reflector* (Paris correspondent in Paris on June 22, 1888) has a column with concern the report of a special consultation by a mysterious official known as the *Monsieur Fleurence* of Rouen. On Sunday, June 20, 1888, during a violent storm that swept over that region of the Vire, among the great quantity of buildings that fell at the time a certain number were found split in two. On the lower floor of each of the houses, according to the local papers that appeared the next day, was the image of the Madonna, known as *Bonhomme* and known as *Notre Dame de Notre*. The local Catholic regarded it as a fulfilment of the municipal council's wish of the previous 15th century of the Virgin. So many people testified

in having seen the miraculous medicines that the bishop of Saint-Denis instituted an inquiry: 894 men, women, and children were healed by the parish priest, and certain well-known men of science present agreed were cured. The report has just been published in the *deuxieme* *Supplement*, and concludes in favour of the absolute authenticity of the facts under inquiry: . . . The fact would seem with the bishop, 'that will decide everything in the construction of the report of the special commission.'

This is Catholicism in practice. Those who think in terms of it, by their construction that supernatural interventions can never be matters of fact, are liable to the reproach which they most dislike—that of scholastic intellectualism, and neglect of concrete experience.

This denial of the supernatural as a factor in the physical world seems to us almost sufficient to make the position of the Modernists in the Roman Church untenable. That form of Christianity stands or falls with belief in miracles. It has always sought to bring the divine into human life by intercalating acts of God among facts of nature. Its whole sacred literature, as we have said, is permeated through and through by the belief that God continually intervenes to change the course of events. What would become of the cult of Mary and the saints if it were recognized that God does not so intervene, and that the saints, if saints at all, are those they ever existed, not do anything by their interventions to stop calamity or bring blessing? The Modernist priest, it appears, can still say 'for you monks' to a Mary whose biography he believes to be purely mythical. At any rate, he can tell his worshippers with a good conscience that if they pray to Mary for grace they will receive it. But what is the good of this mother-belief? And, if it is in part of a transaction in which the worshippers pay money for assistance which he believes to be miraculous and only obtainable through the good offices of the Church, is it even purely human? The worshippers may be helped by his respectful conviction that his charges on the treasury of souls has been honoured; but if, apart from the natural effects of suggestion, nothing has been given him but a mere placebo, is the sacerdotal effect one which an honourable man would wish to dilate?

We have no wish whatever to make any imputation against the motives of the brave men who have risked the shadow of the Vatican, and who in some cases have been personally rebuked by their superiors, several of their opinions. Perhaps none but a Catholic priest can understand how great the sacrifice is when one in his position breaks away from the authority of those who speak in the name of the Church, and deliberately incurs the charge, still as terrible in Catholic eyes, of being a heretic and a leader of heresy. Not one man in twenty would dare to run the storm of obloquy, hatred, and calumny which is always ready to fall on the head of a heretical priest. The Encyclical indicates the measures which are to be taken officially against Modernism. Para II states that all the young professors suspected of Modernism are to be driven from their chairs in the universities; that infidel books are to be condemned indiscriminately, even though they may have received an imprimatur; that a committee of censors is to be established in every diocese for the revision of books; that writings of liberal priests or laymen are to be forbidden; that every diocese is to have a vigilance committee to discover and inform against Modernists; and that young clerical Modernists are to be put 'in the lowest places,' and held up to the contempt of their more orthodox or obsequious comrades. But this persecution is as nothing compared with the crushing condemnation with which the religious world, which is his only world, visits this kind of tortuery; the loss of friendships, the grief and shame of loved relatives, and the haunting dread that an authority as august as that which has condemned him cannot have spoken in vain. Inevitably all forms of truth must do homage to the courage and self-sacrifice of these men. The doubt which may be reasonably felt and expressed as to the consistency of their attitude reflects no dim light on their personality. Nevertheless, the alternative must be faced, that a 'modernised' Catholicism must either descend to deliberate quackery, or proclaim that the bank from which the main part of her revenues is derived has stopped payment.

What will be the end of the struggle, and in what way, if not, will it leave the greatest Church in Christendom? There are some who think that the Church will grow tired of the attitude of Charles, and will retreat to the point which Modernism professes, will show high-water mark. But the policy of France has never been concision, but expansion, even at the cost of alienating large bodies of her supporters; and we believe that in the present instance, on no future occasion, the Vatican will recede in principle. Modernism and the movement within her body is created. She can hardly do otherwise, for the alternative offered is not a gradual reform of her dogmas, but a sweeping revolution. This we have made abundantly clear by quotations from the Modernists themselves. If the Vatican once proclaimed that such views about supernaturalism as those which we have quoted are permissible, a deadly wound would be inflicted on the faith of simple Catholics all over the world. The Yoke of Christ would seem to them to have a pointed end. The whole machinery of piety, as practised in Catholic countries, would be thrown out of gear. Nor is there any strong body of educated laymen, such as exists in the Protestant Churches, who would influence the Pope in the direction of liberalism. Not only are the lay thought that their province is to obey, and never to call in question the decisions of ecclesiastical head, but the large majority of thoughtful laymen have already severed their connection with the Church, and have no interest in progress for its reform. Everything points to a complete victory for the Jesuits and the archaic party; and, such as we may regret the ending of free discussion, and the expulsion of vibrant and speculative thinkers from the Church which they love, it is difficult to see how any other policy could be adopted.

Of the Modernists, a few will remain, others will remain in the Church, though in open revolt against the Vatican; but the majority will be alienated, and will make a hyphenation to atheism. The disastrous results of the rebellion, and of the system taken as credit to, will be apparent in the deterioration of the priesthood. Modern thought, it will be said, has not been, definitely, con-

demand by the Church; nor has been openly deflected against progress. Many who, before the crisis of the last few years, believed it possible to enter the Roman Catholic fold without any sacrifice of intellectual honesty, find in the future that it is impossible to do so.

We may expect to see this result more palpable in France, where men think rapidly, and are less to be influenced by custom and prejudice. Unless the Republican Government allows the dying culture into a blaze by rapid progression, it is to be feared that Catholicism in that country may soon become "une question négligeable." The prospects of the Church in Italy and Spain do not seem very much better. In fact the only wonders which we can suggest to those who regret the decline of an august institution, is that churches everywhere have shown an astonishing toughness. But as head of the universal Church, in any true sense of the word, Rome has reached her life.

A more vital question, for those at least who are Christians, but not Roman Catholics, is in what shape the Christian religion will emerge from the assaults upon traditional beliefs which science and historical criticism are pressing home. We have given our readers for several the *Revue* our attempt at reconstruction. In the first place, we do not feel that we are required by many criticisms to reconsider nearly all that M. Loisy has contended. We believe that the Kingdom of God which Christ preached was something more than that a political dream. We believe that He did speak as a true man speaks, so that those who heard Him were convinced that He was more than man. We believe, in short, that the object of our worship was a historical figure. Nothing has yet come to light, or is likely to come to light, which prevents us from identifying the Christ of history with the Christ of faith, or the Christ of experience.

But, if too much is surrendered on one side, too much is taken back on the other. The contention that the progress of knowledge has left the traditional beliefs and values of Catholicism untouched is untenable. It is not too much to say that the whole edifice of supernaturalistic

fusion, under which Catholic piety has shivered long for these hundred years has fallen in ruins to the ground. There is still enough superstition left to win a certain respect for supernatural events at Lourdes, and split last-century Romanism. But that kind of religion is doomed, and will not survive three generations of broad-brush education given equally to both sexes. The saving the signs and wonders—that broad road which attracts as many converts and wins as rapid a success—leads one step at last to its destruction, as Christ seems to have foreseen His own disciples. Science has been the slowly advancing Dromedary which has overthrown a huckstered and puppeted Christianity. She has come with a winning, but in her hand, and she will not stop till she has thoroughly pugged her door. She has left us the divine flame, whatever may be the truth about certain mysterious events in the human life. But honestly she has not left us the right to offer bloodless prayers to a mythical Queen of Heaven; she has not left us the right to believe in such possible stories as the Madonna-child; or hallucinations, in order to induce a comfortably pious state of mind.

The dualism alleged to exist between faith and knowledge will not serve. Man is one, and reality is one; there can be none to two "orders of reality" not allowing each other that there can be two faculties in the human mind working independently of each other. The universe which is interpreted to us by our understanding is not natural, nor are its laws placed to our wills, as the pragmatists so rudely tell. It is a divinely ordered system, which includes man, the real and more of things, and Christ, in whom is revealed to us his inner character and meaning. It is not the province of faith either to find essential knowledge, or to contaminate the material on which science works by introducing what St. Le Roy calls "transcendental symbols"—myths in fact—which do not become true by being recognized as false, as the new apologetic seems to suggest. Faith is not the brute objectifier of Modernist theology. Faith is, on the practical side, just the resolution to stand or fall by the solid

hypothesis: and, on the intellectual side, it is a progressive initiation, by experiment which ends in error's man, into the unity of the good, the true, and the beautiful, founded on the inner assurance that these three attributes of the divine nature have one source and conduct to one goal.

The Modernists are right in finding the primary principle of faith in the depths of our individual personality. They are right in teaching that faith develops and comes into its own only through the activity of the whole man. They are right in changing the name of faith to *critical opinion*, which may leave the character unchanged. As Herbert Spencer says:

'Think not the faith by which the just shall live
Is a dead creed, a map extorted of heaven,
For thus a better faith and better,
A thoughtful gift, withdrawn as soon as given.
It is an affirmation and an act
That into eternal truth is pressed hard.'

For all this we are grateful to them. But we maintain that the future of Christianity is in the hands of those who insist that faith and knowledge must be confronted with each other till they have made up their quarrel. The union of faith cannot be effected with by establishing a *modus vivendi* between scepticism and superstition. That is all that Modernism offers us; and it will not do. Rather we will believe, with Clement of Alexandria, that *ratio est puer, scientia est puer*.

If this confidence in the reality of things hoped for and the hopefulness of things not yet well-founded, we must wait in patience for the coming of the wise modern-builders who will construct a more truly Catholic Church out of the fragments of the old, with the help of the material now being collected by philosophers, psychologists, historians, and scientists of all kinds and countries. When the time comes for the building to rise, the contributions of the Modernists will not be described as wood, hay, or stubble. They have done valuable service in biblical criticism, and in other branches, which will be always recognized.

shall. But the building will not [as modernists in psychology] be started on their plan, nor by their Church. History shows how complete of the consequences of delayed regeneration. Not a new generation likely to see much of the reconstruction. The Church, as institutions, will continue for some time to show apparent weakness, and other maintaining and circling agencies will do much of their work. But, since there never has been a time when the character of Christ and the union which he taught have been held in higher honour than the present, there is every reason to expect that the next "Age of Faith," when it comes, will be of a more genuinely Christian type than the last.

CARDINAL NEWMAN

(III)

THE life of Newman was divided into two nearly equal portions by his change of religion in October 1845. For the earlier half of his career we have long had his own narratives; and Newman is a prince of autobiographers. It was his wish that the 'Apologia' should be the final and authoritative account of his life in the Church of England, and of the steps by which he was led to transfer his allegiance to another communion. The voluminous transcripts of the Tractarian movement, which include large selections of Newman's own letters, has continued the account of his narrative, and has made out a better description of that strange episode in English University life. Ineffable! With the 'Apologia' and Dean Church's 'Oxford Movement' before him, the reader needs no more. Mr. Wilfrid Ward has therefore been well advised to adhere loyally to the Cardinal's wishes, by confining himself to the last half of Newman's life, what a brief summary of the childhood, youth, and middle age till 1845. Nevertheless, it is misleading to give the title 'The Life of Cardinal Newman' to a work which is only, as it were, the second volume of a biography. There are very few men, however long-lived, who have not done much of their best work before the age of forty-five, and Newman was certainly not one of the exceptions. From every point of view, except that of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical hierarchy, Newman's Anglican career was far more interesting and important than his residence at Birmingham. He will live in history, not as the author of *Edinburgh*, nor under the name of the Cardinal's

last which fell to his lot, almost his last, to save the souls of the Victorian, when he had passed the normal limit of human life, but on the real border and border of nineteenth century Anglo-Catholicism, the movement which he created and then tried to run to-day. The profound calmness and serenity of his later life seem very pale and almost petty when compared with the activities of the years while he was making a chapter of English history. His greatest work, though it was written many years after his conversion, is the record of a drama which ended in the interview with Father Donnelly the Penitential. It is 'The Water of my Religion Epiphany'; and after 1845 his religious epiphany had, as he says himself, no further history. The incomparable style which will give him a permanent place among the masters of English prose was the product of his life at Oxford, where he lived in a society of highly cultivated men, whose writings show many of the same excellences as his own. Newman's English is only the Oxford manner of his time. Such an instrument could hardly have been forged at the Birmingham Oratory, where his association, who had followed him from Littlemore, were of such an inferior type that Mark Pattison, who knew them, was surprised that he could be satisfied with their company. His best poems and his best prose belong to his English period. 'The Dream of Gerontion,' with all its finest gems, is his best verse (his 'Lead, kindly Light,' and other short poems of his youth). Moreover, his social and Roman ecclesiasticism is one of almost unbroken failure. If he had died eighteen years after his conversion, when he already looked upon himself as an old man whose name was nearly lost, he would have been regarded as one who had sacrificed a great career in the Church of England for religion and eternity. From the first he was distrusted by the 'Old Catholics' (the old English Catholic hierarchy in England), and regarded at the Vatican, where Galvani emphatically represented him as 'the most dangerous man in England.' When Manning, Archbishop of Westminster, followed his example and joined the Roman Church, Newman was confronted with a still more subtle and religious opponent, whose hostility was never relaxed till the conversion of a

Liberal Pope made it no longer possible to cast the burden of early-latecomers upon a better-organized man. The recognition came in time to make his decision, but too late to enable him to turn his back upon the administration of the Roman Church.

The main results of a very successful career are narrated at length in Mr. Pardy's volume. After his 'conversion' Newman first resided in a small community at Maryvale (Dorset) but soon left it on a journey to Rome, where he spent some time at the College of Propaganda, and had a firsthand of the distress with which Pius IX. and his advisers always regarded him. His plan at this time was to found a theological seminary at Maryvale, and in this scheme he had the support of Wiseman, the chief Roman agent in the United Kingdom. But the 'Kemp on Development,' with its archaic language and unbalanced list of quotations, seriously alarmed the theologians at Rome, and Newman, regarding the list of many reforms, abandoned this project in favour of another. He resolved to join the Dominicans, an order founded by St. Philip Neri, and obtained permission to modify, in his proposed establishment, the rules of the Order, which, among other things, proscribed frequent haggings in public. He visited Naples, and came back a believer in the liquefaction of the saint's blood. The amazing letter to Henry Wilberforce, written Dom Beate Croce, shows that he was the most docile and obedient of converts. Even the Holy Roman of Loreto caused him no difficulty. 'He who feared the sea, on the wings of a world-wide sea, and touched in it all living things, who has hidden the terrestrial paradise, who said that birds might convert mountains . . . could do this wonder also.' 'It may have been'; 'everybody believes it in Rome'; therefore Newman 'has no doubt'!

The new Order was placed by Pius IX. at Birmingham. The first president of it was his friend who had left the English Church with him. Newman soon came in, and his health became very bad of it. But for many years Newman had reason to complain of neglect and want of sympathy. He even found empty churches when he preached in London. In conjunction with Faber, in 1871

started a series of 'Lives of the Saints,' in which the most 'cleared' miracles were accepted without question on time. The 'Old Catholics,' who had no stomach for such food, protested; and Newman, this time thoroughly irritated, had to admit another failure. The *Quarterly*, however, and its London offshoot under Faber were prosperous, and the churches where Newman preached were not long empty. In 1858 we find him in better spirits. He employed his energies in a series of direct lectures on 'Anglican Difficulties,' in which he criticised the Church of his day even with all the cultured severity of which he was a master. But he was soon in trouble again. One Dr. Charles Achilli, formerly a Dominican friar, gave lectures in London upon the scandals of the Roman Inquisition, which had impressed him for attacking the Catholic faith and fomenting sedition. The temper of the British public at this time made it ready to believe anything in the interests of the Roman Church, and Achilli became a popular hero. When man published a brilliant article upon him in the *Dublin Review*, which passed unnoticed. But when Newman suggested the charges of plagiarism in a public lecture, Achilli brought an action for libel, which in costs and expenses cost Newman £12,000. The money however was paid, and much more than paid, by his co-sponsors. This trial was quickly followed by the inauguration of a scheme for founding a Catholic University in Ireland, the avowed object of which was to withdraw young Catholics from the blighting influence of mixed education. This scheme was sure to appeal strongly to Newman. Liberalism had come in with a rush on Oxford, after the dissipation of the 'long night-time' (as Mark Pattison calls it) while the University was dominated by religious medievalism. The Oxford of Newman had become the Oxford of Jewett. The allies of Newman's young friends and disciples, such as Mark Pattison and J. A. Froude, were now in the opposite camp, full of anger and disgust at the subversive influences from which they had just escaped. Newman, as might be expected, was anxious to protect Catholic students from similar dangers, and accepted the post of Rector of the proposed Catholic University. He intended it to provide

philosophical defence of Catholicity and Revolution, and create a Catholic Movement.' The lectures in which he expounded his ideas at Dublin were a great success, and he returned to England full of hope. With a naive inability to read the character of one who was to be his great enemy, he offered Manning the post of Vice-Rector. Manning's refusal was followed by his failure to obtain the support of Ward, Henry Wilberforce, and others; and Catholic opinion in Ireland was much divided. For three or four years Newman was engaged in intellectual efforts to push his scheme forward. At last, in 1838, he was installed as Rector, and began his work as Dublin. A new church was built at St. Stephen's Green with the surplus of the Jewish subscriptions, and Newman produced some excellent literary work in the form of *University Sermons* and sermons. But the whole movement was viewed with distrust by the Irish ecclesiastical class, who, at the end of a moment of impetuosity, 'regard any intellectual man as being on the road to perdition.' There was a cloud over his work from first to last. He had been promised a bishopric, without which he was made to feel himself in an inferior position by the Irish prelates; but the promise was not fulfilled. The Irish objected to one or two English parsons-in-the-staff, because they were English. Dr. Cullen, the ruling spirit in the Irish hierarchy, was a narrow conservative, who looked on Mr Newman merely as an instrument against progressive tendencies in Church and State. In 1847 he resigned an impossible task, and returned to Birmingham.

New undertakings followed, no more successful than the abortive university scheme. There was to be a new translation of the Bible, and a new Catholic magazine called the *Rambler*. The latter enterprise was already well advanced when the general indifference of the Catholic public caused it to be abandoned. The *Rambler*, the medium by which need a freedom of discussion accessible to Roman ecclesiastics, struggled on amid a storm of criticism till 1846, when Newman, who was then [himself] editor, resigned, and one more humiliating failure was registered. The management of the magazine passed into other hands.

The *Oxford School of Himpsham*, a much less contentious undertaking, was eventually founded in the same year.

In 1865 came the emancipation of the Office of the Church by Canon and Victor Emmanuel. Newman returned to the Protestants as 'unfortunate victims,' but his advocacy of the temporal power was not strong enough to please the Catholics, while the strength of Manning's language left nothing to be desired. Newman became more unpopular than ever. His reputation suffered by his former connection with the *Quarterly* and his supposed connection with the Home and Foreign Office, which done included to represent the views of progressive Catholics, till it also was smothered out by the hierarchy. The five years from 1865 to 1870 are considered by Dr. Ward to have been the saddest in Newman's life. He felt, truly enough, that the dominant party had no sympathy with his aims, and that he was treated as 'some wild, incomprehensible beast, a spectacle for its wisdom to exhibit to strangers, and himself being the leader who explained it.' 'All through my life I have been plagued,' he writes to an old Oxford friend. There was even in his mind at this time a wicked yearning after the friends and the Church that he had left: a feeling, doubtless transient, but significant, which his biographer has allowed to show itself in a few pages of his book. After revivifying himself, in his story, of the warning against those who, after putting their hand to the plough, look back,' he proceeds to look back, because he cannot help it.

"I live more and more in the past, and in hopes that the past may revive in the future . . . I think, as death comes on, his mind turns to his soul and on his body, and that, viewed naturally, my soul is half dead now, whereas then for his Protestant ideal it was in the freshness and fervour of youth. . . . I say the scene of my state of mind from 1845 to 1860, when I became a Catholic. It is a clear past and gone—it relates to a world done and over. "Quite well content, at one time means progress, sometimes then, quietness from contemplation on? Quaker spiritualism, the quiet quiet nature, or of lower the spiritualism in nature?" . . . I have no doubt of this: I have laboured in England, to be independent, independent and secure. I have laboured in Ireland, with a free and clear

in my life. . . . Correspondingly with this neglect on the part of those for whom I laboured, there has been a shoving towards me on the part of Protestants. Their very words and actions which Catholics did not understand, Protestants did. I was under the temptation of looking out for, if not counting, Protestant praise. . . . When I went as a Protestant has told his private pains, fears, misgivings, doubts, then my Catholic work."

Such reflections might seem to indicate a disposition to return to the Anglican fold. But a man must have misapprehended Protestantism most intensely when he can leave the Church of Rome for any other. The irremediable disaster of the civil war among institutions from on in the judgment of the Roman Catholic towards Protestants. When Newman was publicly charged with intending to return to Anglicanism, his spirit broke out in a dangerous and flaming manner.

The bitterness of these few years of neglect, in which he had been seeing his heart in silence, must be remembered in connection with the famous Kingsley controversy, which in 1841 caused him to put on his armour and fight for his reputation. There had always been an element of combativeness in Newman's disposition. "Fierce people, my people must happily run at the prospect of danger," he wrote early in life. And when he could persuade himself that not only his honour but that of the Church was at stake, he could feel and show the true Catholic tenacity, the deadliest spirit of war. "a heresiarch," he had written even in his Anglican days, "should meet with no mercy. He must be dealt with by the competent authority as if he were embodied evil. To spare him is a false and dangerous pity. It is to endanger the souls of thousands, and it is uncharitable towards himself." This was the temper, armed by doubt and not mollified by age, which Charles Kingsley in an evil moment let himself down straight to provoke. At Christmas 1841 there appeared in *Newman's Magazine* a review of Froese's "History of England," in which Kingsley wrote "Truth be it our new saint has never been a virtue with the Roman clergy. Father Newman

informers that it need not be, and on the whole ought not to be—that coming in the weapon which Heaven has given to the saints wherever it vindicates the brute mechanism of the wicked world.” This change was in fact, taken as a matter of reading, or an important modification, of the remarkable discourse in ‘*Sermons on Subjects of the Day*.’ The discourse in question is a somewhat numerous glorification of the world’s temper, but it only says that the Redeemer’s doctrine is by His providence recommended that it is always mistaken for truth. The implication of meaning is therefore a misstatement in its relation. Kingsley ought to have read the sermon again, and withdrawn nervously from an untenable position. But he thought that something less than a complete apology would serve; and so gave Newman the opportunity of his life. When the withdrawal which he offered was rejected, Kingsley made neither his time, nor his himself, by an ill-considered pamphlet called, ‘*What then does Dr. Newman mean?*’ In this effusion he vents all his rage and hatred for Catholicism—the ten thousand fictions, its monstrous credulity and appetite for miracles, which were pressed, according to him, either from infantile folly or from diabolical imposture. Forgetting altogether that he has in default himself against a specific charge of scandal, he offers his great opponent the choice between writing himself down a liar or a fool—a liar if he pretends to believe in the Holy Eucharist and the blood of St. Innocent, a fool if he does not believe in them.

The character of this attack upon an elderly man of saintly character and acknowledged intellectual eminence, who had to all appearances blighted a great career by honestly cherishing his conscience, offended the British public, which was now fully disposed to give a respectful and favourable hearing to whatever Newman might care to say in reply. In a Catholic country it would have been manifestly a Protestant, he would fairly be attacked, to appeal to Catholic public opinion for justice; but Newman understood the English character, and saw his splendid chance.

The famous defence was, from every point of view except the highest, a complete triumph. And although there was

plainly appears in discussing the treatment of England as "hostile christianity," it is demanding too much of human nature to expect a master of laws, who vainly attacked with a bludgeon, to abstain from the pleasure of pinning his adversary monstrously in the tender parts of his body. The latest postage was added to later editions; and the "Apologia" remains a masterpiece of autobiography, and a powerful defence of Catholicism. To Newman this appeared to be the turning-point in his life-time. He felt strong enough to administer a severe reprimand to Monseigneur Talbot, his old enemy, who, knowing of the return of the "Apologia," invited him to preach at Rome. Then at once he threw himself into a great scheme for founding an Oratory at Oxford. Eight and a half acres were bought between Worcester College, the Clarendon Press, the Observatory, and Brunswick Street, a magnificent site, which the Catholics required for only £100. But here again he was thwarted. W. G. Ward opposed the scheme with all his might, insisting on the necessity of "preserving the purity of a Catholic atmosphere throughout the whole course of education." The whole tendency of the Ultramontane movement was to secure, below all other things, a body of militant young Catholics to fight the battles of the Church. Newman was willing to support the English Episcopate rather against itself; to the Ultramontane a Protestant is as certainly damned as an atheist, and is more mischievous as being less amenable to Catholic influence. Manning and Talbot seem to have given the project its coup de pique at Rome, and Newman sold the land which he had bought. He was bitterly disappointed; but the growth of public opinion had given him self-confidence, and he did not again fall into dependency, though he had a strange power most of approaching death, which prompted his last famous poem, 'The Dream of Gerontius.' A second attempt to go to Oxford was thwarted by enemies at Rome and in England in 1861. The extreme party, with Manning, now Arch-bishop, at their head, seemed to be victorious all along the line. They were able to prevail in their supreme triumph in the Vatican Council which saved the dogma of Papal infallibility. Newman,

while others were hailing and harping, was quietly engaged in preparing himself for that last and noblest of his master's characteristic work, 'The Grammar of Assent,' an attempt at a Catholic apology: on a 'personalist,' as opposed to an 'intellectualist' basis. He declined to take an active part in the theological conferences about infallibility, being by this time well aware how little weight such arguments as he could bring were likely to have at Rome. He was disappointed at the failure of the Congress of the Ultramontanians, but he had no wish to conduct it. The situation was hopeless, and he knew it. The death of several friends increased the sense of isolation, and during the years 1872 to 1879 his silence and depression were very noticeable to those who lived with him. His dearest friend, Archbishop St. John, successor of several who died about this time. Trinity College, Dublin, made him an honorary fellow in 1877, an honour which seemed to prefigure the far higher distinction which was soon to be conferred upon him.

The death of Pius IX in 1878 brought to an end the long reign of obscurantism of the Vatican, and with the election of Leo XIII Newman emerged from the cloud under which he had remained for more than a generation. The new Pope had no time in making him a Cardinal, though even now the gates seemed to be on the point of slipping through his fingers. He valued the honour immensely as setting the official seal of approbation on his life's work, and the last two years of his life were quietly happy. He was able to engage actively in affairs of public interest, and to write long letters, till near the end. He died on August 11, 1890, in his eightieth year, and was buried, by his own request, in the same grave with his friend Archbishop St. John.

Why is it that this sad, isolated, broken life, in which the young man traverses the road of the lay, and the older man joins worth upon the byways of his priest; which found its last haven in a society which wished to make a God of him but interested him too much for even this priestly service, has still an absorbing interest for our generation? For it is not only in England that Newman's hour has

and given. In France there is a cult of Newman, which has produced biographies by Bertrand and Furet, as well as a history of the Catholic Revivalism inspired by Thomas-Maugé. In England, besides Dean Church's 'Oxford Movement,' we have biographies by R. H. Hutton and W. Burn, and appreciations or depreciations by R. C. Marsh, Leslie Stephen, Froude, Mark Pattison, and several others.

The interest is mainly personal and psychological. Newman's writings, and his life, are a 'human document' in a very precise degree. Newman is right in calling attention to the interiorism of Newman. "Although the outer the words," I "and" we "are entirely new in Newman's writings, whether as preacher, novelist, controversialist, philosopher, or poet, he always reveals and always describes himself." Even his historical portraits are reconstructed from his latest consciousness: hence their historical failing—all agree on that in the histories—and their philosophical merit. In a sense he was the most inward of men. We do not know whether he had any ordinary temptations; we do not know whether he ever fell in love. But the history of his mind and the growth of his opinions have been laid bare to us with the candour of a child and the accuracy of a dissection or analysis. He reminds us of St. Quiricius, who should tell the story of his own life, but no more, and whose style, like his own, was modelled on the literary traditions of the eighteenth century.

He has left us, in the 'Autobiography,' a picture of his passionate and stronger hearted, when he lived in a world of his own, peopled by angels and spirits, a world in which the supernatural was the only nature. He was lonely and inward, then as always. It is not for nothing that in his sermons he expounded on often on the impossibility of the human mind. A naturalist will certainly be always something hard and inhospitable about it; he was loved, but loved little in return. And yet he craved for more affection than he could receive. "I cannot ever refuse to myself," he wrote once, "that there have not." It is a common failing in imaginative, & idealistic characters. Disappointed in his father like a woman for the hidden springs of thought, action, and belief. "When I awake at 'morning,'"

as he did occasionally, he meant, not the faculty which decides ethical problems, but the unrestricted consciousness which includes the separate activities of thought, will, and feeling. In this sense the epigrammatism was right. Why not that 'in Newman his own nature was a revelation which he called conscience.' He 'followed the ghosts,' uncertain whether to avoid them. The poem 'Lord, Truly Ugly' is the most intimate self-revelation that he ever made. This married attack, which he took early in life, became the foundation of his 'perpetrated' philosophy, and of the anti-intellectualism which was the negative side of it. But this release in the hourlight, which hardly made a myth of him, was clouded by a haunting fear of that myth, which imparts a gloomy tinge to his English sermons, and which, while he was talking between the English Church and Rome, plied him with the very unmythical question 'Where shall I be next night?' an exposure which he had used repeatedly and without success in his pastoral sermons.¹

It is nevertheless true that this self-exposed spirit was, at least in early life, impressionable and open to the challenges of others. His friendship with Harold Frederic and Arthur affected his opinions considerably; and still more potent was the prevailing intangible influence of Oxford—the academic atmosphere. It cannot indeed be said that the University was at this time in a healthy condition. Much Puritanism has disintegrated with rustic contempt; the intellectual lethargy of the place, and the miserable quality of the lectures. Oxford was still at least a close clerical corporation, and its most colleges 'inhabited men' rather than scholars were chosen for the fellowships. Oxford was its unique position by breaking through this tradition, and also by making originality rather than reverence in the university examinations the main qualification for election. But even at Oxford, and among the ablest men, there was great ignorance of much that was being thought and written elsewhere. Knowledge of Germany was rare. Even the classics were not read in a humanistic spirit. 'Of the world of

¹ Cf. e.g. *Frederic and John Newman*, vi. 106.

wisdom and refinement—of poetry and philosophy, of social and political experience, contained in the Latin and Greek classics, and of the irrevocable loss of the degenerate and semi-barbarous Christian writers of the fourth century to that world—Oxford, in 1830, had never dreamed.¹² That general prejudice is, first, detached the whole-cloth of the resident fellows, and concentrated all estimation of relative values. Nevertheless, all through his life, took a step towards overcoming this early prejudice. He imagined a golden age of the Church, at several golden ages, and found them in 'the first three centuries,' in the time of Alfred the Great, or of Edward the Confessor, or in the seventeenth century. He was only sure that the seventeenth century was made of much better stuff. This ecclesiastical idealisation of the past, even the barbarous past, was very characteristic of Newman and his Circle. They looked back to the Anglican Church the strange legend of an age of pure doctrine and heroic practice, in which it should be one day to 'return.' The real strength of this legend lies in the fact that it has no historical foundation. The ideal which is presented as a return, or a revival, is nothing of the kind, but a creation of our own time, projected by the imagination into the past, from which it comes back with a halo of authority. Newman had his full share of these illusions. In his youth and prime he was more of an Englishman than an Englishman. He despised foreigners, whom they were Catholics who, would not lose the right of the master, and hated all the 'isms of the Revolution.' His dictum, 'Luther is dead, but Lutherism and Calvinism are alive,' shows a kind of light upon the contents of his mind, as does characteristically English prejudice which caused him to be horrified at the sight of ships sailing at Malta 'on a holy day.' His range of vision was so much narrowed that Newman, a sincere admirer, says that his imagination lived on 'one jejune discovery after another.' How tragic was the fate which caught this loyal Englishman and made him blind to the murder of a cosmopolitan institution in which England needed for 1500 years. Oxford for nothing at all!

¹² *Ideal History, Newman*, p. 27.

The Reform of 1834 seemed to threaten the English Church with destruction. Arnold in this year wrote "The Church, as it now stands, no human power can save." The bishops were elected and bewildered by the unexpected outbreak of popular hostility. Old methods of defence were plainly useless; some new plan of campaign must be devised against the double assault of political radicalism and theological liberalism. To Newman both sides were of the devil; theological liberalism especially was only apostasy disguised. He never had the slightest feeling that a deep religious movement and love of truth underlay the revolt against orthodox tradition. His fighting instincts were aroused. When Keble attributed the scheme for suppressing some Irish bishops to "national apostasy," he rushed to condemn defence of Church privileges and property. In the first Tract (1833) he says:

'A nation has gone abroad that the people can take every part please. They think that have given it and can take it away. They have been deluded into a notion that present religious opinions, professional modes, establishments in your Realm—that these and such-like are the basis of your Nation's happiness. Delighted then in this notion: first set holy fathers—the Bishops, as the representatives of the Apostles and the Angels of the Churches, and especially your allies, on being deluded by them to take part in their misdeeds.'

That was the essence of the whole Tractarian movement. A weapon was needed to strike liberalism. Nothing but a compact and powerful organization could tap the foe. God must have provided such an organization; a Divinity, certain of ultimate victory, must wait somewhere. Newman and his friends hoped to find it in the Anglican Church; and such was the power of their new faith and self-confident enthusiasm, that the immediate danger was actually stayed off, and the Establishment was allowed a new lease of life. But the national Church of England was not constituted to resist the national will, and the attempt to reorganize it on Catholic lines was doomed to failure. And so, since the assumption that a great institutional fighting Church must exist was never

even questioned, when Anglicanism told him there was no other refuge but Rome.

He was certainly more logical than his friends who remained behind. Anglo-Catholicism has its theoretical basis in a definition of Catholicity which is repudiated by all other Catholics: its traditions are largely legendary. But it is an eclectic system well suited to the English character, and the distorted view of history which Newman imparted to the party has enabled it to borrow much that is good from different sides, without any sense of inconsistency. The idea of a Divine society has been, and is the inspiration of thousands of ardent workers in the Anglican Church. It lured the religious of many Englishmen from the somewhat gross and bourgeois position in which the movement found it, to a pure and heavenly idealism. And, unlike most other religious revivals, especially in this country, it has remained remarkably free from unhealthy emotionalism and hysteria. The social atmosphere of Oxford, always alien to material sentiment, permeated the whole movement, and maintained in it for many years a certain unity and dignity which, while they doubtless prevented it from spreading widely in the middle class, made the Christians supported by men of taste and education. But these influences could not be permanent. The goodwill of the Christian line (if we may so express it) has not been monopolised by men with very different aims and methods. The ablest members of the party are plunging vigorously into social politics, while the able and able in increasing numbers are drifting round the Roman circle, into which many of them must ultimately fall.

The progress of the movement between 1855 and 1865 was almost entirely in the direction of leading the clergy to "occupy their office." The other part of the scheme, the conflict against theological liberalism, fell quite into the background. The main reason for this was that during those strange years the conservatives completely dominated Oxford (that liberalism could hardly make its head), and was despised as well as hated. Only after Newman's conversion could the regeneration of the University begin. Then liberal liberalism came in like a flood, though it was

a very shallow soul in some cases. This was the day of the well-intentioned young revolutionist, "What if 1793 was proclaimed the evermore day of which I will Perish on death for it is Liberty," as Byron wrote—the day of death from thought which after a generation was shattered by another spiritual revolution.

If Newman could have known the victory of his party in the English Church, he might perhaps have been content to remain idle. Westminster. But it is doubtful whether he would have taken Pusey's place as leader of the party. Newman's influence was disturbing and subtly disintegrating to every cause for which he laboured. It is startling to think of an isolated like Newman. He could not work with others, and lived with nearly all his friends, retaining only his disciples. He considered himself a bad judge of character. It is doubtful, after all, whether he was much injured by the jealousy and almost instinctive hat which he inspired among the Roman Catholic hierarchy. If he had been allowed to take the place due to his abilities, his character, and his reputation, what would he have done that he was unable to do at Edgbaston? We cannot fancy him plunged in involved ecclesiastical intrigues, like that English statesman, Cardinal Manning. Will he ever we fancy him haranguing nations, and settling the details of ever-growing a trade dispute. We think he suffered under the sense of injury; but probably he did what was in him to do. If the Roman Church would not use him as a tool, it was probably because he would not have been a good tool. There are some mistakes which that Church seldom makes; it knows how to choose its men.

What will be the verdict of history on the type of Catholicism which Newman represented? He was kept out of the fold by a conservative Pope, and honoured by a liberal Pope. Which was right, from the point of view of Catholic interests and policy? This is perhaps the most important question which the life of Newman raises; for it affects our anticipation of the future even more than our judgments of the past. Is Newman a sign of a possible guide for Catholics in the twentieth century?

Newman was an ecumenicist; he understood it himself.

'the game of mind,' he says, "has never led me towards metaphysics; rather it has been logical, critical, practical."¹ For metaphysics implies an initial act of faith in human reason, and Newman had not this faith. Even in his dogmatic days he refused many outstanding things in our triumph of reason. "What is intellect itself [he asked] but a devil at the Fall, not found in paradise or in heaven, more than in little children, and at the utmost but tolerated by the Church, and only not incompatible with the Supreme mind? . . . Reason is God's gift, but so are the passions. . . . Eve was tempted to follow passion and reason, and she fell!" "Faith does not regard degrees of evidence."² "Faith and humility coexist, not in going about to prove, but in the silent confiding in the testimony of others." "The more you get trained to argue and prove, in order to discover truth, the less likely you are to grasp it inwardly."³ The amazing creativity of his overused circumlocutions is likely to make the reader a philologist, not a philosopher, and to make the rationalist in contemporary laughter. In this and many other cases, Newman seems to love to confuse even himself, and to put his beliefs in that form in which their outrageous content seems most completely. We can imagine nothing more calculated to drive a young and ingenuous mind into fervent scepticism than a reading of Newman's sermons. The relative incoherence of his arguments is not left to the reader to make; it is incessantly provided by the preacher.

And yet Newman's central position is not shared, or only because shared when it is applied to justify belief in great superstitions. He holds that what he calls "reasoning" deals only with abstractions, and is not the faculty on which we rely in forming "judgments." These judgments, to which we give out "assent," and by which we regulate our conduct, are affirmations of the lived personality. And there here an authority far greater than can ever arise out of the logical manipulation of concepts. "There is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony borne to the

¹ *Discs Discours*, p. 14.

² *Ibid.* vi. 146.

³ *Illustrated and Plain Discours*, v. 111.

⁴ *Ibid.* vi. 146.

truth by the mind itself.' The 'mind itself,' the concrete personality, is concerned with realities, while the intellect, which for him corresponds very nearly with the dispassionate *Nous Intellectuel* of the Greek philosophers, is at home only in mathematics and, up to a certain point, in logic. The concepts of the intellect have no existence outside it. 'The mind has the gift, by an act of creation, of bringing before it abstractions and generalizations which have no counterpart, no existence, out of it.'¹ Practically, we may say that passages like this show how wide of the truth Mr. Barry is when he speaks of Newman as a 'thorough Aristotelian.' To deny the existence of universals, to regard them as mere creations of the mind, is such blasphemy for a Platonist; and the Aristotelian non-Christian Platonist. No more misleading statement could be made about Newman's philosophy than to associate him with Platonism of any kind, whether Pagan or Christian. Newman adopts the conventionalist (Lockian) theory of knowledge. Ideas are copies or modifications of the data presented by the senses. 'But principles are abstractions from facts, not elementary facts [not to mention.]' This is pure nominalism, in its crudest form. It makes all arguments in favour of the great truths of religion valueless; for if there are no universals, rational faith is impossible. It follows that the famous scholastic 'proofs of God's existence' have for Newman no cogency whatever; indeed it is difficult to see how he can have escaped condemning the whole philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas as a juggling with bloodless concepts. Newman himself pleaded that he had no wish to oppose the official dogmas of his Church. But protestations are of no avail when the facts are as clear. 'The natural theology of our schools,' says a writer in the *Edinburgh*, quoted by Dr. Challinor in his 'Philosophy of Religion,' 'is based chiefly and wholly on the appeal to reason.' This is notoriously true; and what Newman thought of reason we have already seen. His intense disparagement of the intellect means to exclude what he calls 'realism' in the words and language of Catholicism; for these clearly

¹ *Discourse of Ideas*, part I. c. I. and 2.

series of "rational" propositions. But Newman would answer that the Church is a concrete fact, to which 'evidences' may be given; and the Church has guaranteed the truth of the rational propositions in question. But does reason in part cut of itself as a witness to truth, or, what hardly, or on what evidence, does Newman say? Putting his doctrine, that side of scepticism, on any side, finds its sympathy from him. But does he, like many Catholics and others, make the will supreme over the other faculties? Evidently, as we have seen, he bases his reliance on the verdicts of the individual personality, which has often such confidence. The loss of sympathy was at this very time being deeply deepened by John Ruskin. It is in itself an equivalent which has no necessary connection with Christianity. 'Practicalism,' as it is technically called, reminds us that we do not actually base our judgments on grounds which are not partly rational; that the intellect, in forming concepts, has to be content with an approximate resemblance to concrete reality; and that the will and feelings have their rights and claims which cannot be ignored in a philosophy of religion. But while it is compatible with a robust faith in the power of the constructive intellect, practicalism is beyond question a self-reliant, independent, individualistic doctrine. When it is combined with a romantic theory of knowledge, it naturally suggests that every man may and should live by himself, with little reliance on others. Now there was much in Newman's temperament which made him turn in this direction. 'Look, God's light' has been the favourite hymn of many an independent thinker, to whom the authority of the Church is less than nothing. But on another side Newman was all his life a fierce upholder of the principle of authority. His reason for accepting the dogmas of the Church, and for wishing to destroy heretics like William, was certainly not that his individual personality testified to the truth and value of all ecclesiastical dogmas. He believed them 'by confiding in the testimony of others'—in other words, on the authority of the Catholic Church. If we push back the inquiry one step further, and ask us what grounds he chooses to give the authority of the Catholic Church to other individuals, such as natural

science or philosophy, we are driven again to his great stress on the oldest political society which he felt that such a Divine society should exist. In accepting the authority of the Church, he accepted the authority of all that the Church teaches, in complete independence of human reason. But the Roman Church never professes to be independent of human reason. The official scholastic philosophy claims to be a demonstrative proof of faith.

Newman, then, was only half a Catholic. He accepted with all the fervour of a convert the principles of submission to Holy Church. But in place of the official infallibilistic apostolic, which an Englishman may study to great advantage in the remarkably able series of manuals issued by the Society of Holywell, he substituted a philosophy of experience which is entirely un-Catholic. The authority claimed by the Roman Church rests on one side upon revelation, on the other upon an elaborate structure of dogmatic tradition, which the single folk are allowed to "take as read," only because they cannot be expected to understand it, but which is dictated to be of absolute regard to any properly instructed mind. To deny the validity of reasoning upon Divine things is to withdraw one of the supports on which Catholicism rests. Subjectivism, based on vital experience, mixes us better with this system than all with rules. Subjectivism gives itself no clear-cut definitions, no inflexible logic, no using words always in the same sense. For Newman, as for his disciples the Modernists, theological terms are only symbols for varying values, and he holds that the moment they are treated as having any fixed connotation, error begins. It is no wonder if learned Anglican thought that Newman did not play the game. Father Downes, in spite of his friendship for the subject of his criticism, declared that "Newman missed it miserably much."

The accusation of subjectivism, which was not unreasonably brought against him, was hotly resented by Newman, and with some justice. Of the intensity of his personal conviction there can be no doubt whatever. Indeed, it was just because his faith was so deep that he refused to let

for any intellectual change of it. He might have made his own the lines of Wordsworth:

'Have thou no mind; and leaving for our need
The reason that human reasoning can achieve
To mortals in proportion.'

Wordsworth, too, it may be remembered, speaks of 'reason'¹ with hardly more respect than Newman himself did:

'The inferior faculty that moulds
With her minute and speculative pain
Opinion, ever changing.'

Robert Browning also, especially in his later years, was anti-intellectual in language equally unimpassioned. "What's deepest the reason," he says in "La Solitude," Coleridge's distinction between 'understanding' and 'reason,' is Wordsworth's distinction between "reason" and "reasoning," might have saved these great writers from the appearance, and perhaps more than the appearance, of blaspheining against the highest and most divine faculty of human nature. For the reason is something much higher than logic-chopping; it can provide, from its own resources, a remedy for the intellectual error which is just now mischievous in our day; it is the activity of the whole personality under the guidance of its highest part; and because it is a real sublimation of our disordered nature, it can bring us into contact with the highest world of spirits. Newman's disposition was not doubtless almost entirely of faith: it was only a wholly unjustifiable contempt and distrust for the limited activity of the human mind. This activity, whether he would or no, produced only various forms of 'liberalism,' which he strongly enough regarded as a kind of scepticism. Thus he returned, with equal injustice, the unjust charge brought against himself.

Newman himself has been suspected of a kind of splitting and intellectual dishonesty. Ringley, whose harsh but somewhat rough English morality and common sense were revivified by Newman's whole attitude to life and conduct, maintained no measure how we judged of man could believe in wicked Virgins and lying King David, and thought that

Stowman must be dishonest. When recently Dr. J. May has accused him of being a philologist. Judged by ordinary standards, Stowman's culture of belles-*l'es* seems incompatible with intellectual honesty. Look at Stowman's remarks in his theory of knowledge, say down a column which contradicts absolutely the Cardinal's doctrine of *intuition*. 'There is one striking mark,' he says, 'by which a man may know whether he is a lover of truth or not; namely, the not content with any proposition with great or moderate truth the person it is believed will warrant.' Wronging himself upon this doctrine, and anyone equal to that man-do, new matter of fact, does their judgments in a very different fashion. To most people, however, the fact that opinions are so uncharacterised is no proof that they ought to be so. To most people it seems plain that the great evil consists of making unverified assumptions, and the habit of clinging to them because we have made them, even after their falsity has been exposed, is a satisfactory explanation of the prevalence of error, but not a reason for accepting it. It is useful, they hold, to point out how assumption has a peculiar tendency to pass for proof, not that we may intentionally confuse assumption with proof, but that we may be on our guard against doing so. But such is Stowman's doctrine of 'reason' that he refuses to find that the majority of mankind are, in fact, not guided by it. And then, having made this discovery, he is quite ready to 'prove' himself, but not in the manner of an earnest seeker after truth. Reason, for him, is a veritable weapon of attack or defence, but he is like a man fighting with magic invulnerable armour. He accepts a kind of logical theory; but it will decide nothing for him: his "cardinals" is independent of it. It is easy to see that such an attitude must appear profoundly dishonest to any man who accepts Locke's maxim about truth-seeking. It is equally easy to see that Stowman would regard the charge of dishonesty as better as the charge of scepticism. His principles make it easy for him to adopt the characteristic Catholic habit of 'believing' everything that is pleasing to the religious imagination. His passages are full of such phrases as "Believers come to show us": "why should we not believe . . . ?"

'who knows whether . . . ' and the like, all introducing some fantastic supposition. He deliberately accepts the hypothesis and readily admits that 'no man is convinced of a thing who can declare the thought of its contradictory being true.' To which we may reply that, on the contrary, no man has a right to be convinced of anything until he has fairly faced the hypothesis of its contradictory being true. As long as Newman's method prevailed in Europe, every branch of practical knowledge was condemned to barrenness.

For what kind of knowledge is it which is acquired, not by the exercise of the discursive intellect, or by the evidence of our senses, but by the affirmations of our lived personality? Surely the legitimate province of "personation" lies in the region of general ideas, or rather in the Weltanschauung as a whole. Our undivided personality protests against any philosophy which makes life conditional, or hypothetical, or inevitably evil. It claims that those pictures of reality which are provided by the intellect, by the mathematician, and by the moral sense, shall all have justice done to them in any attempted synthesis. It rejects materialism, metaphysical dualism, solipsism, and pessimism, on one or other of those grounds. Such a kind of interpretation of existence as any of those offers, leaves out some fundamental and essential factor of experience, and is therefore not viable. If an metaphysical scheme can be constructed which is at once comprehensive and inwardly consistent, personation insists that we must acknowledge defeat for the time, rather than take refuge in a logical system which may be free from inner contradictions but which does not satisfy the whole man as a living, not merely spiritual being. This is a second argument. But it is almost to suppose that our personality, acting as an undivided whole, can decide whether the institutional Church, or our branch of it, is the Body of Christ and the vehicle of infallible revelation; whether Christ was born at Bethlehem, at Nazareth; or whether Nazareth was a town. We have no magical secret for getting those facts, and no infallible guide to tell us that authority is to be followed implicitly, with the possibility of nothing being right in it, to be substituted even in thought.

NEWMAN is armed supplies us with the best weapons against himself. If there be in fact, even in 1841, such a sentence as this: "Revealed religion contradicts the other sciences, which, from science, life to themselves, would never reach. Thus, in the science of history, the preservation of our race in that's work is an historical fact, which history never would arrive at without revelation." The transition from belief on the purely internal ground of personal assent to belief on the purely external ground of Church authority is certainly almost and hard to explain; but Newman makes it fully, without any consciousness of a subtle mistake. In the "Apologia" he even says that the argument from personality is "not from the argument from authority." The argument seems to be: "There is no third alternative besides Catholicism or Protestantism. But 'personality' will not accept the division of reason; therefore it must accept the authority of the Church." It is a strange argument. All through his life he unconsciously exaggerated the moral and intellectual weight which should be attached to Church tradition. "Hoc est verum" were the words which rang in his ears at the supreme moment of his great decision. The "verum verum" was the Latin mystery. And when even in those countries the authority of the Pope is rejected, he condemns modern civilization as an aberration. This however is a complete abandonment of his own ten. He then says "The judgment of the great world is laid"; and then "If the world decides against those, so much the worse for the world." After all, Newman had no right to say plain if his opponents found his reasoning disappointed. To make up our whole that, and to argue in favour of the decision afterwards, is to try to make the reason a horse of wood and dream of water to the irrational part of our nature.

It is precisely his sympathy with Catholicism on the religious side, and his aversion from intellectual method, which makes Newman's apologetics by two edged weapon. In attempting to defend Catholicism, he has gone far to explain it. To the historicists, there is no great mystery about the growth and success of the Western Catholic Church. Christianity was already a supernatural religion

in the second century. Like the other forms of worship, with which it competed for the popular favour, it contained the necessary elements of spontaneity, of ritual, of moral brotherhood, and of personal devotion. The Roman mass granted profits of spontaneity. It had a dramatic advantage over the religious of East and Britain in the matter of music and incense which it derived from the Jewish tradition. When the fathers of the last generation found the Empire no longer in accordance with the Church, the transformation of the Imperial into autonomous Christian communities into a centralized doctrinal hegemony, claiming apostolic as well as episcopal succession, was only a matter of time. It was inevitable, just as the progress of spontaneity and the influence of Providence were inevitable. But there is nothing specially divine or genuine about any of these Imperial Roman elements. The Imperial Pontifical hierarchy in the Catholic religion was equally derived, and so is the structure of religious unity from the Roman Church at the present day. Roman doctrine with great force and ingenuity that all the developments in the Roman system which Protestants reject as mere accidents were always and necessary. But this only means that the Catholic Church, in order to live, was compelled to shape itself to the prevailing conditions of human culture in the centuries when it desired to be vigorous. The argument is all to be given, with equal truth, that the world of the Empire represented characteristically by itself. And if the "other" hierarchy, which was given to various influences of Latin Catholicism, is left exposed to human influences, how, in Roman's principle, can it hope to have its mission? The true reason for the strength and vigour which the Roman Church still retains are not sufficient to say. Its system presents an inner consistency, which is easily explained by recognizing that the system was a step and from that of the world, but which guarantees to those who have once accepted it an individual call, and consequently accepted by those who have been handed upon a man of doubt. It represents itself with its spiritual strength by preserving its coherence that all moral and religious Kingdom, in which alone Holy Church has presented

its reality, are suggestions of the kind that, to be accepted, has the promise of necessity. It has succeeded, by long experience, in providing satisfaction for nearly all the needs of the average man, and for all the needs of the average woman. In particular, the aesthetic tastes which, in Western Europe at any rate, are closely connected with religious feeling, are fully satisfied for; and those superstitions which the majority of mankind still have in their hearts, though they are somewhat ashamed of them, are directed in favourable channels. Further, Catholicism encourages and shows that spirit dejects which has produced the brightest triumphs of civilisation as well as the darkest stains of cruel bigotry in human history. A Church which unites these advantages is no danger of falling into insignificance, even if the intellects and morality of the age are estranged from it. It may even have a great future as the nucleus of a conservative resistance to the social revolution. It is doubtful whether those who wish to preserve the traditions and civilisation of the past will be able to find anywhere, except in the Latin Church, an organisation sufficiently coherent and universal to provide a rallying ground for defence against the new barbarian invasions—proceeding this time not from the rude nations of the North, but from the married alloys of our great towns—which threaten to plunge us into a new Dark Age. The success of the Red Party will secure, for a long time to come, the survival of the Flock.

But the Roman Catholicism which has a future is probably that of Manning, and not that of Newman. A Church which depends for its strength and prestige on the iron discipline of a restricted university, and on the habitual devotion of soldiers who know no duty except obedience, no cause except the interests of their country, can make no terms with the disintegrating nominalism, the uncertain subjectivism, of a mind like Newman's. It has been the strange fate of this great man, after driving a wedge deep into the Anglican Church, which at this day is threatened with disintegration through the movement which he helped to originate, to have nearly succeeded in doing the same to the far more compact structure of Roman Catholicism.

The Modernist movement has from the first appealed to Newman as its founder, and has sought to protect itself under his authority. It is necessary to consider, as the last topic of this article, whether this affiliation can be allowed to be true. Newman who has read any of Newman's works can doubt that he would have recoiled with horror from the destructive criticism of Loyola, the contempt for scholastic authority of Tyndal, and the defiance heaped at the Papacy in the manifesto of the Italian Modernists. Newman's doctrine of Development was far removed from that of Hegel's "*Entwicklung-Gebäude*." He defended the fact of development against the criticism of modern-purvey dogmatism; but his notion of development was more like the unfolding of a seed than the growth of a tree or the expansion and change of a human character. "Every Catholic body," he says, "that the Christian dogmas were in the Church from the time of the Apostles; that they were true in their substance what they are now." Compare this with the following words from the Italian manifesto: "The representative life of Christ in the laicised and in the Church has been studied in an historical form, which has given birth to what we might somewhat loosely call the Christ of legend. . . . Such a criticism does away with the possibility of finding in Christ's ministry even the embryonic form of the Church's later theological teaching." "A dogma," says Le Roy, one of the ablest philosophers of the school, "provisional, above all, a provocation of practical order; it is the formula of a rule of practical conduct. Why then should we not bring theory into harmony with practice?"

These extracts mark a much later phase of the search against Catholic dogma and scholastic theology than can be found in Newman's writings. They are contemporary with the *Fragmentation of Jesus and Infidelty*, and the *Letter to Dr. Hodge*. He held a doctrine of evolution would have been impossible thirty years earlier. And yet, when Newman gave voice upon human reason, and when he maintained the "continuities" in the response of faith to truth, in his way, in fact, preparing the way for those startling declarations, which imply a complete rupture with Catholic

authority? Dogmas are indisputably 'national' propositions; that is to say, they belong to that class of truths in which Newman ascribes only a very subordinate importance. We cannot, in his sense, 'accept' even historical propositions as such, but only to the authority which has solicited us to believe it. And is there any justification for Newman's confidence that this authority may make apparent innovations, such as he admits to have been made throughout the history of the Church, but no real changes? If he had been able to think out the implications of his doctrine of development with the help of such arguments as those of Hegson, would he not have seen that without change and real innovation there can be no true evolution? He set the faith to and proposed a character of dogma, as much limited as by Rahner and Le Roy, follow from the anti-intellectualist premises which we have seen to be the foundation of Newman's philosophy of religion? The Modernist might argue that he is only extending to the history of that Church the doctrine of allowing for experience which Newman found to be true in the life-history of the individual. Life itself, with its experience and its needs, is the provider of truth. We cannot anticipate the wisdom of the future.

'I do not wish to see

The distant shore; nor step enough for me.'

The kindly light leads a man on step by step; it conducts him from experience to experience, and without leaving him none; it instructs him if he desires to 'choose and see his path.' If this is true in the history of the individual, is it not probably also true in the history of the Church? And if it is true in the history of the Church, are not the dogmatists wrong who have tried to legislate not only for the present but the future, and to bind the Church for all time to the formulations which appeared satisfactory to themselves? If Providence is leading the Church through varied experience in order to reach a greater wisdom, is it not clear that we must not readily predicate the possibility of future revelation by stereotyping the results of some earlier stage of experience? Thus the experience of

Moderns leads logically to consequences which he would have been among the last to expect.

Some rather shallow thinkers in this country have expressed their surprise and regret that the Vatican has refused to make any terms with Modernism. They have supposed that the fault lay with an ignorant and reactionary Pope. But there are many reasons why this dangerous and disintegrating tendency must be rigorously excluded from Roman Catholicism. In the first place, Modernism destroys the historical basis of Christianity, and converts the foundation and movement into nothing but the flow of other spring and rising surges, which hardly pretend to be historical. But it was this foundation in history which helped largely to secure the triumph of Christianity over its rivals. In the place of the historical Christ-King, Modernism gives us the Society of the Church as an object of reverence. We are bidden to contemplate as the object of unwearingly tough fidelity but great adaptability, which in its determination to survive has not only changed colour like a chameleon but has from time to time put forth new organs and discovered new weapons of offence and defence. We ask the evidence that the Church has regenerated the world; and we are shown her, by land or by sea, it has succeeded in safeguarding her own interests. Ecclesiastical functions are ingenious and unscrupulous; but it is impossible even for them to exhibit Church history as the record of a continuous intervention of the Spirit of Christ in human affairs. If any Spirit has presided over the annals of popes, cardinals, and inquisitors it is not that of the Founder of Christianity.

Further, the religious philosophy of Modernism is itself much worse than the rationalism which it denies. It is in essence a revival of the sophistry of Protagoras. And if it were metaphysically more respectable than it is, it is no wiser opposed to the whole system of Catholic apologetics, that if it were accepted, it would necessitate a complete reorganisation of Catholic dogma. Let any man read the *Thomistica* manuals, and say whether the radical scepticism of the Modernists could find a lodgment anywhere in such a system without disturbing the stability

of the whole. Catholicism is one of the most compact systems in the world, and it casts on propositions which are far removed from those of Modernism. It is one thing to admit that dogmas in many cases have a pragmatic origin, and quite another to say that they may be invented or rejected with a pragmatic purpose. The healthy human intellect will never believe that the same proposition may be true for half and untrue for half; but this is the Modernist proposition.

Lastly, the subjectivism of Newman and the Modernists is fatal to that catholicism which is the conservatism of Catholic policy. The analogy between the individual and the Church suggests that that may 'build himself in many ways, but one good custom should corrupt the world' do there are many individuals, each of whom is being guided separately by the 'kindly lights,' so there may be many churches. The pragmatic point of the truth of a religion, from the fact of its survival and successful working, does not justify the Roman claim to monopoly. The Protestant churches also display vitality, and their members seem to exhibit the fruits of the Spirit. The condemnations of Modernism published by the Vatican show that the Papal system is quite alive to this danger. On the other side, indeed, it might seem a happy solution of a long controversy if the Roman Church would be content to claim the gifts of grace which are really lost, without denying the validity of the Orders and Sacraments of other bodies, and the persistence of the Christian graces which they confer. It would then be admitted on all hands that some impermanence was more suited to Catholicism, others to Protestantism, and that the character of each man develops most collectively under the discipline which suits his nature. But we must not expect any such concession from Rome; and in truth such an admission would be the beginning of the end for Catholicism in its present form.

Our conclusion then is that although Newman was not a Modernist, but an exceedingly mild conservative, he did introduce into the Roman Church a very dangerous and essentially alien habit of thought, which has since developed into Modernism. Perhaps Monseigneur Talbot was not the

wrong, from his own point of view, when he called him "the most dangerous man in England." The rule of his thought was based on principles which, when logically drawn out, must lead away from Catholicism in the direction of an individualistic religion of experience, and a substitution of history for dogma which makes all truth relative and all values fluid. Newman's writings have always made genuine Catholic readers, though they hardly know why. It is probable that here is the solution.

The character of Newman—his wish that we must realize—seems to have been more advanced than his time. He was most apt to make thoughts than things. Yet he was broad and generous to men whose era is so barren, and he is admired by all who are acquainted with his life. The Roman Church has been too sluggish to blight what Newman conceived there is the highest religion which it can achieve. Throughout his career he was a rebel, witness against legal and common professions of religion, and against any compromise with the fading remnants of popular opinion. As cultured readers, who have learned their faith on the martyrdom of good men, type, are attracted, sometimes against their will, by the dignity and courage of his life, qualities which bring to the truth and help close to the truth. Like Aristotle, he defines the truth after which make the community needed truth and good. "But the apostolic Rome," the Church Newman saw in vision." Like Wordsworth, he might say "So true the blood I have no coming on." There are no cheap visions in any of Newman's writings. He is the most understanding of teachers. Truth had to what was to come to give a better than truth, its highest truth. They are not indifferent to truth, because they desire its truth; but they will be willing to sacrifice themselves. The public must come to them; they will not go to the public. There have been many great men who have been so indifferent to Newman to the opinion of the public. But they have been generally either pure idealists or pure artists, in which

* The intellectual power through words and things
 Best coming in a few and precise way.

Norman's 'confidence towards God' was of a still nobler kind. It rested on an unshakable faith in the Divine guidance, and on a very just estimate of the worthlessness of contemporary praise and blame. There have been very few men who have been able to combine so strongly a faith with a thorough distrust of both ego-theory and emotional excitement; and who, while denying themselves these aids to conviction, have been able to say, calmly and without paradox, that with them it is a very small thing to be judged of man's judgment.

'What (he asked) can I become, their peers who believe and look to the face of God? Shall we add a drop to the ocean, or profit to the soul of the sea? We pay indeed our expenses full conscience, and with thankfulness we enter the Lord's hall; and we know no man takes us deserving admiration and reward; and the more ready we become, because there are little things to pay.'¹

Such unworldliness as this, in the well-known words of St. Basil, 'stands out in strange and almost majestic isolation in the eager turmoil of modern passions, bustling thrills, restless desires, and groping philanthropies, amidst which it was bred.'

Another mark of genuine independence and reality of aim in a long life. There are few parallels to the neglect of his own literary reputation by Norman. Higher interests, he thought, were at stake; and so he had no dream of building for himself 'a monument more durable than brass,' and of claiming a pedestal among the great writers of English prose and verse. He accepted his part of literary harnessman; he wrote historical essays for which he had no special aptitude, and dogmatic dissertations which even his genius could not save from dullness; he was dominated into mere journalism. The 'Apologia' would probably not have been written but for the accident of Kingsley's attack. It has, no doubt, been said with truth that Norman showed great destiny in choosing opponents with whom to cross swords—Kingsley, Pater, Widdowson.

¹ *Pascal and Saint Thomas*, vol. II.

and his old English soil. But this does not alter the fact that a man who must have been conscious of vast literary gifts made no attempt to immortalise himself by them. It was for the Church, and not for himself, that he wrote as well as lived.

That his life in its main part is covered of modern and fallen is no indication that he was not one of the great men of his time. Independence is no passport to success in a world where, as Swift said, climbing and crawling are performed in much the same attitude. And if we are right in our view that there was something in the composition of his mind which prevented him from being either a complete Catholic or a complete Protestant, this too is no obstacle to our recognition of his greatness. He has left an indelible mark upon two great religious bodies. He has stirred movements which will agitate the Church of England and the Church of Rome, and the end of which is not yet in sight. Anglo-Catholics and Modernists are also growing, perhaps, in the nations where they have found a place; but the man who beyond all others is responsible for putting them upon the old stage is secure of his place in history.

ST. PAUL

(114)

Among all the great men of antiquity there is none, with the exception of Cicero, whom we may know so intimately as Paul of Tarsus. The main facts of his career have been recorded by a contemporary, who was probably his friend and travelling companion. A collection of letters, addressed to the little religious communities which he founded, reveals the character of the writer no less than the nature of his work. Above among the first preachers of Christianity, he stands before us as a living man. Of his virtues, and of his cruel diseases, we know very little; the reality of Peter and James and John, of Stephen and Barnabas. And of our divine Master no biography can ever be written.

With St. Paul it is quite different. He is a saint without a human side. His personal characteristics are too distinct and too human to make idealisation easy. For this reason he has never been the object of popular devotion. Statuesy figures like St. Joseph and St. Anne have been divided and surrounded with picturesque legends; but St. Paul has been spared the honour as the ignominy of being venerated and worshipped by the piety of paganism-Christianity. No tender legends are attached to his cult; he remains for us what he was in the flesh. It is even possible to feel an aversion dislike for him. Lagarde ('*Deutsche Schriften*,' p. 77) shows him as a politician might with an opponent. 'It is noteworthy' (says he) 'that none of our historical feeling should attach any importance to this Paul. This outsider was

a Pharisee from top to toe even after he became a Christian'—and much more to the same effect. Mosacher describes him as 'one of the most ambitious of men, whose ambition was only equalled by his cunning. A man, indeed, much to be pitied both as a constantly unpleasant person both to himself and to others. . . . He had a great deal on his conscience. He affected to study, to write, to say, to think, to inquire, to doubt, and the love of extending.' Raman, who could never have made himself ridiculous by such challenges as these, does not disguise his repugnance for the 'ugly little Jew' whose character he can neither understand nor admire. These mischiefs of personal animosity, so strange in modern critics dealing with a paragraph of ancient history, show how vitally his days shade out from the present. There are very few historical characters who are alive enough to be hated.

It is, however, only in our own day that the personal characteristics of St. Paul have been intelligently studied; and the most valuable books about him are later than the unbiassed studies of Lagarde and Deussen, and the masterpieces of Deane. In the nineteenth century, Paul was observed behind Pauline. His letters were studied as treatises on systematic theology. Kuhnle's doctrine of sinlessness, justification, and grace were expounded on his authority, as if he had been a religious philosopher or theological professor like Origen and Thomas Aquinas. The name of the apostle came to be associated with angular and rigid disquisitions which were rapidly being torn away from their connection with vital religion. It has been left to the scholars of the present century to give us a picture of St. Paul as he really was—a man much nearer to George Fox or John Wesley than to Origen or Calvin; the greatest of missionaries and preachers, and only incidentally a great theologian. The critical study of the New Testament has opened our eyes to see this and many other things. Much new light has also been thrown by studies in the historical geography of Asia Minor, a work in which Deussen, certainly, has characteristically taken a prominent part. The delightful books of Sir W. R.

Library have now been supplemented by the equally attractive volume of another travelling scholar, Frederick Deussen. A third source of new information is the mass of inscriptions and papyri which have been discovered in the last twenty years. The social life of the middle and lower classes in the Levant, their religious beliefs and practices, and the language which they spoke, are now partially known to us, as they never were before. The human interest of the *Pauline Epistles*, and of the *Acts*, is largely increased by these new sources of knowledge.

The *Epistles* are real letters, not treatises by a theological professor, nor literary productions like the *Epistles of Seneca*. Each was written with reference to a definite situation; they are messages which would have been delivered orally had the apostle been present. Several letters have certainly been lost; and St. Paul would probably not have cared much to preserve them. There is no evidence that he ever thought of adding to the Canon of Scripture by his correspondence. The author of *Acts* seems not to have read any of the letters. This view of the *Epistles* has rehabilitated some of them, which were regarded as spurious by the Tübingen school and their successors. The question which we now ask when the authenticity of an *Epistle* is doubted is, Do we find the same man? not, Do we find the same system? There is, properly speaking, no system in St. Paul's theology, and there is a singularly rapid development of thought. The "Pastoral *Epistles*" are probably not genuine, though the debate of them is not quite a desperate undertaking. Of the rest, the weight of evidence is slightly against the Pauline authorship of *Ephesians*, the vocabulary of which differs considerably from that of the undoubted *Epistles*; and the short letter called *I Thimotheus* is open to some suspicion. The genuineness of *Ephesians* is not of great importance to the student of Pauline theology, unless the closely allied *Epistle to the Colossians* is also rejected; and there has been a remarkable return of confidence in the Pauline authorship of this letter. All the other *Epistles* seem to be freely established.

The other sources of information about St. Paul's life is the Acts of the Apostles, the value of which as a historical document is very valuably estimated. The doubts refer mainly to the earlier chapters, when St. Paul appears on the scene. Some scholars can hardly dispute that the "we-passages," in which the writer speaks of St. Paul and himself in the first person plural, are the work of an eyewitness, and that most of the important facts in the later chapters are from the same source. The difficult problem is concerned with the relation of this writer to the editor, who is responsible for the "Petrine" part of the book. There is very much to be said in favour of the tradition that this writer, who also compiled the Third Gospel, was Luke or his son. The physician and friend of St. Paul. It does not necessarily follow that he was the fellow-traveller who in a few places speaks of himself in the first person. Little if we may decide the question for ourselves by giving him this name; most have been a man of very attractive character; full of kindness, loyalty, and Christian charity. He is the most beautiful and affectionate writer in the New Testament, and shows a marked partiality for the tender aspects of Christianity. He is attracted by miracles, and by all that makes happy pictures and romances. His social sympathies are so keen that he gaped himself the Christian relation with nearly all his heathen hosts. Above all, he is a Greek man of letters, dominated by the conventions of Greek historical composition. For the Greek, history was a work of art, within the education, and not merely a bald record of facts. The Greek historian invented speeches for his principal characters; this was a conventional way of elucidating the situation for the benefit of his readers. Everyone knows how Thucydides, the most conscientious historian in antiquity, habitually uses this device, and how readily he explains his method. We can hardly doubt that the writer of Acts has used a similar freedom, though the report of the address in the city of Ephesus reads like a summary of an actual speech. The narrative is coloured in places

by the historian's love for the missionary. Christ here also suspected an ulterior purpose in his treatment of the relations between St. Paul and the Jerusalem Church.

That of Tarsus was a descendant of pure Asiatic descent, but also a Roman citizen by birth. His famous old Jewish name was Antioch or Chariton or Paulus (Gallo's name "waddling," and would have been a different name); his descendants have both names from Tarsus. Tarsus is situated in the plain of Cilicia, and is now about ten miles from the sea. It is bounded by a range of hills, on which the wealthiest residents had villas, while the high plain of Tarsus, some 200 miles further inland, provided a summer residence for those who could afford it, and a fortified camp in times of war. The town on the plain must have been almost inaccessible in the heavy Asiatic summer-heat. The harbour was a lake formed by the Cydnus, five or six miles below Tarsus; but light ships could sail up the river into the heart of the city. Thus Tarsus had the advantages of a maritime town, though far enough from the sea to be safe from pirates. The longest port called the "Cilician Gates" was traversed by a high-road through the gorge into Cappadocia. Indian colonists came to Tarsus in very early times; and Ramsey is confident that Tarsus, "the son of Aram," in Gen. x. 4, is more akin than Tarsus. The Greek colonies, of course, mixed with the natives, and the Oriental element gradually swamped the Hellenic. The ruins of Tarsus show Greek figures and Aramaic lettering. The principal deity was Baal-Beth, whose effigy appears on part of the coins. Under the suzerainty of Alexander, Greek influence revived, but the administration continued to be of the Oriental type, and Tarsus never became a Greek city, until in the first half of the second century B.C. it purchased its own autonomy, and renamed itself Antiochia-Cydnus. Great privileges were granted it by Antiochus Epiphanes, and it rapidly grew in wealth and importance. Besides the Greeks, there was a large colony of Jews, who always established themselves on the highways of the world's commerce. Since St. Paul was a "citizen" of Tarsus, i.e. a

number of one of the "Tribes" into which the citizens were divided, it is probable (as Ramsey argues) that there was a large "Tribe" of Jews at Tarsus; but no Jew would have been admitted into, or would have consented to join, a Greek Tribe, with its pagan cult.

The matters about which Cilicia became a Roman Province in 101 B.C. The city fell into the hands of the Indusian Tigranes twenty years later, but Pompeius re-established the Roman power, and with it the dominance of Hellenism, in all. Augustus turned Cilicia into a more adjunct of Syria; and the gods of Tarsus received a shock. Nevertheless, the Emperor showed great respect to the Tarsians, who had died with Julius and himself in the civil wars. Tarsus was made a "*libera civitas*," with the right to live under its own laws. The leading citizens were doubtless given the Roman citizenship, or allowed to purchase it. Among these would naturally be a number of Jews, for that nation loved Julius Caesar and detested Pompeius. But Hellenism could not remain its hold on Tarsus. Strabo Chrysostomus, who visited it at the beginning of the second century A.D., found it a thoroughly Oriental town, and notes that the women were doubly veiled in Eastern fashion. Possibly his accounts for St. Paul's prejudice against unveiled women in church. One Greek institution, however, survived and flourished—a university under municipal patronage. Strabo speaks with high admiration of the and the learning displayed by the Tarsians, who formed the entire audience at the professors' lectures, where no students came from outside. This has been shown, perhaps, that the lectures were not men of wide reputation; indeed, it is not likely that Tarsus was able to compete with Athens and Alexandria in attracting famous teachers. The most famous Tarsians, such as Antipater the Stoic, went to Europe and taught there. What distinguished Tarsus was its love of learning, widely diffused in all classes of the population.

St. Paul did not belong to the upper class. He was a working artisan, a "tent-maker," who followed one of the popular trades of the place. Perhaps, as Deissmann thinks,

the 'large letters' of Gal. vi. 11 imply that he wrote clumsily, like a working man and not like a scholar. The words indicate that he usually dictated his letters. The 'Acts of Paul and Thecla' describes him as short and bald, with a bushy nose and bushy brows; there is nothing impossible in this description. But he was far better educated than the modern rabbis. Not that a single quotation from Aristotle (1 Cor. vi. 25) shows him to be a good Greek scholar; an Englishman may quote 'One breath of nature makes the whole world his,' without being a Shakespearean. But he was well educated because he was the son of a rich Jew. A child in such a home would learn by heart large pieces of the Old Testament, and, at the synagogue school, all the contents of the Jewish law. The pupil was not allowed to write anything down; all was committed to his memory, which in consequence became extremely retentive. The perfect pupil 'lost not a drop from his teacher's wisdom,' at the age of about fourteen the boy would be sent to Jerusalem, to study under one of the great Rabbins; in St. Paul's case it was Gamaliel. Under his tuition the young Paulus would learn to be a 'strong Churchman.' The Rabbi viewed everything from an ecclesiastical standpoint. The interests of the Priesthood, the Levites, and the Temple overshadowed everything else. The Friendly Code, says Mr. Oakes, practically reduces itself into one idea: Everything in Israel belongs to God; all persons, all things, all persons, and all property are His. But God occupies a part of His day; and if this part be scrupulously paid, He will send His blessing upon the remainder. Besides the written law, the Pharisee had to take on himself the still heavier burden of the oral law, which was equally binding. It was a necessary education of the most rigorous kind. St. Paul cannot reproach himself with any slackness during his servitude. He threw himself into the system with characteristic ardour. Probably he thought to be a Jerusalem Rabbi himself, still pursuing his trade, as the Rabbi usually did. For he was unmarried; and every Jew except a Rabbi was expected to marry at or before the age of twenty-one.

He suffered from some chronic physical trouble, the nature of which we can only guess. It was probably epilepsy, a disease which is compatible with great periods of endurance and great mental energy, as is proved by the cases of Julius Caesar and Napoleon. He was liable to spiritual trances, in which some have found a confirmation of the supposition that he was epileptic. But these abnormal states were rare with him; in writing to the Ghibellines he has to go back fourteen years to the date when he was "caught up into the third heaven." The visions and trances which attended his active ministry prove nothing about his health. At that time anyone who underwent a physical experience for which he could not account believed that he was possessed by a spirit, good or evil. It is significant that Tertullian, at the end of the second century, says that "almost the majority of men in the church derive their knowledge of God from visions." The impression that St. Paul makes upon us is that of a man full of nervous energy and able to endure an exceptional amount of privation and hardship. A curious indication, which has not been noticed, is that, as he tells us himself, he five times received the maximum number of lashes from Jewish tyrants. These floggings in the *Prætorium* were very severe, the offender being required to lay on with his full strength. There is evidence that he must have a much smaller number of strokes than the full number was allowed, so as not to endanger the life of the culprit. The other trials which he mentions—these Roman scourgings, one during a day and night spent in beating with the *verge* after darkness, would have worn out any constitution not exceptionally tough.

We must bear in mind this terrible record of suffering if we wish to estimate fairly the character of the poet. During his whole life after his conversion he was exposed not only to the hardships of travel, sometimes in half-starved districts, but to "all the cruelty of the limitations which upon like a consuming fire through the religious history of the East from the daughter of Heli's priests to the daughter of St. Stephen, and from the boundaries of

from at Alexandria under Caligula to the martyrdom of Christians at Lyons, Tarras, and Amiens in the year 178.—(Eisenmann). It is not well worth of such fulsome flattery that it breathes hatred and excitement in its violence, and tempts them to reprisals. St. Paul does speak bitterly of his opponents, though chiefly when he finds that they have injured his converts, as in the letter to the Galatians. Modern critics have suggested this element in a character which does not seem to have been known or implausible. He writes like a man engaged in a stern conflict against enemies who will give no quarter, and who shrink from no treachery. But the sharpest expression that can be laid to his charge is the impetuous, perhaps half humorous wish that the Judaizers who sought to circumcise the Galatians might be subjected to a severer operation themselves (Gal. v. 12). The dominant impression that he makes upon us is that he was put in a *locus horribilis*. He is violently indifferent to criticism and calumny; he pursues on earth one far from him his purpose. He has made room for all a complete martyr of all earthly joys and all earthly ties; he has broken (he, the devout Jewish Catholic) with his Church and loved her freedom; he has faced the specterisms of being called traitor, heretic, and apostate; he has "withstood to the death" the Palestinian apostles who were chosen by Jesus and held His communion; he has set his face to achieve, almost single-handed, the conquest of the Roman Empire, a thing never dreamed of by the Jerusalem Church; he is absolutely indifferent whether his mission will cost him his life, or only involve a continuation of almost intolerable hardship. It is this intensest courage, complete self-sacrifice, and single-minded devotion to a magnificently audacious but not impracticable idea, which constitutes the greatness of St. Paul's character. He was, with all this, a warm-hearted and affectionate man, as he proves abundantly by the tone of his letters. His personal religion was, in essence, a pure mysticism: he worships a Christ whom he has experienced as a living presence in his soul. The mystic who is also a man of action, and a man of action because he is a mystic, yields

a tremendous power over other men. He is like an invulnerable knight, fighting in noble combat.

It is an interesting and difficult question whether we should regard the intense moral decline of the Epistle to the Romans as a confession that the writer has had an unusually severe personal battle with temptation. The moral struggle certainly assumes a more tragic aspect in those passages than in the experience of many merely skeptical. We find something like it in Augustine, and again in Luther: it may even be suggested that those great men have stamped upon the Christian tradition the idea of a burden "thick of sin and so" that the normal experience of the moral life can justify. But it is not certain that the first person singular in such verses as "I wished man that I am I who shall deliver me from this body of death!" is a personal confession at all. It may be for human nature generally that he is speaking, when he gives utterance to that consciousness of sin which was one of the most distinctive parts of the Christian religion from the first. It does not seem likely that a man of so lofty and heroic a character was ever completely troubled with ignominious temptations. That he yielded in them, as Melancthon and others have suggested, is in the highest degree impossible. Even if the self-reproaches were uttered in his own person, we have many other instances of saints who have blamed themselves passionately for what ordinary men would consider slight transgressions. Of all the Epistles, the Second to the Corinthians is the one which contains the most intense self-reproaches, and few can read it without crying as well as bowing to the author.

We know nothing of the Apostle's residence at Jerusalem, except the name of his teacher. But it was at this time that he became steeped in the Pharisaic doctrine which formed the framework in which his earlier Christian beliefs were set. It is now recognized that Pharisaism, far from being the caricature of Christianity, was rather the quarter where the Gospel found its best recruits. The Pharisaic school contained the finest part of whatever faith, loyalty and piety in-

mixed among the Jewish people; and the dogmatic system passed almost entire into the earliest Christian Church, with the momentous addition that Jesus was the Messiah. A few words on the Pharisaic teaching which St. Paul must have inherited from Gamaliel are indispensable even in an article which deals with Paul, and not with Paulinism.

The distinctive feature of the Jewish religion is not, as is often supposed, its monotheism. Hebrew religion in its golden age was monotheism rather than monolatry; and when Hebrew became more strictly 'the only God,' the cult of intermediate beings came in, and restored a quasi-polytheism. The distinctive feature in Jewish faith is its historical and teleological character. The God of the Jew is not eternal law. If the idea of necessary causation ever forced itself upon his mind, he at once gave it the form of predestination. The whole of history is an unfolding of the divine purpose; and so history as a whole has for the Jew an importance which it never had for a Greek thinker, not for the Hellenised Jew Philo. The Hebrew idea of God is dynamic and ethical; it is therefore rooted in the idea of Time. The Pharisaic school modified this prophetic teaching in two ways. It became more spiritual; anthropomorphisms were removed, and the transcendence of God above the world was more richly maintained. On the other hand, the religious relationship became in their hands narrower and more external. The notion of a covenant was defined more rigidly; the Law was practically treated above God, so that the Jewish even represented the deity as studying the Law. With this legalism went a spirit of intense exclusiveness and bitter exclusivism. As God was raised above direct contact with men, the old animism lived in angels and demons, which had lived on in the popular mind by the side of the worship of Jehovah, was extended in a new way. A celestial hierarchy was invented, with names, and an inferior hierarchy too; the independent ghosts of animism became fallen angels. Satan, who in Job is the cross-purposer, one of God's angels, became God's adversary; and the angels, formerly

meditations of God Himself, are now quite separated from Him. A representative physics or cosmology was evolved at the same time. Above Him, the centre of the earth, the seven heavens, in the highest of which the Trinity has His throne. The underworld is now first divided into Paradise and Gehenna. The destiny of the fall of man, through his participation in the representative guilt of his first parents, is Platonism; as in the strange legend, which St. Paul seems to have believed (1 Cor. xi. 3), that the serpent actually seduced Eve, and seduced the race with spiritual poison. Justification, in Platonism as for St. Paul, means the rejection of material. The last motive in this life the reward for any small merit which they may possess; the aim of the good must be attained for; but merit, as in Roman Catholicism, may be gained and transferred. Martyrdom especially suggests the spiritual back-balance of the whole nation. There was no official Messianic doctrine, only a mass of vague legends and beliefs, grouped round the central idea of the appearance on earth of a supernatural Being, who should establish a Kingdom of some kind on Jerusalem. The statement that will be asked to take part in this kingdom. The course of the world is thus divided into two epochs—'this age' and 'the age to come.' A catastrophe will end the former and inaugurate the latter. The promised deliverer is now waiting in heaven with God, until his hour comes; and it will come very soon. All this St. Paul must have learned from Clement. It formed the framework of his theology as a Christian for many years after his conversion, and was only gradually thrown off, under the influence of mystical experience and of Greek ideas, during the period covered by the letters. The loss of good and evil spirits (the latter are 'the powers of this world,' 1 Cor. ii. 4, 6) pervades the Epistles more than modern students are willing to admit. It is part of the heritage of the Platonic school.

It is very unlikely (in spite of Johannes Weiss) that St. Paul ever saw Jesus in the flesh. But he did come in contact with the little Christian community at Jerusalem. These disciples at first attempted to live as strict mono-

less of the Jewish Church. They knew that the coming Messiah was their expected Master, but this belief involved no rupture with Judaism. So at least they thought themselves; the Sadducees saw more clearly what the new movement meant. The crisis came when numerous "Hellenists" attached themselves to the Church,—Jews of the Dispersion, from Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere. A continual rupture between these and the Palestinian Christians was avoided by the appointment of seven deacons or church commissioners, among whom Stephen soon became prominent by the dangerously 'liberal' character of his teaching. This gave important testimony to the existence of a 'liberal' school among the Jews of the Dispersion, who, under protest of upholding the traditional law, let all keeping the Sabbath and the great festivals, and even dispensing with the rite of circumcision. Thus the admission of Gentiles as very soon came into the Church was no new idea to the Palestinian Jews; it was known to them as part of the standing policy which prevailed among their brethren of the Dispersion. With Stephen, this kind of liberalism seemed to have entered the group of "disciples." He was accused of saying that Jesus was to destroy the temple and change the customs of Moses. In his bold defence he admitted that in his view the Law was valid only for a limited period, which would expire as soon as Jesus returned as Messiah. This was quite enough for the Sadducees. They stoned Stephen, and compelled the 'disciples' to disperse and fly to their lives. Only the deacons, whose devotion to the Law was well known, were allowed to remain. This last fact, briefly recorded in Acts, is important as an indication that the persecution was directed only against the Hellenizing Christians, and that these were the great majority. Paul, it seems, had no quarrel with the Twelve; his hatred and banishment were aimed against a sort of Hellenist Jews who openly professed that the Law had been abrogated in advance by their Master, who, as Paul observed with horror, had lowered the name of the Law by dying as a sinner. All the Pharisee in him was revealed; and he

led the strange journey-quest which followed the execution of Stephen.

What caused the sudden change which so astonished the survivors among his victims? To suppose that nothing prepared for the vision near Damascus, that the apparition in the sky was a mere 'bolt from the blue,' is an impossible theory. The best explanation is furnished by a study of the Apostle's character, which we easily know very well. The author of the Epistles was certainly not a man who could watch a rising sun without being led back to death by haunting memories, and led to reaction. Stephen's speech may have made him indignant; his heroic death, the very ideal of a martyrdom, must have awakened very different feelings. An independent of Judaism, almost, of dogmatism, of the old and suspicious conservatism breeding of the Pharisees now sprung up, and came they were the surface. His inquiry retained him as a generation for a few weeks more; but how if he could himself see what the dying Stephen said that he saw? Would not that be a welcome Messiah? The vision came in the desert, where men are visions and have visions to this day. They were very common in the desert of holy men when Moses first perceived it. "The Spirit of Jesus," as he came to call it, spoke to his heart, and the form of Jesus looked before his eyes. Stephen had been right; the Crucified was indeed the Lord Jesus himself. He had become a Christian; and it was in the Christianity of Stephen, not in that of Jesus the Lord's brother, that he was converted. The Pharise in him was killed.

The travelling missionary was at length a figure in the Levant as the travelling lecturer on philosophy. The Greek language brought all nationalities together. The Hellenism of the East had gone on steadily since the conquests of Alexander; and Greek was already as useful as Latin in many parts of the West. A century later, Marcus Aurelius wrote his Confessions in Greek; and even in the middle of the third century, when the tide was beginning to turn in favour of Latin, Christian lectured in Greek at Rome. Christianity, within a few years after the Crucifixion, had allied itself definitely with the speech,

and therefore inevitably with the spirit, of Hellenism. In the time since have lived and trade there as free between the West of Europe and the West of Asia. A Phrygian merchant, according to the inscription on his tomb, made seventy-two journeys to Rome in the course of his business-life. The decomposition of nationalities, and the destruction of civic exclusiveness, led naturally to the formation of voluntary associations of all kinds, from religious sects to trade unions, sometimes a single association combined these two functions. The Oriental religions appealed strongly to the unprivileged classes, among which particular religious life was growing, while the official cults of the Roman Empire were crumbling in themselves and associated with oppression. The attempt of Augustus to subordinate the old religion was artificial and unaided. The living movement was towards a synthesis of religious ideas and practices, all of which came from the East, and previous and foreign to them. The prominent features in this new devotion were the removal of the supreme Godhead from the world to a transcendental sphere, contempt for the world and mortal abnegation of 'the flesh'; a longing for healing and redemption, and a close identification of salvation with individual immortality; and, finally, trust in movements of 'mysteries,' in Church as indispensable means of grace or redemption. This was the Paganism with which Christianity had to reckon, as well as with the official cult and its guardians. The established church is conquered and destroyed; the living syncretistic beliefs it claimed, simplified, and disciplined, but only absorbed by becoming itself a syncretistic religion. But besides Christians and Pagans, there were the Jews, dispersed over the whole Empire. There were at least a million in Egypt, a country which St. Paul, for reasons unknown to us, left severely alone; there were still more in Syria, and perhaps five millions in the whole Empire. In spite of the hostility of Jewish women, so much emphasised by St. Paul in his history of the Church at the nation's Head, it is impossible that the Hebrew stock should have multiplied in this extent. There must have been

a very large number of converts, who were admitted, sometimes without discrimination, on their profession of monotheism and acceptance of the Jewish moral code. The majority of these remained in the class technically called 'God-fearers,' who never took upon themselves the whole yoke of the Law. These half-converts were the most promising field for Christian missionaries; and nothing surprised the Jews more than to see St. Paul taking an interest in their welfare. The spirit of propaganda almost disappeared from Judaism after the middle of the second century. Judaism stands again as a purely Eastern religion, and maintained the dangerous compromise with Western ideas. The labours of St. Paul made an all-important parting of the ways. Their result was that Christianity became a European religion, while Judaism fell back upon its old traditions.

It is very unfortunate that we have no thoroughly trustworthy records of the Apostle's earlier mission preaching. The Epist. has only cover a period of about ten years; and the rapid development of thought which can be traced during this short time prevents us from assuming that his earlier teaching closely resembled that which we find in the Letters. But if, during this earlier period, he devoted his attention mainly to those who were already under Jewish influence, we may be sure that he spoke much of the Messiahship of Jesus, and of His appointing power, these being the chief articles of faith in Jewish Christianity. This was, however, only the framework. What attracted converts was really the historical picture of the life of Jesus: his message of love and brotherhood, which they found realized in the little community of believers; and the abolition of all external barriers between human beings, such as social position, race, and sex, which had undoubtedly been proclaimed by the Founder, and sustained implicitly by the promise of an universal religion. We can infer what the manner of his preaching was from the style of the letters, which were probably dictated like our Emperor's edicts, at least much prepared. He was an trained orator, and he thoroughly distained the arts of the rhetorician. His Greek, though vigorous and effective, is

with a current not stagnant. His disputation is of the kind which proceeds from obscure convictions, and from a thorough knowledge of Old Testament prophecy and gradually... his had preparation for a religious teacher. If at times he argued like a Rabbi, those rigid debates were so acceptable to ancient Jews as they are to modern Christians. And when he takes fire, as he does with some vital truth which he has lived as well as learned and taught, he establishes his right to be called what he never ceased to being—a writer of genius. Such passages as I Cor. xiii, Phil. ii, Rom. viii, rank among the finest compositions in later Greek literature. Regarded merely as a piece of poetical prose, I Cor. xiii is more than anything that had been written in the Greek language since the great Ionic prose-writers. And if this was dictated impromptu, similar outbursts of splendid eloquence were probably frequent in his apostolic preaching. Their effect must have been overwhelming, when reinforced by the flashing eye of the speaker, and by the eloquent sincerity which none could doubt who saw his face and figure, illumined by hell and warmed by heaven.

In addressing the Gentiles, we may assume that he followed the customary Jewish line of apologetics, denouncing the folly of idolatry—as old in worship which is quite innocent and natural to some peoples, but which the Jews never understood; that he spoke much of judgment to come; and especially that he contrasted the pure and affectionate social life of the Christian brotherhood with the heartlessness, crafty, injustice, oppression, and mutual suspicion of Pagan society. This argument probably struck home in very many 'heathen' hearts. The old idolatry, with all the brilliant qualities which make many moderns regret its destruction, rested on too narrow a base. The women and the slave were left out, the women specially by the Greeks, and the slave by the Romans. A few social inequalities always remain pure, healthy, and unobscured when humanity. And when the structure which maintained these inequalities is itself rotting, the oppressed classes begin to feel that they are unnecessary, and to long for emancipation.

When St. Paul drew his bold picture of Pagan society steeped in unrelieved idolatry, without hope for the future, 'hated and hated one another,' and then pointed to the little flock of Christians—among whom no one was allowed to be idle and no one in slaves, and where family life was pure and mutual confidence full, truth and justice abounded—the women and the slave, of whom Aristotle had spoken so contemptuously, rushed into his congregation, and began to exonerate themselves for their victory which Nietzsche thought so deplorable.

It is not necessary in this way to traverse again the familiar field of St. Paul's missionary journey. The first epoch, which embraces about fourteen years, had its scene in Syria and Cilicia, with the short tour in Cyprus and other parts of Asia Minor. The second period, which ends with the imprisonment in a.d. 55 or 56, is far more important. St. Paul crosses into Europe; he works in Macedonia and Greece. Churches are founded in two of the great towns of the ancient world, Corinth and Ephesus. According to his letters, we must assume that he only once returned to Jerusalem from the great tour in the West, undertaken after his controversy with Peter; and that the object of this visit was to deliver the money which he had promised to collect for the poor 'saints' at Jerusalem. He intended after this to go to Rome, and thence to Spain—a scheme worthy of the southern genius of an Alexander. He was Rome indeed, but as a prisoner. The rest of his life is lost in obscurity. The writer of the Acts does not say that the two years' imprisonment ended in his execution; and if it was so, it is difficult to see why such a fate should be suggested. If the charge against him was at last dismissed, because the women did not think it worth while to come to Rome to prosecute it, St. Paul's silence is more explicable. In any case, we may regard it as almost certain that St. Paul ended his life under a Roman axe during the reign of Nero.

"There is hardly any last" says Heracleitus "which deserves to be turned next and pondered so much as this, that the religion of Jews has never been able to reach

himself in Jewish or even upon Jewish soil.' This extraordinary result is the judgment of history upon the life and work of St. Paul. Jewish Christianity rapidly withered and died. According to Justin, who must have known the facts, Jesus was rejected by the whole Jewish nation "with a few exceptions." In Goiden especially, but, if any, Christian Churches existed. There are other examples, of which Jerusalem is the most notable, of a religion gaining its widest acceptance outside the borders of the country which gave it birth. But history offers no parallel to the complete visitation of St. Paul's policy in carrying Christianity over into the Greek-Roman world, where alone, as the event proved, it could live. This is a complete answer to those who maintain that Christ made no break with Judaism. Such a statement is only possible if it is made in the sense of Marshall's words, that 'what Gentile Christianity did was to carry out a process which had in fact commenced long before in Judaism itself, viz. the process by which the Jewish religion was inwardly reconstituted and turned into a religion for the world.' But the true account would be that Judaism, like other great ideas, had to 'die to live.' It died in its old form, in giving birth to the religion of civilised humanity, as the Greek nation perished in giving birth to Hellenism, and the Roman in creating the Mediterranean empire of the Caesars and the Catholic Church of the Popes. The Jewish people were unable to make so great a sacrifice of their national hopes. With the marvellous tenacity which characterises their race they clung to their ritual and their temple and local nationalisms. The disaster of a.d. 70 and of the Jewish wars Hadrian destroyed a great part of the race, and at last uprooted it from the soil of Palestine. But nevertheless, as usual, it had its partial justification. Judaism has refused to acknowledge the religion of the civilised world as her legitimate child; but the nation has refused also to surrender its life. There are no more Greeks and Romans; but the Jews we have always with us.

St. Paul saw that the Gospel was a far greater and

more revolutionary scheme than the Unitarian apostles had dreamed of. In principle he committed himself from the first to the complete emancipation of Christianity from Judaism. But it was inevitable that he did not at first realize all that he had undertaken. And, fortunately for us, the most rapid evolution in his thought took place during the ten years he spent in constant laboring. It is exceedingly interesting to trace his gradual progress away from apocalyptic Messianism to a position very near that of the Fourth Gospel. The evangelist whom we call St. John is the best commentator on Paulinism. This is one of the most important discoveries of recent New Testament criticism.

In the earliest Epistles—those to the Thimotheans—we have the more picture of Jewish coming on the scene, which, as we now know, was part of the Hellenistic tradition. In the earliest group the Christology is far more complex. Besides the Pharisaic Messiah, and the records of the historical Jesus of Nazareth, we have now to reckon with the Jewish-Alexandrian idea of the generic, archetypal man, which is unintelligible without reference to the Platonic philosophy. Paul is here a great help towards understanding one of the most difficult parts of the Apostle's teaching. We have also, fully developed, the mystical doctrine of the Spirit of Christ dwelling in the soul of the believer, a conception which was the core of St. Paul's personal religion, and more than anything else emancipated him from apocalyptic dreams of the future. We have also a fourth conception, quite distinct from the three which have been mentioned—that of Christ as a cosmic principle, the instrument of creation and the sustainer of all life in the universe. We must again have recourse to Paul and his doctrine of the Logos, to understand the genesis of this idea, and to see Fourth Gospel to find it stated in clear philosophical form. In this second period, those doctrines about the Person of Christ are held consecrately, without any attempt to reconcile or systematize them. The eschatology is being entirely modified by the conception of a "spiritual body," which is prepared for us no more as our "eternal

man" dwells in death. The resurrection of the flesh is explicitly denied II Cor. iv. 14; but a new and finer, "spiritual" clothing will be given to the soul in the future state. Already the Fundamental Platonic doctrine of the two ages—the present age and that which is to come—is in danger. St. Paul can now, like a true Greek, contrast the things that are seen, which are temporal, with the things that are not seen, which are eternal. The doctrine of the Spirit as a present possession of Christians brings down heaven to earth and sends earth to heaven; the "Parousia" is now only the end of the existing world-order, and has lost little significance for the individual. These ideas have not displaced the earlier apocalyptic language; but it is only to see that the one or the other must recede into the background, and that the Platonic tradition will be the one to take.

The third group of Epistles—Philippians, Colossians, and Ephesians—are steeped in ideas which belong to Greek philosophy and the Greek mystery-religion. It would be impossible to translate them into any Eastern language. The Rabbinical disputes with the Jews about justification and election have disappeared; the danger stand is now from Gnosticism and the barbarical Plotinian, which was otherwise natural in Gnosticism. The teaching is even more Christianistic than before; and the Catholic doctrine of the Church as the body of Christ is more prominent than individualistic mysticism. The cosmology is thoroughly Plotinian, and only recalls the name of the Logos.

This cosmopolitanism in new ideas is one of the most remarkable features in St. Paul's mind. Few indeed are the religious problems and questions whose convictions are still unshakable after they have begun to govern the minds of others. St. Paul had already proved that he was a man who would "believe the ghost," even when it called him to a complete break with his past. And the further development of his thought was made much easier by the fact that he was an systematic philosopher, but a great missionary who was willing to be all things to all

man, while his own faith was fortified by his strength of purpose, and by the steady glow of the light within.

It is difficult for us to realize the life of his little communities without importing into the picture features which belong to a later time. The organization, such as it was, was democratic. The congregation as a whole exercised a sovereignty over the conduct of its members, and decisions were effected "by vote of the majority" (I Cor. x. 17). The family formed a group for religious purposes, and remained the recognized unit till the second century. In Ignatius and Roman we find the campaign against family churches in full swing. The meetings were like those of modern revivals, and sometimes became dissipated. But of the moral beauty which pervaded the whole life of the brotherhoods there can be no doubt. Many of the converts had formerly led dissipated lives; but these were the most likely to appreciate the gain of being no longer outlaws, but members of a true family. The brotherhood were united at the head of people whom the Christians admitted and treated like brethren; but in the first century scarcely do we seem to have been frequent. Roman, who were probably always the majority, enjoyed a consideration unknown by them, before. The extreme importance attached by the early Church to social purity made it possible for them to mix freely with Christian men; indeed, the strange and painful practice of a "brother" and a "sister" sharing the same house seems to have already begun, if this is the meaning of the obscure passage in I Cor. vi. 18.

Charity and indifference to death were the two qualities in Christians which made the greatest impression on their neighbors. Galen is especially interesting on the former topic. But we must add a third characteristic—the cheerfulness and happiness which marked the early Christian communities. 'Joy' as a moral quality is a Christian attribute, as a study of the range of grief in Greek will show. Even in Augustine's time the temper of the Christian, '*severa et non dissoluta hilaritas*' was one of the things which attracted him to the Church. The secret of this happy social life was an intense

realisation of corporate unity among the members of the ecclesiamy, which they represented to themselves as a 'mystery'—a mystical union between the Head and members of a 'body.' It is in this conception, and not in other details, that we are justified in finding a real and deep influence of the mystery-religion upon Christianity. The Catholic conception of sacraments as bonds uniting religious communities, and as channels of grace flowing from a corporate treasury, was as certainly part of the Greek mystery-religion as it was foreign to Judaism. The mysteries had their bad side, as might be expected in private and half-secret societies; but their influence as a whole was certainly good. The three chief characteristics of mystery-religion were, first, rites of purification, both moral and ceremonial; second, the promise of spiritual communion with some deity, who through them entered into his worshippers; third, the hope of immortality, which the Greeks often called 'deification,' and which was secured to those who were initiated.

It is useless to deny that St. Paul regarded Christianity as, at least on one side, a mystery-religion. Why else should he have used a number of technical terms which his readers would recognise as ones so belonging to the mysteries? Why else should he repeatedly use the word 'mystery' itself, applying it to doctrines distinctive of Christianity, such as the communion with a "spiritual body," the relation of the Jewish people to God, and, above all, the mystical union between Christ and Christians? The great 'mystery' is 'Christ in you, the hope of glory' (Col. i. 26). It was as a mystery-religion that Europe accepted Christianity. Just as the Jewish Christians took with them the whole framework of apocalyptic Messianism, and set the figure of Jesus within it, so the Greeks took with them the whole scheme of the mysteries, with their sacraments, their purifications and laws, their idea of a mystical brotherhood, and their doctrine of 'salvation' (salvage) by essentially a mystery-word through membership in a divine society, worshipping Christ as the patterned deity of their mysteries.

Essentially, this type of Christianity was the origin

of Catholicism, both Western and Eastern; though it is only recently that this character of the Pauline churches has been recognized. And students of the New Testament have not yet realized the importance of the fact that St. Paul, who was ready to fight to the death against the defiling of Christianity, was willing to take the first step, and a long one, towards the Paganizing of it. It does not appear that his personal religion was of this type. He speaks with contempt of some doctrines and practices of the Pagan religions, and will allow no compromise with what he regards as devil-worship. In this he remains a pure Hebrew. But he does not appear to see any danger in allowing his Hellenistic churches to mutilate the worship of Christ to the measure paid in the gods of the pagans, and to use their whole religion in this measure, provided only that they have no part nor lot with those who sit at 'the table of demons'—the sacramental over-leave of the heathen religions. The danger which he does see, and against which he issues warnings, are, brother divisions, dissensions and disorder in the one body, and doctrinal deviations on the other. He declines to tolerate 'the speaking with tongues' (γλῶσσαι), which was the favorite selfish form of religious enthusiasm at Corinth. (On this subject Prof. Balch's sermon is the most instructive discussion that has yet appeared. The 'Testament of Job' and the magical papyri show that gliblish started in a state of spiritual excitement was supposed to be the language of angels and spirits, understood by them and acting upon them as a charm.) He urges his converts to do all things 'decently and in order.' He is alarmed at signs of moral laxity on the part of self-styled 'spiritual persons'—a great danger in all times of religious enthusiasm. He is also alive to the dangers connected with that kind of mysticism which is based on theories of the impurity of the body—the typical Oriental form of mysticism in fact. But he does not appear to have between the medieval and polytheistic developments of sacramental mysticism. In this particular he is taking opponents India with more justification than he is willing to allow them.

There is something tremendous about all St. Paul's teaching. We cannot take him out of his historical setting, as so many of his commentators in the nineteenth century liked to do. This is only another way of saying that he was, in one his own expressions, a *viva* master-builder, not a detached thinker, an arm-chair philosopher. To the historian, there must always be something astounding in the magnitude of the task which he set himself, and in his enormous success. The history of the civilized world for two thousand years, perhaps for all time, was dominated by his missionary journeys and heralded writings. It is impossible to guess what would have become of Christianity if he had never lived; we cannot even be sure that the religion of Europe would be called by the name of Christ. This dependent achievement must seem to have been due to an almost unique practical insight into the marvellous factors of a very difficult and complex situation. We watch him, with breath-holding interest, steering the vessel which carried the Christian Church and its fortunes through a narrow channel full of hidden rocks and shoals. With marvellous instinct he avoids them all, and brings the ship, not into smooth water, but into the open sea, out of that perilous strait. And so he was his masterly policy born from apprehension, that his contemporaries have been 'Body-Souls' and 'Not Body-Souls' of Christians, and there has been no religious revival within Christianity that has not been, on one side at least, a return to St. Paul. Protestants have always felt their affinity with this individualism, syriac with this dissipation. The reason, put shortly, is that St. Paul understood what most Christians never realize, namely, that the Gospel of Christ is not a religion, but religion itself, in its most universal and deepest significance.

INSTITUTIONALISM AND METHODISM

[1911]

It happens sometimes that two opposite tendencies draw forth together, drawing at length from a sense of the danger with which each is threatened by the popularity of the other. Hence the antagonism is not absolute, each may gain by being compelled to recognize the strong points in the rival position. In a serious controversy the right is seldom on never all on one side; and on the normal course of events both theories undergo some modification through the influence of their opponents, until a compromise, not always logically defensible, brings to an end the acute stage of the controversy. Such a tendency of rival institutions is very apparent in the religious thought of our day. The quickening of spiritual life in our generation has taken two forms, which appear to be, and in a large extent are, sharply opposed to each other. On the one side, there has been a great revival of mysticism. Mysticism means an immediate communion, real or supposed, between the human soul and the God of the World or the Universe. The hypothesis on which it rests is that there is a God *within* us upon the inner ideal beyond the great outward Spirit, who in Christian theory is identified with the Logos-Christ. He was the instrument in creation, and through the incarnation and the gift of the Holy Spirit, in which the incarnation is continued, has entered into the most intimate relation with the inner life of the believer. This revival led to the inspiration of the individual has immensely strengthened the position of Christian apologists, who find their old institutions no longer

trouble against the worship of material science and its institutionalization. It has given to belief new independence, and has vindicated for the spiritual life the right to stand on its own feet and rest on its own evidence. Spiritual things, we now realize, are spiritually discerned. The frightened soul can see the invisible, and live its true life in the responsible sphere. The primary evidence for the truth of religion is religious experience, which in persons of religious genius—those whom the Church calls saints and prophets—includes a clear perception of an eternal world of truth, beauty, and goodness, ever-present to and penetrating it at every point. It is the spontaneous testimony of these favored spirits that the obstacle in the way of realizing this transcendental world are partly subjective and in a large extent removable by the appropriate training and discipline. Nor is there any serious discrepancy among these views as to the nature of the vision which is the highest reward of human effort, or as to the course of preparation which makes us able to receive it. The Christian must first begin with the practical and conscientious discharge of his duties to society; he must not purify his desires from all worldly and carnal lusts, he only the pure in heart can see God; and he may thus fit himself for 'glorification'—the stage in which the glory and beauty of the spiritual life, now clearly discerned, are themselves the motive of action and the incentive to contemplation; while the possibility of a yet more immediate and ineffable vision of the God-head is not denied, even in this life. There is reason to think that this conception of religion appeals more and more strongly to the younger generation to-day. It brings an intense feeling of relief to many who have been distressed by being told that religion is bound up with certain events in antiquity, the historicity of which it is in some cases difficult to establish; with a cosmology which has been definitely disproved; and with a philosophy which their reason makes their own. It allows us what George Bernard Shaw calls 'the capture of the forward view.' It brings home to us the meaning of the promise made by the Redeemer Christ that there are many

things as yet hid from humanity which will in the future be revealed by the Spirit of Truth. It encourages us to hope that the each individual who is trying to live the right life the virtues of which will be progressively justified in experience. It breaks down the denominational barriers which divide men and women who worship the Father in spirit and in truth—barriers which become more useless in each generation, since they no longer correspond even approximately with real differences of belief or of religious temperament. It makes the whole world kin by offering a pure religion which is substantially the same in all climates and in all ages—a religion too divine to be distorted by any man-made formula, too deeply human to be badly acceptable to man in whom the lips and eyes are still alive, but which finds a congenial home in the purified spirit which is the "Home of the God-head." Such is the type of faith which is now moving us. It makes no imposing show in Church membership; it does not fill our churches and chapels; it has no organization, no propaganda; it is for the most part passively lived, without much enthusiasm, to the instruction among which it finds itself. But in reality it has overgrown all barriers; it knows no time or place limit; and amid the strikes and persecutions of a sad and turbulent time it can always renew its hope and confidence by ascending in heart and mind to the heaven which is closer to it than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

But on the other side we see a tendency, even more manifest if we look for external signs, to emphasize the institutional side of religion, that which prompts men and women to continue in sacred societies, to cherish systematic devotion for the Church of their early education or of their later choice, to find their chief satisfaction in acts of corporate worship, and to subordinate their individual faith and beliefs to the common tradition and discipline of a historical body. It is now about eighty years since this tendency began to manifest itself as a new phenomenon in the English Church. Since then, it has spread to other organizations. It has prompted a new degree of denominational loyalty in several Protestant bodies

on the Continent, in America, and in our own country; and it has arrested the decline of the Roman Catholic Church in countries where the people would have broken from the ecclesiastical point of view. Such a movement, so widespread and so powerful in its results, is clearly a thing to be reckoned with by all who desire to estimate rightly the signs of the times. It is a current running in the opposite direction to the mystical tendency, which regards unity as a spiritual, not a political ideal. Fortunately, the theory of institutionalism has lately been defended and expounded by several able writers belonging to different denominations; so that we may hope, by comparing their statements, to understand the attractions of the theory and its meaning for those who so highly value it.

Ashley Moore, writing in 1886, examined the Catholic revival with the abandonment of atomism in natural philosophy and of Cartesian metaphysics. There were, he thought, the counterparts of individualism in politics and Calvinism in religion. The advantages of anti-Calvinistic science and philosophy were highlighted by the phenomenon of 'that in the nineteenth century actually expressing a belief in a divine society and a supernatural presence in our midst, a brotherhood in which men become members of an organic whole by sharing in a common life, a service of man which is the natural and spontaneous outcome of the service of God.'¹ In the view of this learned and acute thinker, Catholicism, or institutionalism, is destined to supplant Protestantism, as the organic theory is destined to displace the atomist.

More recently Gifford, writing as a Protestant, has emphasized the institutional side of religion in the most uncomprehending way.

* One of the clearest results of all religious history and religious psychology is that the nature of all religion is not dogma and rites, but culture and community, the living intercourse with the Deity—an intercourse of the entire community, having its chief focus in religion and deriving its ultimate power of first

¹ Moore, *Science and the Faith, Introduction*.

uniting individuals, from its faith in God. . . . Whatever the future may bring us, we must expect a separation and loss of the knowledge of God and of His omnipotent power to subvert without compromise and culture. . . . and as long as a Christianity of any kind shall exist at all, it will be united with a culture, and with Christ having a central position in the culture."¹

From America, the last refuge of individualism, there has come a protestantism not less drastic. Professor Royce, the author of the admirably metaphysical treatise entitled *The World and the Individual*, has recently published a double series of Hibbert Lectures on "The Problem of Christianity," in which he affirms the individualist theory with a surprising absence of qualification. The whole book is dominated by one idea, advanced with a zeal which would hardly have been possible to a theologian—the idea that Christianity is the essential part of the Christian religion.

"The salvation of the individual man is determined by some sort of membership in a certain spiritual community—a religious community, and in the narrow sense a divine community, in which life the Christian virtues are to reach their highest expression and the spirit of the Master is to obtain its fullest fulfillment. In other words, there is a certain universal will divine spiritual community. Membership in that community is necessary to the salvation of man. . . . Such a community exists, is needed, and is an indispensable source of salvation for the individual man, and in the fitting order whereby alone the kingdom of heaven which the Master promised can find its expression, and wherein alone the Christian virtues can be effectively practised."²

These statements, which in rigour and rigour would satisfy the most extreme-orthodox in the Society of Jesus, are not in itself startling in an American philosophy, who, as far as the present writer knows, does not belong to any "Catholic" Church. The point that is vitalized is the argument of the whole book, in which "loyalty to the universal man

¹ *Frederick, His Believing for Individualism* (New York: The Century, 1904), pp. 10-11.

² Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, vol. 1, 101.

unity' is destined to be the characteristic Christian vision. It is true that the collection of Professor Ruyer's Catholic Studies is destined to be changed in the second volume, where he intends us to look for the ideal divine community in any existing Church, and expresses his conviction that great changes must come over the dogmatic teaching of Christianity. But for our purpose the significant fact is that throughout the book he insists that Christianity is essentially an institutional religion, the most completely institutional of all religions. For Professor Ruyer to be a Christian is to be a Churchman.

Our last witness shall be the learned Roman Catholic layman, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, the deepest thinker, perhaps, of all living theologians in this country. "It is now ever increasingly clear to all deep impartial students that religion has ever primarily expressed and formed itself in culture, in social organisation, social worship, intercourse between soul and soul and between soul and God; and in symbols and sacraments, in contacts between spirit and matter." He proceeds to discuss the strength and weakness of institutionalism in a perfectly cooled spirit, but with his particular reference to the present conditions within the Roman Church is help as much to our more general survey. He mentions the drawbacks of an official philosophy, proscribed by authority: "only in 1858 did the Congregation of the Index withdraw Innocentius' ban on its list." He emphasises the necessity of historical dogmas, but admits that orthodox idealism, along with them, "fact-like historical pictures" which "cannot be taken as directly, simply factual." He vindicates the orthodoxy of religious tradition, and refuses to assign all non-Catholics to perdition, warning the tendency to identify absolutely the visible and invisible Church, which prevails among "some of the most dominant Italian and German French Catholics." Lastly, he boldly recommends the frank abandonment of the Papal claim to exercise temporal power in Italy. This is not so much a critique of institutionalism as the plea of a liberal Catholic that the logic of institutionalism should not be allowed to override all other considerations.

The State is, indeed, himself a mystic, though also a strong believer in the necessity of institutional religion.

We have then a considerable body of very competent opinion, that a man cannot be a Christian unless he is a Churchman. To the mystic pure and simple, such a statement seems monstrous. Did not even Augustine say, 'I want to know God and my own soul: these two things, and no third whatever' ? What intermediary can there be, he will ask, between the soul and God ? What intermediary is there in an organization ? Is it not a matter of common experience that the morality of an institution, a society, a state, is inferior to that of the individuals who compose it ? And is organized Catholicism an exception to this rule ? And yet we must admit the glamour of the idea of a divine society. It arouses that spirit *de corps* which is the strongest appeal that can be made to some noble minds. It calls for self-sacrifice and devoted labour in a cause which is higher than private interest. It demands discipline and co-operation, through which alone great things can be done on the field of history. It holds out a prospect of really influencing the course of events. And in these has been a historical fascination, it believes that God has actually intervened on the stage of history, and that it is His will to carry out some great and divine purpose in and by means of the course of history. With this object, as the Catholic believes, He established an institutional Church, pledged to the highest of all causes ; and what greater privilege can there be than to take part in this work, as a soldier in the army of God in His long campaign against the spiritual powers of evil ? The Christian institutionalist is the servant of a grand idea.

There are, however, a few questions which we are bound to ask him. First, is his idea of the Church Christian ? Did the Founder of Christianity contemplate or even implicitly sanction the establishment of a semi-political international society, such as the Catholic Church has actually been ? Orthodox Catholicism maintains that He did. Modernism admits that He did not, but adds that if He had known that the Moslemic expectation was illusory, and that the existing world-order was to continue

for thousands of years, He would certainly have wished that a Catholic Church should exist. And, again, the Reformation, if it is a good thing that a Catholic Church should exist, it is useless to quarrel with the conditions under which alone it can maintain its existence. The philosophical historian must admit that all the changes which the Catholic Church has undergone—its concessions to Pagan superstition, its secular power, its ruthless extermination of whole peoples for heresy, its steadily growing centralization and autocracy—were forced upon it in the struggle for existence. Those who wish that Church history had been different are wishing the impossible, or wishing that the Church had perished. But this argument is not valid as a defense of a divine institution. It is rather a merciless exposure of what happens, and must happen, to a great idea when it is enslaved by an institution of its own creation. The political organization which has grown up round the idea, and by struggling it, and continuing in fight for its own preservation by the methods which govern the policy of all other political organizations: force, fraud, and accommodation. There is nothing in the political history of Catholicism which suggests in the slightest degree that the spirit of Christ has been the guiding principle in its councils. The methods have, on the contrary, been more cruel, more fraudulent, more unscrupulous, than those of most secular powers. If the Founder of Christianity had appeared again on earth during the so-called ages of faith, it is hardly possible to doubt that He would have been burnt alive or crucified again. What the Latin Church preserved was not the religion of Christ, which lived on by its inherent inner strength, but parts of the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophies, distorted and perverted by greekism, a vast quantity of purely Pagan superstitions, and the ancient imposture of Roman Canonism. The normal end of Scholasticism is a mechanical philosophy of reality, in which there are no problems to solve, but a great many fixed positions to consult. The normal end of a policy which exploits the separation of the peasant is a desperate warfare against education. The normal end of Roman

Impediment to a vigorous life that of Nicollson. It is difficult to find a proof of scholarly and independent wisdom in the evolution of which these are the last terms. We read with the almost sympathetic and admiring fervour of Hugh's loyal and fervent appeals to the authorities of his Church, that they may shew not the strong and least doubtful parents of institutionalism, and avoid its insidious dangers. But it may be doubted whether such a policy is possible. The history of Roman Catholicism in France, with the Ultramontanes. They, and not the Modernists, are in the line of development which Catholicism as an institution has consistently followed, and must continue to follow to the end. It can do no other life is there for the name of Catholicism : the preservation of true Christianity lies therein, life within it, and are transmitted without fail to those who are born of the Spirit.

We must further ask the institutionalist what are his grounds for identifying the Church of God with the particular institution to which he belongs. On the institutional hypothesis, it might have been expected rather that there would have been no divisions in Christianity, or that all existing bodies would have shown such manifest inferiority in wisdom, morality, and reality, that the unshaken claims of the Great Church would have been sustained at the bar of history. This is, in fact, the claim, which Roman Catholics make. But it can only be upheld by writing history in the spirit of an advocate, or by giving a preference, not in accordance with modern ethical views, to certain types of character which are produced by the peculiar life of the Catholic 'religion.' It is however highly difficult to find, in the lives of those who belong to any one denomination, proofs of marked superiority over other Christians. Of course, we know little of the real character of our neighbours as they appear in the eyes of God ; but in considering a theory which lays so much stress on history as Catholic institutionalism does, we are bound to make use of such evidence as we have. And the evidence does not support the theory that we are not in Christianity unless we are Catholic. For there is even countenance the view that we cannot be Christians

where we see individual members of some religious organization. Professor Rogers seems to have been carried away by the idea which prompted him to write his book; but a little thought about the character of his correspondence might have given him pause.

The institutional theory of devotion which assumes so much importance in some fashionable Anglican teaching about the Church need not detain us long. The logical division need ultimately be between the great institutional Catholic Church and what Augustus Sabatier called the religion of the Spirit. The religion of all Protestants, when it is not mechanical, as it too often is, belongs to this latter type, even when they lay much stress on the idea of brotherhood and corporate action. For with them institutions are never more than associations for mutual help and edification. The Protestant evangelist is he saved *per* Christian, not *per* Churchman.

A third question which must be asked is whether institutionalism is a practice useful for unity among Christians, or for division. Too often the chief visible sign of the 'corporate idea' of which so much is said, is the dignity of the spoken word. It seeks round its own particular fold. The obstacle is not of reason (which in no way wars with them the anomaly of formal organizations) are ruled almost exclusively by still instinctive signals. The much-disputed Kilgus case has brought this home to everybody. But for those uncompromising Protestants, Christians of all denominations would be glad enough to meet together at the Lord's table on special occasions like the service which gave rise to this controversy. Anglicans are well aware that the differences of opinion within their body are far greater than those which separate some of them from Protestant Non-conformity, and others of them from Rome. Anglicans to this of that denomination is generally an accident of early surroundings. To make these external classifications into barriers which cannot be crossed is either as a barrier as a confession that a Church is a political organism. A Roman Missal once explained, at request of the Kilgus service, that no Roman Catholic could ever communicate

in a Protestant church, because in so doing he would be guilty of an act of apostasy, and would in so doing be Roman Catholic. The attitude is consistent with the Roman claim to universal jurisdiction; the only other body it would be allowed. The civil institutionalist is detached by his theory from fraternising with men who should be his friends, while he is bound to be hostile when he has no sympathy. His theory is often more bound to conflict with the facts.

Lastly, we must ask whether institutionalism is really a spiritual and moral force. Of the advantages of *esprit de corps* I have spoken already. No one can doubt that unity is strength, or that Catholicism has an immense advantage over its rivals in the efficiency of its organisation. But is not this advantage dearly purchased? Party loyalty is notoriously unscrupulous. The idealised institution becomes itself the object of worship, and it is entirely legitimate that a Christian Church might be seen as "interested" except the highest welfare of humanity. The substitution of military for civil ethics has worked disastrously on the conduct of Christians. Theoretically it is admitted by Roman writers that an immoral order ought not to be obeyed; but it is not for a layman to pronounce himself *infidel* unless received from a priest; if the order is really immoral, "obedience" commands him who transgresses it, in all other cases disobedience is a deadly sin. The result of this substitution of private judgment to that the rules of conscience is often stiff, and unscrupulous policies are carried through by Christians, which secular public opinion would have condemned decisively and rejected. The persecution of Douglas is a recent striking instance. If all France had been Catholic, the victim of this shocking injustice would certainly have died in prison. It is extremely doubtful whether the presence of a highly organised Church has contributed to moral and social reform in a country. The temptation to play a political game seems to be always too strong. In Ireland, the priest had helpfully helped to maintain a comparatively high standard of moral morality, but it cannot be said that the Irish Catholic population is in other re-

applies a model of civilization and good citizenship. In other nations especially the influence of ecclesiasticism has been almost uniformly pernicious, so that it seems impossible for any country where the children are left under priestly tutelage even to rise above a certain rather low level of civilization.

The stamped chain of institutionalism in our respect is probably the intellectual restraint which is exercising upon many persons who need moral and intellectual guidance. It is the fashion to disparage the official ideology, and to have certainly suffered by being separated, like everything else that Rome touches, into a dead system; but it is immeasurably superior to the theosophies and fancy religions which run riot in the superficially cultivated classes of Protestant countries. The undisciplined mystic, in his relation to the inner light, may fall into various kinds of delirium and repetition. In some cases he may even lose his sanity for want of a wise restraining influence. It is not an accident that Sweden, where institutionalism is weakest, is the happy breeding-ground of religious quacks and crazes. Individualism is too prone to undermine the restraining influence of ancient and consecrated tradition, which is kept up mainly by ecclesiastical institutions. These probably prevent many such experiments from being tried, especially in the field of morals. Even nations like St. France insist on the human virtues which conventional tradition still teaches to humanity. These claims may be admitted; but they come very far short of the glorification of institutionalism which we found in the authors quoted a few pages back.

The Institutionalist, however, may reply that he by no means admits the validity of Sweden's distinction between religion of authority and the religion of the spirit. His own religion, he believes, is quite as spiritual as that of the Protestant individualist. He may quote the line saying of a medieval mystic that he who can see the inward in the outward is more spiritual than he who can only see the inward in the inward. We may, indeed, be thankful that we have not to choose between two mutually exclusive types of religion. The Quaker, whom we may take as the type of anti-institutional mysticism,

has a brotherhood to which he is proud to belong, and for which he feels loyalty and affection. And Christianity has been rich in contemplative souls who have lived in the light of the Divine presence. The question raised in this essay is neither of the relative importance of these two elements in the religious life, those of desiring one and rejecting the other. I will conclude by saying that our preference of one of these types to the other will be largely determined by our attitude towards history. It was good to see that Professor Bonanquet, in his late Oxford lectures, has the courage to expose the limitations of the 'historical method,' now so popular. He protests against Professor Ward's doctrine that 'the actual is wholly historical,' as a view little better than naive realism. History, he says, is a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degree of being or freedom. It is a fragmentary discernment of finite life-phenomena seen from the outside, and very imperfectly known. It consists largely of snatching parts in some great world-experience in particular actions—a highly speculative enterprise. To set these fragments and dubious constructions above the operations of pure thought and pure insight is indeed a return to the philosophy of the man in the street. 'Social morality, art, philosophy, and religion take us far beyond the spatio-temporal actualities of history; these are separate and secondary living worlds, and in them the finite mind begins to experience something of what indefinitely must ultimately mean.' Our inquiry has thus led us to the threshold of one of the fundamental problems of philosophy—the value and reality of time. For the institutionalist, happenings in time have a meaning and importance far greater than the spirit is willing to allow us them. Like most other great philosophical problems, this question is largely one of temperament. Christianity has found room for both types. I believe, however, that the observations or suggestions of institutionalism have been, and are, more dangerous, and further removed from the spirit of Christianity than those of mysticism, and that we must look to the latter type, rather than to the former, to give life to the next religious revival.

THE INFERENT MOAISSE CHRISTIANITY

[1877]

No thinking man can deny that this war has grievously stained the reputation of Europe. Even if the verdict of history confirms the opinion that the conspiracy which threw the torch into the powder-magazine was laid by a few persons in one or two countries, and that the unparalleled outrages which have accompanied the conflict were ordered by a small circle of brutal officers, we cannot forget that these crimes have been committed by the irresponsible representatives of a divided European power, and that the nations which they represent has shown no quality of conscience. That such a calamity, the permanent results of which include a halocaust of European wealth and credit, accumulated during a century of unparelleled industry and ingenuity, the loss of innumerable lives, and the destruction of all the old and honorable associations which have hitherto regulated the intercourse of civilized nations with each other, is met as well as its peers, should have been possible, is partly felt to be a reproach to the whole continent, and especially to the nations which have taken the lead in its civilization and culture. The unshook ranks of Asia, which have never admitted the moral superiority of the West, are heavily impacted spectators of our civilised frenzy. A Japanese is reported to have said, 'We have only to wait a little longer, till Europe has completed her last fire.' This is, indeed, what any intelligent observer must think about the present struggle. Just as the feudal barons of England destroyed each other and brought the feudal system to

as yet in the West of the House, as the great industrial nations are tending to place the whole fabric of modern industrialism, which can never be reconstructed. Mr. Norman Angell was perfectly right in his argument that a European war would be ruinous to both sides. The material objects at stake, such as the control of the British Empire and the African continent, are not worth more than an insignificant fraction of the war-bill. We are witnessing the suicide of a mortal order, and our descendants will marvel at our madness, as we marvel at the senseless wars of the past.

There has, it is plain, been something fundamentally wrong with European civilization, and the disease appears to be a moral one. With this conviction it is natural that men should turn upon the official custodians of religion and morality, and ask them whether they have been faithful to their trust, or whether it is not rather proved that the faith which they profess is itself bankrupt and incapable of exerting any salutary influence upon human character and action. Christianity stands arraigned on the bar of public opinion. But it is not without significance that the indictment should not be signed with a vengeance which we do not find in the records of human convictions. It was not generally felt to be a scandal in Christianity that England was all war for 45 years out of the 124 which preceded the battle of Waterloo. Harder our generation expected more from Christianity, as it was far more shocked by the sudden outbreak of this fever war than our ancestors were by the almost chronic condition of European campaigning to which they were accustomed. The fever is probably the true focus. The belief in progress, which at the beginning of the industrial revolution was an article of faith, had become a hardly accepted presupposition of all serious thought; and even those who were dubious about the moral improvement of mankind in other directions, seldom denied that we were more humane and peaceable than our forefathers. The disillusion has struck our self-complacency in its most vital spot. Nothing in our own experience had prepared us for the hideous struggle and vandalism

of German workers, the first accounts of which we received with thank acknowledgments and hospitality. Then, when disbelief was no longer possible, there arose within us a sense of fear for our home and women and children—a feeling to which modern civilization may had long been a stranger. We had not supposed that the non-convictant population of any European country would ever again be exposed to the horrors of savage warfare. This, much more than the war itself, has made thousands feel that the basis of civilization is built upon the sand, and that Christianity has failed to rid the most barbarous instincts of human nature. Christians cannot regret that the flagrant contradiction between the principles of their creed and the crimes that have been started during the last three years is fully recognized. But the often repeated statement that 'Christianity has failed' needs more examination than it usually receives from those who utter it.

History compares us with two kinds of religion, which, though they are not entirely separate from each other, differ very widely in their effects upon conduct and morality. The religion which Lucretius hated, and from which he strongly hoped that the scientific materialism of Epicurus had finally delivered mankind, has its roots in the ancient and childish superstitions of the savage. Four, as Hesiod and Paganism tell us, created the gods of this religion. These deities are capricious and capricious powers, who exact vengeance for the transgression of arbitrary laws which they have not provided, and who must be propitiated by public worship, but none collective punishment fall on the sinner, blighting its crops and setting its lands with marauds, or giving it over into the hand of its enemies. This religion makes very little attempt to correct the current standard of values. Its rewards are wealth and prosperity; its punishments are calamity in this world and perhaps torture in the next. It is not, however, incapable of materialism. The wrath of heaven may visit not the innocent violation of some law, but cruelty and injustice. In the historical books of the Old

Tenement, though Tenet is seldom dead for teaching the soft, and the subjects of King David afflicted with passions because their ruler took a census of his people, *tenet* is above all things a righteous God, who punishes bloodshed, adultery, and social oppression. So in Tenet the Father punishes the homicide and the perjure, till the name of his family is thus put out. Revolution tells us how the family of Tenet was extinguished because he reached the grade of Delight about an act of mismanagement which he was committing.

International law was protected by the same fear of divine vengeance. The number of hostile wars by all means is restricted. When the Romans repudiate their 'sweat of paper' with the Germans, they deliver up to the enemy the officers who signed it, though with characteristic 'stomachs' not the clay which the mountaineers had captured and threatened under the agreement. To destroy the temples in an enemy's country was an act of nation impiety; Revolution cannot understand the religious intolerance which led the Persians to burn the statues of Greek gods. Thus religion had a restraining influence in war throughout antiquity, and in the Middle Ages. The Pope, who was believed to hold the keys of future bliss and torment, was frequently, though by no means always, obeyed by the turbulent feudal lords, and often averted the severity of a contest by the threat or the imposition of excommunication and interdict. In order to make these penalties more terrible, the heretics of those who died under the displeasure of the Church were painted in the most vivid colours. But in the official and popular Christian mythology, as in the imperial theology of the Old Testament, there is little or no moral kingdom. The joys or pains of the future life are made to depend, in part at least, on the observance or violation of the moral law, but they are themselves of a kind which the rational man would desire as dead. They are an reward, because a deferred, satisfaction of the same kind which in more primitive religions promises earthly prosperity to the righteous, and earthly retribution to the wicked. Values, positive and negative, are

taken ready as they stand in the estimation of the average man.

But there is another religious tradition, which in Greece was almost separated from the official and national cults, and among the Hebrews was often in opposition to them. The Hebrew prophets certainly proclaimed that "the history of the world is the judgment of the world," and often assumed, too crudely as it seems to us, that national calamities are a proof of national iniquities; but the whole course of development in prophecy was towards an autonomous morality based on a spiritual valuation of life. Its quarrel with materialism was mainly directed against the unethical selfishness of the privileged; the revolt was grounded in a lofty moral idealism, which found expression in a half-symbolic vision of a coming state in which might and right should coincide. The apocalyptic prophecies of post-exilic Judaism, which were not based, like some political predictions of the earlier prophets, on a statistesimistic view of the international situation, but on hopes of supernatural intervention, had their roots in visions of a new and better world-order. This aspiration, which had its discharge itself by degrees from the political dreams of a righteous and righteous war, was projected into the near future, and was mixed with less worthy political wishes which had a different origin. The prophet always sanctifies his revelation, and generally blends the city of God with a vision of his own country transfigured. We see him doing this even to-day, in his Utopian dreams of social reconstruction.

And so it has always been. We remember Oedipus installing a reign of truth and peace just before he was compelled to flee from the shores of voluntary exile in a damp cell at Thebes in Boeotia; and Kant feeling the approach of a peaceful international republic while Napoleon was preparing to drown Europe in blood. Apocalypticism is a compromise between the religion of rewards and punishments and the religion of spiritual deliverance. It calls a new world into existence by reborn the values of the old; but its dissent with the old is mainly the result

of a moral and spiritual valuation of life. Greek philosophy has really made its common with Hebrew prophecy, though the Greek envisaged his ideal world as the eternal background of reality, and not under the form of history. In its matured form, it is a transvaluation of all values in accordance with an absolute ideal standard: that of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. This idealism appears in a still more dramatic form in the religions of Asia, which preach deliverance by demonstrating it a stroke of the world's necessity. Spiritual values are alone accepted; man wins peace and freedom by renouncing in advance all of which nature may deprive him.

We are apt to assume, in deference to our theories of human progress, that the evolution of religion is normally from a lower to a higher type. It would, indeed, be almost to question that the religion of a civilized people is usually more spiritual and more rational than that of barbarians. But even the law, the history of religions is generally a history of decline. In Judaism the prophets came before the Scribes and the Pharisees. Brahminism and Buddhism were both degraded by superstitions and unethical rites. Christianity, which began as a revolution: that of the poorest prophetic teaching, has suffered the same fate. In each case, when the revolution has lost its freedom, and the mechanism which it evolved has begun to rot, a revolution in other habits of thought and customs takes place: and sometimes it may be said that the old religion has really conquered the new.

Christianity, as taught by its Founder, is based on a transvaluation of values even more complete than that of Platonism and the later Platonism, because, while it regards the objects of ordinary ambition as a positive hindrance to the higher life, it accepts and gives value to those points of sympathy which Greek thought denuded, as detracting from the calm enjoyment of the philosophic life. This acceptance of the world's suffering, from which every other spiritual religion and philosophy promises a way of escape, is perhaps the most distinctive feature of Christian ethics. In practice, it thus achieves a more complete conquest of evil than any other system: and

by bringing sorrow and sympathy into the Jewish life. It not only presents the character and nature of the Ruler in a new light, but opens out a new field of moral perfection. This is not the place for a discussion of the main characteristics of the Gospel of Christ, and they are familiar to us all. But, since we are now considering the charge of failure brought against Christianity in connection with the present world-war, it seems necessary to emphasize two points which are not always remembered.

The first is that there is no evidence that the historical Christ ever intended to found a new institutional religion. He neither attempted to make a religion in the Jewish Church nor to substitute a new system for it. He placed Himself deliberately in the prophetic line, only claiming to sum up the series in Himself. The whole nature of His life and teaching was prophetic. The differences which superficially may be found between His style and that of the other prophets do not remove Him from the company in which He clearly wished to stand. He treated the institutional religion of His people with the independence and indifference of the prophet and mystic; and the hierarchy, which, like other hierarchies, had a sure instinct in discerning a dangerous enemy, was not slow to declare war to the hilt against Him. Such, He predicted His mission, was the treatment which all the prophets had met with from the class to which they seemed belonged. This, then, is the first fact to remember. Institutional Christianity may be a legitimate and necessary historical development from the original Gospel, but it is something alien to the Gospel itself. The first disciples believed that they had the Master's authority for supporting the end of the existing world-order in their own lifetime. They believed that He had come forward with the cry of 'How variable is!' Whether they misunderstood Him or not, they clearly could not have held this opinion if they had received instructions for the constitution of a Church.

The second point on which it is necessary to insist is that Christ never expected, or taught His disciples to expect, that His teaching would meet with wide-

movement, or serious political influence. "The world"—signified human society—was the enemy and was to swallow the church. The passage, he believed, would be moved and rejected by the majority; and those who persuaded it were to expect persecution. This warning is repeated so often in the Gospels that it would be superfluous to give quotations. He made it quite plain that the big businessmen are never likely to be persuaded before the narrow gate. He declared that only later prophets are well spoken of by the majority. When we consider the revolutionary character of the Christian idealism, its indifference to nearly all that passes for "religion" with the vulgar, and its reversal of all current valuations, it is plain that it is never likely to be a popular creed. As much as the presence of high spiritual instincts in the human mind guarantees its inextinguishability, so surely the deeply-rooted propensities which keep the majority on a lower level must prevent the Gospel of Christ from dominating modern politics or social life.

However, the actual extent of its influence cannot be estimated. The servitude and individualism of its teaching make its apparent effectiveness smaller than its real power, which works secretly and unobserved. The ideal which Christ regarded with abhorrence, the possession of character—honesty, hard-heartedness, and worldliness or secularism; and who can say what degree of success the Gospel has achieved in combating these? The method of Christianity is alien to all externalism and machinery; it does not lead itself to those accommodations and compromises without which nothing can be done in politics. As Rammach says, the Gospel is not one of social improvement, but of spiritual redemption. Its influence upon social and political life is indirect and obscure, operating through a subtle modification of current valuations, and curbing the competitive and acquisitive instincts, which really correspond with what Christ called "Mammon" and St. Paul "the flesh." Christianity is a spiritual dynamic, which has very little to do directly with the mechanism of social life.

It is, therefore, certain that when we speak of Christianity as a factor in human life, we must not identify it with the opinions or actions of the individuals who are nominally Christians. We must not even identify it, without qualification, with the types of character exhibited by those who try to bring their lives in accordance with its precepts. For these types are very largely determined by the ideals which belong to the stage through which the life of the race is passing; and these differ so widely in different ages and countries that the historians of religion might well despair if he was compelled to regard them all as typical manifestations of the same ideal. There are times when the disciple of Christ seems to turn his back upon society; he is occupied solely with the relation of the individual soul to God. There are periods when the opportunities for social service are much restricted by a faulty structure of the body politic; periods when creative civilization is so limited, so so moribund, that the religious life can only be led in isolation from it. At another time the typical Christian seems to be the active and valiant soldier of a militant corporation. At another, again, he is a philanthropist, who devotes his life to the removal of some great wrong, such as slavery, or the promotion of a more righteous system of production and distribution. In all these types we can trace the operation of the genius of Christianity, but they are partial manifestations of it, with much else admixture. The spirit of the age, as well as the spirit of Christ, has moulded the various types of Christian piety.

If there has ever been a time when organized Christianity was a sincere embodiment of the pure principles of the Gospel, we must look for it in the era of the apostles, when the Church had already gained coherence and discipline and a corporate self-consciousness, and was still preserved from the corrupting influence of materialism by the danger which attended the profession of an ill-considered creed. A vivid picture of the Christian community at this period has been given by Beloeil¹, whose learning and impartiality are unimpeachable. The Church of this time demanded from its followers an unreserved

exclusion, even when this meant death. It was a brotherhood within which there was no privileged class. Men and women, the free and the slave, had an equal share in it. It abolished the fundamental Greek distinction of civilized and barbarian. It looked with contempt on hate. Its great organization was spread by purely voluntary means, till it gained a firm footing throughout the Empire and beyond it. To a large extent it was an association for mutual aid. Mutual service was its aim, help was its bond. The tangible advantages of belonging to such a guild were so great that the Church had to refuse labor on all who would work, as a condition of sharing in the benefits of membership. Social distinctions, such as those of rich and poor, master and slave, were not abolished, but they had lost their sting, because genuine affection, loyalty and sympathy overruled these inequalities. Great importance was laid on truth, integrity in business, and sexual purity. A complete rupture with pagan standards of morality was insisted on from new members. The human body must be kept holy, as the temple of God. Revenge was forbidden, and injustice was replaced with meekness and pardon. This is an imaginary picture. In that brief golden age of the Church, such were indeed the characteristics of the Christian society. In the opinion of Eusebius the moral condition of the Church in the second century was much higher than among St. Paul's converts in the first. The purity of religion is one of the best, and to judge, is to be accepted for by the spread policy of such efforts. For a short time, then, the artificial selection effected by the persecutions kept the Church pure; and from the happy picture which we can reconstruct of this period we can judge what a really Christian society would be like.

The history of institutional Catholicism must be approached from a different side. Trevelyan agrees with much cogency that the Catholic Church must be regarded rather as the last creative achievement of classical antiquity than as the beginning of the Middle Ages. Its growth belongs mainly to the political history of

Europe: the strictly religious element is in its quite self-sufficient. There is, as Millardet wisely has seen, a real break between the Palatine Gospel and the elaborate mystery-religion, with its graded hierarchy, its Roman organisation, its Palatine speculative theology, which achieved the conquest of the Empire in the fourth century. The Church, as later work, descended to service and to-servage, and adapted itself to the demands of the time. It has travelled far from the simple teaching of the earthly Christ: though we may, if we choose, hold that its spirit continued to direct the grunting and clanging institution which, as a matter of history, had its source in the Galilean ministry. In truth, however, the extremely efficient organisation of the Roman Church began in selfishness and was sustained by egoism. It is one of the strongest of all human institutions, so that it was said before the war that it is one of the 'three inviolables,' the other two being the German Army and the Banked Oil Trust.

But our admiration for the subtle and business genius of this organisation must not blind us to its essentially political character. Its policy has been always directed to self-preservation and aggrandisement; it is an imperium in imperio, which has only checked fanatical nationalisms by the counterpoising influence of a still more fanatical particularism. In the present war, the problem before the Pope's council was whether the friendship of the Central Powers or that of the Entente was best worth cultivating; and the anxious loyalty of Austria to the Church, together with a natural preference for German methods of governing as compared with democracy, turned the scale against us. In Ireland, in Canada and in Spain the Catholic priests have been formidable enemies of our cause. As for the other Churches, they have not the same power of interfering in national quarrels. The Russian Church has never been independent of the secular government; and the Anglican and Lutheran Churches can hardly be expected to be impartial when the vital interests of England or Germany are at stake. Leaders of peace have not much to hope for from organised religion. National Christianity,

as Mr. Bernard Shaw says, will only be possible when we have a nation of Chetani.

The downfall of the medieval European system, though in truth it was a theory rather than a fact, has removed some of the obstacles upon war. The determining principle of the medieval political theory was the conception of a 'lex Dei,' which included the 'lex Moysi,' the 'lex Christi,' and the 'lex naturalis,' but which also, as 'lex naturalis,' comprised the law, science, and ethics of antiquity. These laws were super-national, and no nation dared explicitly to repudiate them. They formed the basis of a real system of international law, ending, like everything else in the Middle Ages, in supposed divine authority.

This theory, with its sanctions, was shattered at the Renaissance; and the Machiavellian doctrine of the absolute State, accepted by France and put into practice by Richelieu, the first, has prevailed ever since, though not without frequent protests. The loss of international law, with an intense self-consciousness, has facilitated the adoption of a theory too greatly influenced to have found better examples in the peculiar circumstances of modern civilization. The resurgence of nationalism was often connected with a legitimate struggle for freedom; and at such times *esprit de corps* seems to be almost the sum of morality, the substitute for all other virtues. Loyalty is one of the most attractive of moral qualities, and it necessarily includes criticism of its own objects, which has the appearance of treason. But, unless the aims of the corporate body which claims our absolute allegiance are right and reasonable, loyalty may be, and often has been, the parent of bitter enmity, and a social evil of the first magnitude. The perversion of *esprit de corps* does incalculable harm in every direction, destroying all sense of honour and justice, of civility and generosity, of sympathy and humanity. It involves a complete repudiation of Christianity, which breaks down all barriers by ignoring them, and insists on love and justice towards all mankind without distinction. The worship of the State has during the last half-century been indeliberately and artificially lowered

in Germany, until it has produced a kind of moral insanity. Even philosophical historians like Treitschke were unable to see the necessity of a political doctrine which has caused his country to be justly regarded as the enemy of the whole human race. Eckstein, writing some years before the war, in a rather gloomy manner deplores Politicism as a national danger; but he does not seem to grasp the entire reality. It is possible that this delirium of the State in Germany may be in part due to an unqualified lack of worship. In Roman Catholic countries, where there must be a divided allegiance, patriotism never, perhaps, assumes such violent and fanatical forms.

But we shall not understand the attraction which this false inspiration in international affairs exercises over the minds of many who are not otherwise ignorant, if we do not remember that the degradation of the Christian ethical standard has been equally thorough in commercial competition. The German officer believes himself to have shown a morally inferior profession that that of the business-man; he serves (he thinks) a larger cause, and he is content with much less personal reward. Socialist opponents of our industrial system, such as they still are, would probably agree with him. It is not necessary to condemn all competition. The desire to excel others is not reprehensible, when the rivalry is in rendering useful social service. But it cannot be denied that the present condition of industry is such that a heavy premium is offered to mere rapacity; that the industrial social life which Christianity requires is often literally impossible, except at the cost of economic suicide; and that in a competitive system a business man is, by the very laws of circumstances, a warrior, though war is an enemy of love and destruction of Christian society. When the object of bargaining is to give as little and gain as much as possible, the Christian standard of value has been rejected as completely as it was by Machiavelli himself. The competition between two parties is a bargain to often a competition in unscrupulousness. Money is very frequently made by creating a local and temporary monopoly, which enables

the worker to oppress the purchaser. In all such cases, efforts for man's gain become man's loss. This state of things, the evils of which are almost universally recognised and deplored, makes the end of the glorification of production industry which was one result of the Reformation.

Hardly anything distinguishes modern from medieval ethics more sharply than the emphasis laid by Protestant morality on the duty of making and producing something tangible. Theoretically the Protestant may hold that 'doing ends in death,' and he may sing these words as Luther; but his whole life as work days is occupied in strenuous 'doing.' We find in Calvinism and Quakerism the gradually religious basis of the modern business life, which, however, has degenerated badly, now that the largest business is made by dealing in money rather than in commodities. In the books of Samuel Butler, and in Chaucer's poem beginning 'Hope were mine and believe, O Man, we find the Gospel of productive work preached with fervour. It is not of Christ now in England; but in America we still see quiet attempts to make business a religion, as in the Middle Ages religion was a business. In those circles, it is produced industriously as much to which value is attached, without much enquiry as to the utility of the product. The result has been an immense accumulation of the apparatus of life, without any corresponding elevation in moral standards. The mischiefs wrought by modern commercialism are largely the fruit of the partly fractional production which it encourages. There are, says Protestant Paragon, Pilgrimages who toil underground over a gold which they will never see, and in their obsession with production, forgive themselves all inclinations to materialism, to materialism, to luxury. Visible signs of such weakness appear in the splendours and hideous aspects which life puts on; the more instruments which emancipate themselves from their men-made human control. 'A historic civilization, built up blind by pain and confusion, should dare to envision a deeper destination than could ever be stopped by these more beautiful tyrannies, tyrannies of religion, against which past revolutions have been directed.' We cannot, indeed, be surprised that this ideal of productive work as a means

of peace, precious for its own sake, has no attraction for the masses, and that independent thinkers like Edward Carpenter should write books on "Civilization, Its Causes and Cures."

This Puritan ideal is not so much restriction as nurture and enlightenment; but the money-making life has of late become more and more heartily predatory and anti-social. The great trusts, and the men of the company-promoter, are hardly fit to perform any social service; they exist to keep selfishness on the public. We may say therefore that, though war between the leading nations of the world had become a strange idea and a far-off memory, we had by no means done away the principles and passions of war in national life. The imaginary boy-military hierarchy enjoyed by Britain and the United States was a fortunate accident, not a proof of higher morality. Our fleet protected both ourselves and the Americans from the necessity of maintaining a conscript army; but we had drifted into a condition in which civil war seemed not to be far off, and in which violence and lawlessness were increasing. By a change inconceivable, many who on moral or religious grounds had opposed wars between nations were found to maintain as justly armed war against the State, organized by disorganised factions of its citizens. Revolutionary strikes, prepared long in advance by stored hoards of money which were carefully called war-funds, had as their avowed aim the paralysis of the industries of the country and the reduction of the population to distress by withholding the necessities of life. These acts of civil war, and disguised outbreaks of criminal anarchy, were justified by persons who professed a conscientious objection to defending their homes and families against a foreign invader. The wars of small powers have little essential connection there is between democracy and peace. It involves a confusion of ideas even greater than the confusion between individualism and militarism in the writings of Herbert Spencer. On this latter subject it is enough to quote the words of John Ruskin: "As far as the advocacy of peace rests on material motives like economy and prosperity, it is the service of Mammon; and the bottom of the platform will drop out

when Bismarck said that war will pay better.' This is precisely what has happened in Germany. A short war, with huge indemnities, seemed to German financiers a promising speculation. It was, were the system sound, the very upon which anti-militarism in this country was based. The Chancellor cannot be blamed for giving the peace-movement a rather lukewarm support.

In Germany there was no internal rivalry, such as prevailed in England; there was also no illusion about the immorality of war. Our politicians ought to have read the signs of the times better; but they were too intent on finding the pulse of the electorate at home in order to disarming and nervousness symptoms abroad. The cause of the war was too difficult to determine. War has long been a national industry of Germany, and the idea of it excited no moral repugnance. The military virtues were extolled; the military profession enjoyed an extraordinary social prestige; the nation thus produced the biological necessity of international conflicts. The army believed itself to be invincible, and it had begun to control the policy of the country; when these two conditions met, no higher power can avert war. Professionalism always has a selfish and anti-social element in its side, and the professionalism of the soldier is always prone to override the rights and duties the citizen of civilians.

The dominant classes in Germany also found that their power was being undermined by the growing industrialisation. The steady increase in the social-democratic vote was a portent not to be disregarded. A letter from a German officer to a friend in Romania, which found its way into the newspapers, tells a great deal of truth in a few words. 'You cannot realise,' he writes, 'what difficulty we had in persuading our Emperor that it was necessary to let loose this war. But it has been done; and I hope that for a long time to come we shall have to move in Germany of peace, internationalism, democracy, and similar peaceful theories.' Sir Charles Fawcett, in his thoughtful book '*Autocracy*,' lays great stress on this. 'It appeared to me,' he says, 'very clear to me, that in the immediate future it was all a question as to whether

THE INSTINCT AGAINST CHIVALRY 201

the labour-man, the peasant peasant, would arrive at the realization of their power before the nations had found a war upon us, or whether the military power would out-weigh this result, and which the next few years have a war upon the world.' To the influence of the military was added the rapidity of the commercial and financial changes. The law of diminishing returns was being rapidly broken and further added; and large profits, it was hoped, might be made by the exploitation of backward countries and the reduction of their inhabitants to serfdom. To a predatory and parasitic class was given only a legal extension of the philosophy upon which it habitually acts; and for this reason privileged classes seldom feel much moral compunction about a war-policy. Lastly, among the causes of the war must be reckoned one which has moved for two little attending these social and political philosophies—the reactions and half-consciousness memories of a race. Ignorant of the home to meet, sometimes after an astonishingly long interval. The dissolution of Catholic Ireland would be quite unattainable without the assistance of the sixteenth century and the unjust exploitation of the seventeenth and eighteenth. The influence of the working class in England has its roots in the earlier period of the industrial revolution (about 1780-1830), when the labourer, with his wife and children, was treated as the 'human-factory' of industry. Similarly, the seeds of Russian brutality and oppression were sown at home and in the killing of Francis the cardinal before the Russian expedition. It such were the causes of the great world-war, how little can be hoped from results of international arbitration!

These considerations have, perhaps, made it clear that the main causes of international conflicts are what the Epistle of St. James declares them to be—'the lusts that war in your members,' the passions and appetitive impulses which pervade our mortal life in times of peace, and not least in those nations which pride themselves on having advanced beyond the military stage. There are men who accept this state of things as natural and necessary, and who thank Christianity for carrying on a hostile campaign

against human nature. This is a very different indictment from that which condemns Christianity for tolerating a pernicious evil; and it is, in our opinion, even less justified. The argument that, because war has always existed, it must always continue to exist, is justly rebuffed by Mr. Newman himself. 'It is commonly asserted that old habits of thought can never be shaken: that, as men have been, so they will be. That, of course, is why we never tell our ministers, pastors, their disciples, minister witnesses with the thousands, and leave those who do not attend the same church.'

The long history of war as a racial habit explains why a religious and humane association shows such timidity; for the conditions which constituted the habit among primitive tribes demonstrably no longer exist. It is probably true, as William James says, that 'militarism without religious sanction might well be a biological or sociological anomaly'; however might say the same about cannibalism. But 'laws of nature' are not ethical norms, and it is open to any one to prove that they are not laws, if he can break them with impunity. It would be the height of pessimistic fixation to hold that men must always go on doing that which they hate, and which brings them no misery and pain. Man is not bound for ever by habits contracted during his racial struggle; his moral, rational, and spiritual instincts are as potent as his physical appetites; and against them, as St. Paul says, 'there is no law.' Huxley's *Romanic Lecture* gave an authoritative support to the mischievous belief that the 'cosmic process' is the enemy of morality. The truth seems to be that Nature presents to us not a categorical imperative, but a choice. Do we prefer to pay our way in the world, or to be parasites? War, with very few exceptions, is a mode of parasitism. The object is to exploit the labour of other nations, to make them pay tribute, or to plunder their goods, as the Germans have plundered the cities of Belgium. War is a parasitic industry; and Christianity forbids parasitism. Nature has her own penalties for the lower animals which make this choice, and they strike with equal severity 'the peoples that delight in war.' The hellish nations have nearly all perished.

There remains, however, a class of cases which escape this consideration; and about them difficult moral problems may be raised. We can hardly deny to a growing and civilized nation the right to expand at the expense of barbarous hunters and nomads. We can well suggest that the Americans ought to give back their country to the Indians, or that Australia should be abandoned to the aborigines. But were the Anglo-Americans justified in expelling the Britons, and the Spaniards the Indians? There is room for difference of opinion in these cases; and a very serious problem may arise in the future, as to whether the European races are morally justified in using armed force to restrict Asiatic competition. As a general principle, we must condemn the expatriation of any nation which is in effective occupation of the soil. The popular delusion of superior and inferior races is thoroughly unscientific and unworkable, as is the prejudice against a dark skin. The opinion that a nation which is increasing in population has a right to expel the inhabitants of another country to make room for its own emigrants is equally untenable. If it is possible war at all, it constitutes a war of extermination, which would attack the subjects most completely by massacring girls and young women. The increase of population is a real cause of war; but the fault is, not that war is right, but that a nation must act the part according to its cloth, and limit its numbers.

Unless we justify wars of extermination, war has no biological sanction, and Christianity is not flying in the face of nature by condemning it. On the contrary, by condemning every form of population, it indicates the true path of evolution. It is equally right in rejecting the purely economic valuation of human goods. The 'economic man' does not exist in nature; he is a fictitious creature who is responsible for a great deal of social injustice. Some modern economists, like Mr. Bohm, would substitute for the old necessary standards of production and distribution an attempt to estimate the 'human costs' of labour. There are wide-reaching ligaments and artistic qualities in work 'easily' at all, unless the labour of labour is the narrow price, against the power of the worker. More economists

work is not easily by the worker if the day's labour is fairly short, or if some variety can be introduced. The human cost is greatly increased if the worker thinks that his labour is wasted, or that it will only benefit those who do not deserve the enjoyment of its fruits. Work which only produces strenuous labour is and ought to be unwholesome to the producers, even if he is well paid. It must also be emphasized that worry and anxiety take the heart out of a man more than anything else. Scarcity of employment greatly reduces the 'human cost' of labour. These considerations are comparatively new in political economy. They change it from a highly abstract science into a study of the conditions of human welfare as affected by social organization. The change is a victory for the ideas of Smith and Malthus, though not necessary for the practical measures for social independence which they proposed. It brings political economy into close relations with ethics and religion, and should induce economists to consider carefully the contribution which Christianity makes to the solution of the whole problem. For Christianity has the remedy to propose, and it is a solution of the problem of war, not less than of industrial strife.

Christianity gives the world a new and characteristic standard of values. It diminishes greatly the values which are derived from competition, and enlarges immensely the non-competitive values. "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." "Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?" "The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Passages like these are found in every part of the New Testament. This Christian idealism has a direct bearing on the doctrine of 'human costs.' Work is intrinsic, not only when it is strenuous or ill-paid, but when the worker is free, well-fed, satisfied or discontented. There is no thing which can make almost any work welcome. If it is done from love or parental affection, the human cost is almost nil, because this has created an overabundance left. This is no exaggeration when it is applied to the devoted labour of the mother and the nurse, or to that of the strongest convalescent of a disease

function. But in all useful work the best desire is neither social service, or to do God's will, disinterested or an idealizable virtue, the "human good" of heaven. This principle introduces a deep cleavage between the Christian remedy and that of political socialism, which fosters discontent and indignation as a lever for social transformation. Men are made unhappy in order that they may be urged to chase a happy dream of the world's wealth. Christianity considers that, measured by human ends, the remedy is worse than the disease. The adoption of a lower standard of value would tear up the law of accumulation by the roots, and would thus effect a real cure. It would also stop the growing and deliberately bad work which at present seriously diminishes the national wealth.

The Christian cure is the only real cure. But the tendency to suppose that education and capacity are gifts of the privileged classes, and that democracy may be treated as a disease to pluck the minority of human men to seek foreign adventures by unjust wars. There is not the slightest reason to accept either of these views. Political power is always abused; an uncompromised class is always plundered. Nor are democratic parties, except by accident. At present they do not wish to use the capital which they regard as their prospective prey dissipated in war; and for this reason their influence in our time will probably be on the side of peace. But, as soon as the competition of cheap Asiatic labour becomes acute, we may expect to see the democracies belated and the emerging class parties. There is no gain work; we already see how the democracies of California and Australia behave towards immigrants from Asia. Readers of Anatole France will remember his description of the economic war decayed by the hosts of the great republic, at the end of "*L'He des Fingères*." It would, indeed, be difficult to prove that the expansion of the United States has different marks, in methods and results, from that of the European empires; and the methods of United States are the methods of gilded bribery. Democracy and socialism are broken tools for the lever of peace to lean upon.

In conclusion, our answer to the indictment against

Christianity is that institutional religion does not represent the Gospel of Christ, but the opinions of a mass of divided Christians. It cannot be expected to do much more than look after its own interests and reflect the moral ideas of its supporters. The real Gospel, if it were accepted, would pull up by the roots not only militarism but its counterpart in civil life, the desire to exploit other people for private gain. But it is not accepted. We have seen that the Founder of Christianity had no illusions as to the reception which the message of redemption would meet with. The 'Prince of this World' is not Christ, but the Devil. Nevertheless, He did speak of the 'white lamp' being gradually increased, and we shall not exceed the limits of a reasonable and justifiable optimism if we hope that the accumulated experience of humanity, and perhaps a real though very slow modification for the better of human nature itself, may at last eliminate the wickedness and most heinous of our malicious inclinations. The human race has probably a number of thousands of years before it, whereas our so-called civilization cannot be traced back for more than a few thousand years. The time when 'barbarians shall not lift up swords against barbarians, neither shall they learn the way of war,' will probably come at last, though we can not predict what the conditions will be which will make such a change possible.

The signs are not very favourable at present for internationalism. The great nations, hitherto and henceforth ruled with cruel severity, will be obliged when the war is organised themselves as nations, with governments strong enough to put down revolutions, and directed by men of the highest attainable ability, whose main function will be to increase production and stop waste. But they will not thereby be inclined as yet to parallel that for capturing markets and exploiting prizes. A combination so harmful to the world cannot other nations, and war even actually forcing the winner, to adopt a similar organisation. This World, of course, means a complete victory for financial capitalism, and the defeat of democracy and trade-union syndicalism. Such a change, which few would just now welcome, will mean the end of the era of state

incursion; and this is what we may live to see. But there is no doubt about the experiments in government. A period of internationalism may follow the intense nationalism which historical events favour for the twentieth century. Or perhaps the international ideas-organizations may be too strong for the existing forces. It is just possible that Europe, by a concerted movement during the violent reaction against militarism which will probably follow the war, will forbid any further military or naval preparations to be made.

Whatever form reconstruction may take, Christianity will have its part to play in making the new Europe. It will be able to point to the terrible violation of its doctrine in the misery and ruin which have overtaken a world which has rejected its valuations and scorned its principles. It is not Christianity which has been judged and condemned at the bar of civilization; it is civilization which has derided itself because it has honoured Christ with its lips, while its heart has been far from Him. But a spiritual religion can win a victory only within its own sphere. It can provide no economically sounder or blinder and surer way to those who obey or disobey its principles. Social happiness and peace would certainly follow a whole-hearted acceptance of Christian principles; but they would not certainly bring wealth or empire. 'Philosophy,' said Hegel, 'will take no man's land'; and it is only in a spiritual sense that the unworldly can expect to protect the world. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to suppose that a Christian nation would be unable to hold its own in the struggle for existence. A nation in which every citizen understood to pay his way and to help his neighbour would be in no danger of weakness or extinction. The mills of God grind slowly, but the future does not belong to ruthless violence. In the long run, the wisdom that is from above will be justified in her children.

MATERIAL AND IMMORTALITY

(1874)

THE predominance of expediency in England was plain to all observers many years before the war; it was perhaps most noticeable among the half-educated folk. Personal reason contributed to this phenomenon. The craving for the supernatural, a very ancient and deeply rooted thought-habit, had been suppressed and driven underground by the arrogant dominance of a materialistic philosophy, and by the absorption of society in the pursuit of gain and pleasure. Modern sciences were laughed out of court. But materialism has superseded religion for its converts. An abstract science, creating itself into a false philosophy, has been held out as more unassailable, and has even actually lured those to intellectual error who are repulsed. Superstitionism is the refuge of the materialist who wishes to make room for ideal values without abandoning the presuppositions of materialism. By detaching even *id* from the world of nature, he materializes the spiritual, but brings the Divine will into the world of experience, from which it had been expelled, and produces a rough scheme of providential government, by which he can live.

The revolt against scientific materialism was made much easier by the disintegration of the mechanical theory itself. Biology found itself cramped by the intrusion of inorganic science, and claimed its autonomy. The result was a total breakdown the debris of materialism, for biology is being driven to accept ideal causes, and would be glad to adopt some theory of 'vitalism,' if it could do so without falling back into the old error of a supernatural 'vital force.'

Biological facts, it is plain, cannot be reduced to the purely quantitative categories of mathematics and physics. Then psychology aspired to be a philosophy of real existence, and attacked both association and materialism. The positivists of psychology established subjectivism and limited propositions, till missionary theology took heart of grace and defended crude supernaturalism, with the whole apparatus of materialist magic, as the " Gospel for human needs." All protection against the greatest superstition was thus swept away. With no fixed standard of reference to distinguish fact from fiction, it was possible to argue that " whatever exists exists in time."

Life in our age has many old habits of thought renovated. When we enjoyed peace and prosperity, the crowding of the public mind its chief outlet in various systems of false-feeding and in the time-honoured pretensions of priestcraft. But the devastation which the war has brought into countless living families has turned the current of aspiration strongly towards sacraments. The "will to believe," no longer inhibited and suppressed as a source for doubt, has been allowed to create its own logic. A few highly educated men, who have long been playing with scepticism and justifying their latitude and curiosity by exploiting the dark places of perverted mysticism, have been swept off their feet by it, and their authority, as " men of science," has dispelled the hesitation of many more to accept what they deeply wished to believe. The longing of the human soul has created for itself a spacious and dreamy satisfaction.

One cause of this strange movement cannot be overlooked too strongly. It proves that the Christian hope of immortality holds very deeply among us. Those who study the wilderness of our religious quietude must admit that it is so. Reference to the future life had, before the war, become rare even in the pulpit. The hope was mainly reserved for hours of loneliness, and was then handled glancingly, as if it would not bear much pressure. Working class religious and congregations listened eagerly to the wildest promises of an earthly empire the day after the morning, but cooled down at once when they were reminded

that 'if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.' Accordingly, the clerical demagogues showed more interest in the unemployed than in the unemployed. Christianity, which began as a revolutionary idealism, had ended in a benumbing sacerdotalist reaction. Such benumbing has no message of hope and comfort for those who have lost their dream. And they have, in fact, been deserted. Their revolution Christianity was received with half-contemptuous approval by trade unions, but her deeper hopes, fears, and longings have now been stirred, which concern all men and women alike, and on the answers to which the whole value of existence is now seen to depend. Christianity can answer them, but not the Churches through the mouths of their accredited representatives. Still so, instead of 'the blessed hope of everlasting life,' the believers have been drawn to this pathos and miserable solace, the last belief in ghosts and demons, which was still before Christianity was young. And what a shattering hope it is that tomorrow offers us! An existence as poor and unsatisfactory as that of *Blaise's* *Blaise*, which the shade of *Blaise's* would have been glad to exchange for nothing in the present human, and with no guarantee of permanence, even if the power of comforting or working surviving relations is supposed to persist for a few years. Such a prospect would add a new terror to death; and none would desire it for himself. It is plainly the dream of an aching heart, which cannot bear to be left alone.

But, it will be said, there is scientific evidence for survival. This claim is now made. Cases are reported, with much parade of scientific language and method, and those who reject the stories with contemptuous incredulity are accused of mere prejudice. Nevertheless, I cannot help being convinced that if communications between the dead and the living were part of the nature of things, they would have been established long ago beyond recall. For there are few things which men have wished more eagerly to know. It was doubtless just possible that among the vibrations of the fundamental ingredients of our world—those atomic, stellar forms of matter which are said to be not even 'material,'

there may be some which are irrelevant for psychological change. Even if psychic were valid, the discovery is really in favour of materialism. It would tend to substantiate those notions of spirit as the most twisted form of matter—an obnoxious condition of it—which Huxley and the Christian from Tertullian postulated. The meaning of 'God is Spirit' would not be understood till this materialist doctrine of metaphysics had been got rid of. It is a very good theory which we are asked to reconsider and perhaps accept. The moment we are asked to accept 'material evidence' for spiritual truth, the alleged spiritual truth becomes for us either spiritual or true. It is degraded into an event in the phenomenal world, and when so degraded it cannot be substantiated. Physical research is trying to prove that eternal values are temporal facts, which they can never be.

The case for materialism is no better if we leave 'objectivity' alone, and appeal to the relative metaphysics of the psychological school. Intervention with the dead is, we are told, a real psychological experience, and we need not worry ourselves with the question whether it has any 'objective truth.' But we cannot allow psychology to have the last word in determining the truth or falsehood of religious or spiritual experience. The arrogant claim of this science to take the place of philosophy must be checked.

Psychology is the science which describes mental states, as physical science describes the behaviour of matter in motion. Both are abstract sciences. Physical science treats nature as the totality of things conceived of as independent of any subject; psychology treats inner experience as independent of any object. Both are outside any idea of value, though it is needless to say that the relations of both sciences trespass habitually, and often unconsciously. Both are dualisms with one side ignored or suppressed. When psychology meddles with ontological problems—when, for instance, it denies the existence of an Absolute, or says that reality cannot be known—it is taking too much upon itself, and has fallen into the same error as the materialism of the last century. On such questions as the immortality of the soul it must remain silent.

Truth is human immortality stands or falls with the belief in absolute values. The interest of consciousness, as Professor Pringle-Pattison has said in his admirable *Collected Lectures*, lies in the ideal values of which it is the locus, not in its mere existence as a mere reflected kind of fact. Ideals are most satisfactorily defined as the interpretation of the world according to a scale of values, or, in Plato's phrase, by the life of the Ideal. The highest values in this scale are absolute, eternal, and super-individual, and lower values are assigned their place in virtue of their correspondence to or participation in these absolute values. I agree with Münsterberg that the conditional and subjective values of the proposition have no meaning unless we have acknowledged beforehand the independent values of truth. If the point of the merely individual significance of truth has been only individual importance, it cannot claim any general meaning. If, on the other hand, it demands to be taken as generally valid, the possibility of a general truth is acknowledged from the start. If this one exception is granted, the whole theory of values of relativism is overthrown. To deny any thought which is more than relative is to deprive even scepticism itself of its presuppositions on which it rests. The logical sceptic has no one to doubt with. 'Every doubt of absolute values destroys itself. As thought is contradictory itself; as doubt is doubtful itself; as belief is despair of itself.' It is not necessary or desirable to follow Münsterberg in identifying valuation with will. He takes of the will nothing, but the will cannot judge. In contemplating existence we are not will to be out of existence, and then try unconsciously to prevent it from influencing the world. But this illegitimate use of the word 'will' does not impede the force of the argument for absolute values.

Now, valuation arranges existence in a different manner from natural science. The attributes of reality, in our world of values, are Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. And we assert that we have no good reason to doubt objective reality for these. There is not anything in the world revealed to our senses. 'All claims on man's behalf,' says Professor Pringle-Pattison, 'must be based on the objectivity of the

values revealed in his experience, and indirectly realized them. Man does not make values any more than he makes reality.¹ Our conviction is that the world of values, which forms the content of idealistic thought and aspiration, is the real world; and in this world we find our own immortality.

But there could be no greater error than to leave the two worlds, or the two 'judgments,' that of existence and that of value, unassociated with each other, or treated as unrelated in our experience. A value-judgment which is not also a judgment of existence is in the air; it is the function before of a value. Existence is itself a value, and an implied in every valuation; that which has no existence has no value. And, on the other side, it is a delusion to suppose that any science can dispense with valuation. Even mathematics admits that there is a right and a wrong way of solving a problem, though by limiting itself to quantitative measurements it can assure us more than a hypothetical reality for its world. It is quite certain that we can think of no existing world without valuation.

'The ultimate identity of existence and value is the venture of both to which mysticism and speculative idealism are committed.'² It is indeed the presupposition of all philosophy and all religion; without this both these can, properly speaking, be no belief in God. But the difference between naturalism and idealism may, I think, be better stated otherwise than by emphasizing the contrast between existence and value, which it is impossible for either side to maintain. Naturalism seeks to interpret the world by investigation of nature; idealism by investigation of value. The one finds the explanation of existence in that from which it started, the other in that to which it tends. The one explains the higher by the lower; the other the lower by the higher. This is a plain issue; either the world shows a tendency or it does not. If it does, the philosophy based on the lower nature is wrong. And the attempt to explain the higher by the lower becomes mischievous or

¹ Quoted by Professor Pringle-Pattison from an article by me in the *Free Library Supplement*.

impossible when we pass from one order to another. In speaking of different 'orders,' we do not commit ourselves to any sudden breaks or leaps in evolution. The organs may be linked in the inorganic, and in the lower forms of life, spirit to soul. But whether the 'scale of perfection' is a ladder or an inclined plane, new categories are necessary as we ascend it. And unless we admit an inner teleology as a determining factor in growth, many facts even in physiology are hardly explainable.

If the basis of our faith in the world-order is the conviction that the ideas of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful are fully real and fully operative, we must try to form some clear notion of what these ideas mean, and how they are related to each other. The goal of Truth, as an absolute value, is unity, which in the outer world means harmony, in the intercourse of spirit with spirit, love; and in the inner world, peace or happiness. The goal of Goodness as an absolute value is the realization of the right-to-be in victorious moral effort. Beauty is the self-encapsulation of creative Spirit in its own works; it is the expression of Nature's own deepest character. Beauty gives neither information nor advice; but it satisfies a part of our nature which is not less Divine than that which pays homage to Truth and Goodness.

Now, these absolute values are supra-temporal. If the soul were in time, no value could arise; the time is always leading its own products into nothingness, and the present is an unattainable point, dividing an unreal past from an unreal future. The soul is not in time; time is alien to the soul. Values are eternal and indestructible. When Plotinus says that 'nothing that really is can ever perish' (creation like the flow), and when Böhme says that 'no value perishes out of the world,' they are saying the same thing. In so far as we can identify ourselves in thought and mind with the absolute values, we are sure of our immortality.

But it will be said that in the first place this promise of immortality carries with it no guarantee of survival in time, and in the second place that it offers us, at best, only an impersonal immortality. Let us take these two

allegiance is torn, though they are in reality closely connected.

We must not regard time as an eternal, infinite, continuous process. Time is the frame of and life ; outside this it has no existence. The entire cosmic process is the life-frame of the universal Soul, the Divine Logos. With this life we are vitally connected, however brief and unimportant the span and the task of an individual career may seem to us. If my particular life-spanning process cet of society, it will be because the larger life, to which I belong, no longer needs that form of expression. My death, like my birth, will have a teleological justification, to which my fifty-temporal self will consent. When a good man's work in this world is done, when he is able to say, without forgetting his many failures, 'I have finished the work that I have given me to do,' surely his last word will be, 'Lord, now lettest Thou Thy servant depart in peace'; not, 'Thank God I may fit for a while even my former home, and hear what is happening to my country and my family.' We may leave it to our misguided contemporaries to describe the adventures of the disembodied ghost—

'One more double petition, of quietude
Before our last experiment we try.'

The most respectable motive which leads men to desire some degree of active participation in the affairs of time is that which Emerson expresses in the above-quoted line, 'Give but the wages of going on, and not to die.' We may feel that we have it in us to do more for God and our fellow-men than we shall be able to accomplish in this life, even if it be prolonged to old age. Is not this a desire which we may regard as a claim? And in any case, it is admitted that there is the force of the will. Are we to hope the same will after death? Further, in our position even when we die! What is to be the fate of that huge majority who, so far as we can see, are equally unendowed of heaven and of hell? To these questions no answer is possible, because we are confronted with a blank wall of ignorance. We do not know whether there will be any future production. We

do not know whether Robert Browning's expectation of
'other souls in other lives, God willing,' will be fulfilled.

'And I shall therefore

Take care, ere I be gone

That none on my adventures leave and care.'

The question here raised is whether there is such a thing as
reincarnation. This belief, so widely held at all times by
sensitive children, and sustained by some of the higher
religions, cannot be dismissed as childish or impossible.
But if it is in fact in the home, "Will the same self live again
on earth under different conditions?" it may be that no
answer can be given, not only because we do not know, but
because the question itself is meaningless. The popular-
physical question which was born at a certain time and
which binds us together down to the present, is not, "Will
the same self live again?" but, "Will the same self live again
under different conditions?" It is just that to say what part of such an
existence would be said to continue. If it were
known in another body and at another time and
place, when all recollection of a previous state has been
for us most almost cut off. The only continuity, it seems
to me, would be that of the social self, if there is such a
thing, or of the directing intelligence and will of the higher
Power which sends human beings into the world to perform
their allotted tasks.

The second question, which, as I have said, is closely
connected with the first, is that of the self as a merely
personal immortality. But what is personality? The
belief of a world of spiritual atoms, "which perform their
part," as Lucretius says, seems to be attractive to many
minds. There are thinkers of course who even picture the
Deity as the constitutional President of a collection of souls.
This kind of pluralism is of course fundamentally incompat-
ible with the presuppositions of my paper. The idea
of the 'self' seems to me to be an arbitrary fiction of our
strange state of mind, a half-way house which belongs to
no order of real existence. The conception of an absolute
self seems to involve three assumptions, none of which is

first. The first is that there is a sharp line separating subject from object and from other subjects. The second is that the subject, thus separated from the object, remains identical through time. The third is that the individualistic entity is in some mysterious way both myself and my property. In opposition to the first, I maintain that the fact of consciousness flows freely into each other even on the psychical plane, while in the eternal world there are probably no barriers at all. In opposition to the second, it is certain that the empirical self is by no means identical throughout, and that the spiritual life, in which we may be said to abide and personally live the first time, is only 'ours' potentially. In opposition to the third, I repeat that the question whether it is 'my' and that will live in the eternal world seems to have no meaning at all. In philosophy as in religion, we had better follow the advice of the Theologian Germanus and Isidore, so far as possible, the words 'me and mine' from our vocabulary. For personhood is not something given to start with. It does not belong to the world of chance and counter-chance in which we chiefly live. We must be willing to lose our seat on this level of experience, before we can find it under the eternal. Personhood is a teleological fact: it is here in the making, elsewhere in fact and power. So in the case of our friends. The man whom we love is not the changing psychophysical organism: it is the Christ in him that we love, the perfect man who is struggling to be victorious in his life and growth. If we ask what a man is, the answer may be either, 'He is what he loves,' or 'He is what he is worth.' The two are not very different. Thus I cannot agree with Kierkegaard, who in exhibiting this type of thought with which, says the text, he has great sympathy, says that 'speculation, whether it likes it or not, ends in an impregnable immortality.' For immortality is a purely negative conception, like timelessness. What is opposed to 'timelessness' is not the reality of the present, but the mortality of the past and future. So the 'impersonality' which is here just withheld towards from the mystic (Germanus) said to belong to eternal life is really the liberation of the idea of personality. Personhood is

allowed to depend on the as it was, and only as men it comes into the way. When Kierkegaard adds, 'The incident of immortality really affirms that the individual is not ultimate,' I entirely agree with him.

The question, however, is not whether in heaven the circumstances of the soul's life is indefinitely enlarged, but whether the value remains. These values are values of consciousness; and consciousness apparently belongs to the world of will. It comes into existence when the will has some work to do. It is not consciousness with life; there is a life which is before consciousness, and there may be a life after consciousness, or what we mean by immortality. We must remind ourselves that we are using a spatial metaphor when we speak of a centre of consciousness, and a temporal one when we talk about a continuing state of consciousness; and space and time do not belong to the eternal world. The question therefore needs to be formulated before any answer can be given to it. Spiritual life, we are justified in saying, must have a richness of content; it is, potentially at least, all embracing. But this enlargement of life is exhibited not only in extension but in intensity. Eternal life is no diffusion or dilution of personality, but its consummation. It seems certain that in such a state of existence individuality must be maintained. If every life in this world represents an unique purpose in the divine mind, and if the end or meaning of soul-life, though achieved for its time, has both its source and its achievement in eternity, then the value and reality of the spiritual life, must remain as a distinct fact in the spiritual world.

We are sometimes inclined to think, with a natural regret, that the conditions of life in the eternal world are no richer unlike those of the world which we know, than we must either have our mental picture of that life in the faintest outline, or fill it in with the colours which we know on earth, but which, as we are well aware, cannot portray truly the life of blessed spirits. To some extent this is true; and whereas a bare and colourless sketch of the sketch of all facts is as far from the truth as possible, we may allow ourselves to fill in the picture as best we can, if we remember

the state which we see in delirium. There are, it seems to me, two chief risks in allowing our imagination to create images of the life of heaven. One is that the eternal world, thus drawn and painted with the forms and colours of earth, indistinguishable in our minds as a second physical world, either supposed to exist somewhere in space, or supposed to exist here, existence somewhere in time. This is the heaven of popular religion; and being a geographical or historical expectation, it is open to attacks which cannot be met. There is the mind of many persons the whole fact of human immortality seems to belong to the domain. The other danger is that, once a geographical and historical heaven is found to have no actuality, the hope of eternal life, with all that the spiritual world contains, should be relegated to the sphere of the "ideal." This seems to be the position of Hidding, and is quite clearly the view of thinkers like Rindge. They accept the doctrine of values and existence, and place the highest hopes of humanity in a world which has values only and no existence. This seems to me to be allowing mankind a stone for bread. Martineau's protest against this philosophy is surely justified:

"I could all readily talk about 'ideals.' I would be sensible that as long as they are a mere self-painting of the passing spirit, they have no more meaning than thinking no thinking, and in the machine and broken by the passing wind. You do not go much as back the threshold of religion, so long as you are detained by the phantasies of your thought; the very gate of entrance to religion, the moment of its new birth, is the discovery that your glowing ideal is the refreshing real."¹

But though our knowledge of the eternal world is weak, not that we could desire, it is much greater than many thinkers allow. We are by no means shut off from realisation and possession of the eternal values while we live here. We are not confined to local and temporal experience. We know what Truth and Beauty mean, not only for ourselves but for all souls throughout the universe, and for God Himself. Above all, we know what Love means. Not

¹ *Study of Religion*, vol. 1, 102.

Love, which is the elevation in experience of spiritual existence, has an unique value as a hierophany of the highest mystery. And Love guarantees personality, for it reveals what has been called otherwise. In all love there must be a subject and an object, and a bond between them which transcends without annulling their separateness. What this means for personal immortality has been seen by many great minds. As an example I will quote from Plotinus' picture of life in the spiritual world. This writer is certainly not inclined to overestimate the claims of separate individuality, and he is under no obligation to make his doctrine seemless in the degree of any creed.

'Hypothese yourself now somewhere in vision. For there all things are inseparable, and there is nothing dark or veiling, but everyone is manifest to everyone mentally, and all things are manifest; for light is manifest in light. For everyone has all things in himself and sees all things in another, so that all things are manifest here and all to all and each to all, and infinite the glory.'¹

This spiritual world is about us and within us while we live here. 'However, in regard to our souls that is the earth in its own being.' The world which we spiritually think of as real is an arbitrary selection from experience, corresponding roughly to the average reaction of life upon the average man. Some values, such as tactfulness, prudence, and rationality, are assumed to be 'real'; others are relegated under 'ideal.' Under the influence of natural science, special emphasis is laid on those values with which that science is engaged. But our world changes with us. In vision we rise, and believe we fall. It puts on immortality as we do. 'Such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them to be.'² Plotinus rightly says that all true knowledge takes place not upon accidents. For the transcendent the whole of life is spiritual, and, as Plotinus says, he recognizes the whole of his spiritual life as his own life being. He knows, as Plotinus declares in a profound statement, that 'all things that are Yours are also from within.'

¹ *Enneads*, v. 8, 2.

² *From John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist.*

Is it then the conclusion of the whole matter that eternal life is merely the true ending of temporal life? Is earth, when seen with purged vision, not merely the shadow of heaven, but heaven itself? If we could see past, present, and future into a future eternal, an 'Eternal Now,' would that be eternity? That I do not believe. A full understanding of the values of our life in time would indeed give us a good picture of the eternal world; but that world, said the saints of God and of blessed spirits, is a state higher and purer than can be fully expressed in the order of nature. The propensity of natural love, as they separate through endless ages is only a Platonic "image" of eternity. That all values are perfected in time; but they are something more than perfected; they are eternal. These loves are the creative forces which shape our lives from within; but all the elements, as St. Augustine says in a well-known passage, declare their indebtedness to their Creator. 'We are lower than they, for He made us.' Scholastic theologians interpreted an intermediary which they called *creatio* between time and eternity. *Altera* is perpetuity, which they rightly distinguished from true eternity. Christianity is plainly emphatically right in insisting that our true home, our patria, is 'not here.' There is in very place; it is with God, 'whose centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere.' There remains a rest for the people of God, when their warfare on earth is accomplished.

A Christian's point of view that the change of our dear mortal life about a future state is an indication that we are not meant to make it a principal subject of our thoughts. On the other hand, the more we think about this eternal value the happier we shall be. As Spenser says, 'Love directed towards the eternal and infinite fills the mind with pure joy, and is free from all sadness. Whence it is greedy to be desired, and sought after with our whole might.' But he also says, and I think wisely, that there are few subjects on which the 'free' man will ponder less often, than on death. The end of life is as right and natural as its beginning; we must not rebel against the common lot, obtain the immortality that mathematics. We are to live in the present through and for the present. The two lines of thought which

Lord's Supper) was as fond of quoting every valuable saying :

' But we die first, and then, human frailties :
We live the while, but unbecomingly.'

' Death does not wait,' as Stethley said to me : and he met his own fate on the 11th with a cheerfulness which showed that he believed it. The craving for more survival, no man or under what conditions, is natural to some persons, and those who have it not need not deem any superiority over those who desisted at the time of weighing this ' pleasant, anxious being.' Some have and have met this fearful fate, have feared death all their lives long ; while others, even when, before death upon them, ' have a desire to depart and to be with Christ, which is far better.' But the longing for survival, and the anxious search for evidence which may satisfy it, have undoubtedly the effect of leading us to truth and nobly consistent : they cause between us and death an true immortality. They cannot remove us what death takes away. They cannot lay the specter which made Charles a slave.

' Ay, but to die and go we know not where ;
To lie in cold obstruction and to rot ;
This mortal worm this motion to become
A clotted clod ; and the delighted spirit
To trundle in her dim, or to trundle
In dwelling regions of which others live ;
To be imprisoned in the narrow walls,
And think with restless sadness round about
The prison world ; or to be worse than worse
To those that live and meditate thoughts
Anguish breathing ! 'tis but breathe !
The transient and more transient partly life
That age, pain, poverty, and imprisonment
Can lay no others, in a passion
To what we live of death.'

We know now, if we did not know it three years ago, that the average man can face death, and does face it in the majority of cases, with a serenity which would be the

comprehensible if he did not know in his heart of hearts that it does not matter much. He may have no articulated faith in immortality, but, like Spenser, he has "felt and experienced that he is eternal." Perhaps he only says to himself, "Who else if England lives?" But the England that lives in his own larger self, the life that is more to you life than the beating of his heart, which a bullet may still the man. And if the extinction of noble personalities can "abolish death, and bring life and immortality to light" the almost-myriads along his track our historians and biographers, should not rejoice to able to do as much for us all? And may it not be that some kinds of heroic self-sacrifices is necessary before we can have a soul which death cannot touch? When Christ said that those who are willing to lose their souls shall save them, meant this what He meant? We must ascertain ourselves in headlong haste of the eternal values, if we desire to live for ever. And a strong faith is not curious about details. "Behold, now are we near of God: and it doth not yet appear what we shall be. But we know that when He is made manifest we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is."

THE END

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